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Well, what about a falsely "functioning" SSD in a system with an SLA of 99.999%. Backups may not be the answer. Ok, it may be RAID1+0 but, what about data corr
by SFJulie 10y ago
Well, what about a falsely "functioning" SSD in a system with an SLA of 99.999%. Backups may not be the answer.
Ok, it may be RAID1+0 but, what about data corruptions?
If primary fails, and secondary is "ok" what will be the state of your data? You don't roll back an image when everything is green.
The point is that in critical systems according to the SLA or the critical aspect of the mission (flight recorder, medical instruments...) silent failures, silent data corruption may not be ok.
However for 99% of the business that is making money out of SSD right now in the world (advertisement, marketing) this is not really a concern. They don't aim at an absolute reliability. Most industry just aim at good enough.
Some small islands of IT aims at doing a legally accurate book-keeping. Like banking, accounting, legal electronic archiving for instance...
This topic is covered in Signal Processing in the first chapter of the cost of False Positive and False Negative.
Security and risk management norms force to enumerate and evaluate the costs and predicting the outcomes of failures in terms of costs.
Here, the paper is saying SSD works pretty much fine all the time. But for failure, there is a lot we don't know.
How do you evaluate the cost of a risk you cannot compute?
And how does another solution that maybe slower rates in risk management with a better failure model that can be better predicted?
The scarriest part in the study is the implication that their could be propagation of failures by coupling in certain environment and that some failure could be snowballing.
SSD are affected by heat/memory usage, CPU load is affected by failures, heat rises, SSD are more likely to fail ....
They are implying that failures can propagate or spread or happen like a contamination.
1 SSD failing alone is already a problem, even small chances of coupling in failures is making the potentiality for a massive failure.
Would you take that risk with a SLA of 99.999%?
- toyg 10y agoI honestly don't believe in five-nines and all that, but my experience is admittedly limited to sectors where it's more about point-in-time backup reliability (finance management) than anything else. As I said, it depends on what your definition of "critical system" is. For aviation, for instance, there are many other factors (shielding etc); no hardware is perfect for all uses. > How do you evaluate the cost of a risk you cannot compute? Easy: you come up with a worst-case scenario, make plans to address it, and the cost of implementing such plans is your cost. Say you assume you could get silent errors: you build test routines for actual data integrity and implement test systems for continuous checks. The cost of building and maintaining all that is the cost of (accepting) your risk.
- hga 10y agoTelcos, at least in times past, really tried to achieve a true 5 9s. I worked for Lucent in 2001 on an ultimately doomed product that was essential to the company's independent survival, a Media Gateway (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_gateway https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_gateway) to supply the other half of their successful Softswitch Media Gateway Controller product, and my NoVa group worked with the Cincinnati people who were responsible for the 5ESS. One of my tasks was vetting the low level design of the persistent database, and it was intense at all levels. No spinning rust, that's for sure. Point-in-time recovery is a snap compared to that domain.
- marcosdumay 10y agoGood thing you pointed at aviation. Aviation standard goal is 9 nines of reliability, and many systems get there.
- AlgorithmicTime 10y ago>Ok, it may be RAID1+0 but, what about data corruptions? ZFS.