3 ms·
For 2,3 the better approach is probably certificates of some form. Ssh supports certificates as well as plain keys (a key with optional meta-data about validity
by e12e 10y ago
For 2,3 the better approach is probably certificates of some form. Ssh supports certificates as well as plain keys (a key with optional meta-data about validity, principals (users,servers etc).
And/or you could use some form of Web of trust model (one could say that a CA system is just a very small, highly trusted wot - typically one key with ultimate trust, that signs all valid certs - as opposed to wot that typically scores a key based on signatures by other (semi-)trusted/known keys).
Unfortunately Ca/wot/certs doesn't solve the problem - but it reduces "verify all the keys" and "rotate all the keys" to verify/rotate the key (eg: the key that signs your user cert - if you have a cert, you have a xhain of trust). It does however bring with it "maintain a CA" - which really is less work than "synchronise all the various public keys" but frequently ends up being hard to decentralise.
The latter is probably solved by realising better is better and having a few people/principals with signing powers (many priest, not just one bishop) and an audit trail, roll-call/revoke - can be a lot safer than ad-hoc trust-on-first-use.
- voltagex_ 10y ago>Ssh supports certificates as well as plain keys (a key with optional meta-data about validity, principals (users,servers etc). Wouldn't validity and principals be best left to something like LDAP? I still haven't found anything that fits in the gap between "I only have one machine" and "I'm comfortable setting up Active Directory et-al". I like reading about all these systems but I've only got 5 or so machines under my direct control (although something that integrates with AWS would be nice for when I'm doing development work there)
- e12e 10y ago> Wouldn't validity and principals be best left to something like LDAP? Yes and no. Even with easier access to caching etc, ldap can still be rather fragile (no (readable) ldap; no login)[1] In general certificates need to be (proof of) principals (the entity that can prove ownership of the secret key X' corresponding to public key X" is X - where X is a uid (eg: e12e) Or a machine or service (login.example.com). But if your use case is simple, and some meta-data can be readily attached to the certificate, it's easy to add limits on where key X is valid from (source ip/host), have access to (services) and when (time of day) -- and adding an expiry. If policy is max lifetime of a week except for CA keys, then that greatly simplifies revocation lists. Generally "trust only this one CA" is simple, and allows moving capability (largely) to certificates. Centralised, on-line catalogs like LDAP make some things simpler. And there might be a balance: perhaps some basic group info is in the cert - and each service can base policy on that (email login ok 24/7 - certain other services only 8-16 -- although I can't think of a compelling need for the latter right now). [1] Of course one should check for revocations, but with an automated system to mint certificates, one can trade off with hour/day/week lifetimes. There was a recentish show hn: sharkey: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12097992 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12097992