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Ok, thank you both. Makes a lot of sense. It's not what I need, but that's fine :-) I've not really looked hard at (open)ssh and kerberos before - as far as I
by e12e 10y ago
Ok, thank you both. Makes a lot of sense. It's not what I need, but that's fine :-)
I've not really looked hard at (open)ssh and kerberos before - as far as I can tell, (open)ssh doesn't support kerberos fully - that is - it's not possible to simply use kerberos to authenticate both client and server to each other?
> When you say "simply automating the signing of ssh server certs", what differences do you mean from this? Because that's what this is -- automating the signing of ssh server certs.
I suppose the fact that you already have an x509 (and kerberos) infrastructure was one thing I didn't "expect" - ideally either one of those should be enough to identify server/services and users to each other -- I absolutely see the sense in leveraging that to automate ssh server cert generation - but it strikes me as a roundabout/complex way of solving the trust issue. Then again, composing a few simple tools might be better than trying to secure/get something like https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6187 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6187 to work...
In essence this places trust in the x509 infrastructure - I'm always a bit skeptical of schemes (most of which I must admit I've thought up myself at one time or another) that end up being "ad-hoc kerberos with public keys". They all feel straightforward on paper, but then I remember how many issues there were with getting kerberos to the place it is today, that is to say create an actually secure system...
I suppose strictly speaking, this is automating the signing of server certs - continuously. Which is a bit more than I meant - I was more precisely thinking of automating the setup of ssh server certificates, I guess. Perhaps with the possibility to push updates from time to time.
Anyway, maybe a sentence at the top of the readme along the lines of "Automating short-lived ssh server certificates on top of existing x509 infrastructure" would've made things more obvious.
Now that I have a handle on what this is, and the context - I suppose a similar infrastructure might be used for generating client certificates too. Perhaps semi-manually via a web-service that uses x509 client certificates for authentication, and perhaps ldap as a backend for authorization data.
It does appear that it's difficult to set up a fleet of ssh server so that there's no need to do a dynamic look-up to something like ldap, and still have sensible limits on who gets to log in to which server. I suppose one could use several CAs for signing user certs - one per group of servers - but that sounds a bit messy.
I suppose the other alternative is to do something with AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand[1] - but that also feels a bit messy...
For others contemplating playing with plain ssh certificates, I came across this, which is about as good a guide as I've read: https://ef.gy/hardening-ssh https://ef.gy/hardening-ssh
[1] http://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config http://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config