10 ms·

Does More Security at Airports Make Us Safer or Just Move the Targets?

72 points by dankohn1 10y ago

venomsnake 10y ago
In the last few months we have: 1. Paris 2. Brussels 3. Russian plane back from Egypt 4. Plane en route to Egypt 5. Couple of attacks in Turkey - assorted 6. Turkey airport 7. Orlando 8. Pakistani attack in the kids playing area 9. I am sure I forget a lot more. Any gathering of people is valid terror target. More security won't help. Terrorism is here to stay. We must accept that we won't be safe and we can only do damage control.
- wmeredith 10y ago
  The real story is that we're all safer than ever[1], but there are huge sums of money being poured into a media structure designed to keep us afraid and tuned in. [1] http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-ever-and-heres-data-prove http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-e...
  - thatcat 10y ago
    Wonder why? Considering the conclusion the media generally comes to is: >“Perhaps the most cost-effective measure is policing and intelligence — to stop them before they reach the target,” Mr. Stewart said.
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
  - adevine 10y ago
    > but there are huge sums of money being poured into a media structure designed to keep us afraid and tuned in. Perhaps true, but I see this argument a lot by engineering folks, and I think it misses a major point of human nature. Large, violent, deadly events, in places where you completely don't expect them, are always going to be a lot scarier than the random low-lying "background" events, like car accidents. The fact that the world is so safe only magnifies how unexpected and terrifying it would be to walk around enjoying the mundane events of modern life - going to a concert, taking a trip somewhere, dancing in a club - and suddenly meet a violent death.
  - illumin8 10y ago
    “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” - Joseph Goebbels “Think of the press as a great keyboard on which the government can play.” - Joseph Goebbels “The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly - it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over” - Joseph Goebbels
- raldi 10y ago
  > We must accept that we won't be safe But we are safe, at least from terrorism. The probability that you'll be killed by a terrorist on any given day is far lower than the probability that you'll be killed by something mundane. Source: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10571077 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10571077
  - Natsu 10y ago
    One could say that we're (mostly) safe from dying, but not safe from the terror of it.
    - mindslight 10y ago
      We really need to start condemning all terrorists. We obviously strongly condemn the few that commit the violent crimes. But we've given a pass to the ones responsible for most of the terror - the ones that sit comfortably behind "news" desks and government podiums.
  - venomsnake 10y ago
    But you have sane definition of safety. Which is "relatively safe". If a definition for safety (which media, powers that be and majority of population are using) is "no one ever dying for terrorism" - then we cannot be safe.
heartsucker 10y ago
I'm not convinced the TSA is the best solution, but I still think bag checks helps. Let's say we "move the target" from on board a plane to the people clustered at the security check itself. A bomb goes off and kills 100 in the airport. That's bad. A smaller bomb goes off on the plane, decompresses the cabin of an international flight, and 600 people die. You get more bang for your buck if you take out the plane, so maybe some of this makes sense? Someone correct me if I'm wrong.
- raldi 10y ago
  If you want to kill 600 people, it's a lot easier to put ten bombs on ten buses, or six bombs on six security lines, than one bomb on one airplane.
  - adevine 10y ago
    Putting 10 bombs on 10 buses requires a lot more planning and terrorists, which greatly enhances the chance of getting caught. Especially in the US, where much of the risk is currently centered around "lone wolf"-type attacks, anything that would require a greater number of people seems like it would be a significant deterrent.
    - raldi 10y ago
      I don't follow. Overnight bus parking lots tend to have very little security. Luggage loaded onto buses gets very little screening. A single person could easily put bombs on multiple buses and then slip away. Or ten people could do it. It's probably a lot easier to find ten recruits willing to load bombs onto buses and escape than to find one recruit willing to die by bringing a bomb onto a plane.
      - jacalata 10y ago
        Even easier to find one person willing to give ten recruits a carefully wrapped package of "drugs" that they think they will deliver at the other end....
      - 10y ago
iofj 10y ago
So at Istanbul airport terrorists attacked the airport screening lanes at the entrance to the airport. Instead^H^H^H^H^H^H In addition to normal security screenings, Istanbul also makes people queue at the entrance, and has a security screening there. A terrorist apparently waited in that line, blew himself up, about 30 dead. What happens to security when a bomb goes off ? Well, apparently it is abandoned, and fails open. So you can walk straight through, unopposed. The 2 remaining terrorists (and hundreds of civilians) did just that, and while a police officer shot one of them before he could run into a crowd and that bomb went off in the middle of an open space, apparently without victims [1]. The other one, however did succeed. According to this article the solution to this is what Baghdad airport does ... which is to have vehicle screening before the vehicles get near the airport building. One can only imagine what a nightmare it would be to do this at a high traffic airport but ... How about we do the other alternative ? Obviously static defenses with long queues effectively make it easier, not harder, for terrorists to strike (talk about obvious). Let's use this opportunity to make sure people don't ever have to wait in security screening, avoiding creating a vulnerable point, and making air travel far more attractive for everybody concerned while we're at it. [1] (note: VERY graphic violence https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA )
raldi 10y ago
The primary way overly-intrusive TSA measures just move the danger around is by making flying unpleasant. If a new indignity -- like making people take their shoes off or wait in a 20% longer line -- pushes even a small percentage of travelers to drive instead of fly (and it does) the increased human risk from the added driving easily outweighs the tiny risk mitigation gained by the new airport rule.
- dmoy 10y ago
  Does it? What's the growth of flights compared to population? Edit: for at least last year, I'm seeing ~5% air travel growth compared to <1% population growth. So I don't know if your premise has taken effect yet...
  - clarkmoody 10y ago
    Considering that driving is -- by far -- the most dangerous activity that most undertake on a daily basis... <Insert appropriate discussion of how people are very bad at estimating risk, especially when those risks involve death> <Also insert something about (risk of occurring) * (consequence of occurrence)> I would say the GP's point is true to first order.
    - dmoy 10y ago
      But what if TSA actually causes people to fly more, because they're bad at estimating risk and it gives them a false sense of security?
      - Nullabillity 10y ago
        There are other variables in play as well. The TSA and its equivalents can retard growth without managing to turn it around.
  - raldi 10y ago
    > What's the growth of flights compared to population? That's irrelevant. For all we know, if we still had pre-2001 TSA rules, air travel would be growing 6% or 7%.
virgil_disgr4ce 10y ago
I mean, increasing security (or "security" if you want) moves the targets, by definition. In principal you would want to increase the security of all potential attack vectors to some acceptable threshold. Increasing vector one above another vector just makes the other vector an easier target. This is how it works for all security in any context.
paulsutter 10y ago
The problem is the /length/ of the line at security. Apparently they plan for average rate not the peak rate. Capacity for peak rate would mean a small line, and a lousy target. It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be covered by adding fees to tickets. Then you start firing TSA managers that allow the lines to get long. EDIT: Budget can be solved with ticket fees, I'm happy to pay more to get a predictable wait at security. in Japan I never, ever had to wait in line for security so it's definitely possible.
- Spooky23 10y ago
  >It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be covered by adding fees to tickets. It's actually a really hard problem. You have to balance dollars, demand and shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. You can't schedule people to come in for two hours, and reassigning staff introduces wastage as they redeploy from one place to another. That said, TSA manages it poorly, but the root issue is not enough money for the task at hand.
  - enraged_camel 10y ago
    >>You have to balance dollars, demand and shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. Don't forget events. Austin airport is usually pretty nice, with short lines. During SXSW however, it gets insanely crowded, with security checkpoints containing hundreds of people in close proximity. It's just not a good situation.
    - nradov 10y ago
      TSA can get approximate passenger counts and departure times from airlines weeks in advance. They could schedule extra shifts and overtime if they wanted to, and had the budget to pay for it. Perhaps a better solution to the budget problem would be to increase the security fee during peak travel periods at each airport, sort of like charging a congestion fee to drive on busy roads during rush hour. That would fund the overtime for security personnel, and encourage some travellers at the margins to schedule their flights at less busy times.
jackhack 10y ago
Neither. It neither changes safety nor moves targets. It is worse -- a distraction that leads away from solving the underlying problem in the same way as the Gun Control/Knife Control issue obscures and redirects passions. Machines and locations of queues are not to blame. The real problem is (multi)cultural -- hate in people's hearts and evil plus incompatibility of cultures & religions. That is the root of the problem and moving a queue to a new location on the sidewalk won't solve it. We are distracted and quibbling about irrelevant details. I refuse to accept the premise. Cutting to the root of the issue as best I can, civilizations must determine whether to abandon multiculturalism and insist on a homogeneous culture or continue down the current path.
- callalex 10y ago
  I'm not sure I quite understand what you're saying. Are you arguing that increased isolation between cultures will create less conflict and hate between them?
  - tamana 10y ago
    "homogenous culture" is a modern racist dog whistle. It can only be achieved via the genocide+isolationism. The original Afghan-West battle wasn't about multiculturalist conflict, it was about imperialism.
- yason 10y ago
  You're absolutely right but unfortunately that's only one side of the equation. We do need practical measures as well while waiting to reach that very stage where that hate has dissipated and cultures and religions have made peace with each other.
- petemc_ 10y ago
  Sorry but that's bunkum. There are many examples in history of cultures embracing diversity and prospering.
iredwards 10y ago
Because global warming is a threat orders of magnitude greater than aviation-based terrorism, to the extent that the TSA discourages flying it makes us all safer.
- TheCoelacanth 10y ago
  What if it causes people to drive instead? Wouldn't that make climate change worse?
  - rosser 10y ago
    Per traveler-mile, commercial aviation is radically worse than automobiles, even if they're all only carrying the driver. Net, it would be a reduction in emissions for everyone to drive instead.
    - vonmoltke 10y ago
      Where are you getting that from? Airbus claims the A380 gets 3L/100km per passenger when fully loaded[1], which is better than all but the must fuel-efficient passenger cars. Even the Concorde got ~17L/100km, putting it in line with large pickups. [1] http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus.com/en/myairbus/airbusview/the_a380_the_future_of_flying.html http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus....
      - rosser 10y ago
        You're basing your calculation on one of the densest possible configurations of the aircraft — one denser than almost every production deployment. Only one actual seat configuration exceeds your Airbus press release's density, offered by Emirates, and is nearly all economy class. Everyone else's offerings are from ~5-40% less dense, yielding comparable decreases in efficiency. [1] So, sure, the largest, most efficient jumbo we currently make has an absolute passenger-mile emissions rate lower than many cars — when it's carrying as many people as possible. You're also ignoring the fact that emissions at altitude have an increased impact. "For perspective, per passenger a typical economy-class New York to Los Angeles round trip produces about 715 kg (1574 lb) of CO₂ (but is equivalent to 1,917 kg (4,230 lb) of CO₂ when the high altitude "climatic forcing" effect is taken into account)." [2] Even the most fuel-efficient car isn't dumping tons of NOx at cruising altitude, inducing excess ozone formation. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_A380 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviati...
pyabo 10y ago
If you put an alarm in your house it means that thieves will choose another, not that thieves will find a job.
- techthroway443 10y ago
  What happens when all houses have alarms?
  - pyabo 10y ago
    It just increase the effort the thieves need to invest. If all houses have alarms, it may be not worthy to rob houses which reward isn't good enough, so they would look for houses with more rewards. Of course, some thieves won't be able to learn this new technology. If all airports had good security it would be more difficult to have attacks but it isn't the case now.
saluki 10y ago
As far as pushing the queue further out I think one solution could be a plinko style entry at the beginning of the security system. Build it so that passengers get separated and spread out. Make it out of a blast resistant material. You could make it more complex where they are identified by cameras and biometrics and have the system channel them a secure location/blast proof holding area if they are flagged as high risk. I think having passengers in a large mass at the beginning of security at the airport or at a stadium is a huge target and risk since what happens when a screener finds a passenger with a suicide vest. I think there should be some type of screening container that is blast resistant checking someone face to face for weapons isn't effective. No one gets paid enough for that job. Roll Matrix Security Check Point Scene https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc
dogma1138 10y ago
I have a bone to pick with this article. First of all the security at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport did partially stop the attackers. At least one of them was shot by security before detonating his suicide vest. When you have 3 suicide bombers that attack a fixed target like an Airport for the most part you can only minimize casualties and while it's hard to admit it 41 deaths is low compared to what can happen in these kinds of situations (Israel in the early 2000's shows you just how many casualties a single suicide bomber can incur). The whole idea of layered security (often modeled after the Ben Gurion Airport) is to reduce lines you have finer and finer security checkpoints at each layer this increases the attackers being caught while reduces the population density at the external checkpoints. Ben Gurion goes further than that and it has incorporated security to how it was built, there is a hairpinned roads ~5min drive from the external security checkpoint to the terminal building (preventing anyone from just rushing pass the checkpoint). The check in counters and the initial security screening is done over a very wide area in order to not to create choke points. Passengers are pre-screened before they enter the security checkpoint which really doesn't care about liquids, shoes, or nail scissors. From the passport control to the main lounge you have quite a long walk through a corridor which has no shops or any thing to gather around just some photographs this again is an anti-rushing measure if some one passes security and decides to rush the gates they are pretty much funneled through a tunnel. The main terminal lounge is fairly small compared to other airports (even of the size of TLV or smaller) it's round with a large fountain in the middle and with fairly low density seating. The gates are clustered over several branches and are separated from the main terminal lounge again by another fairly long defacto tunnel without any shops which again gives security the ability to close off any of them and prevents basically a leap frog rush. There will always be choke points and clusters in an airport or any other public area, the airline counters, the check in desks, the information counter, restaurants, restrooms, the duty free liquor/tobacco store etc and of course the boarding gates. And of course even the most lax security check that is intended to do nothing but to ensure you don't have an RPG in your bags would create them as well. Good security is built around performing as much checks as possible before the people are centralized in one place and cluster, good security is about building the airports in such a manner that would enable security to react promptly while reducing the effectiveness of both armed assaults and suicide attacks. So no security doesn't make you less safe sure intelligence and enforcement is still better than securing an airport but that's a given you don't need to analyze anything to come to that conclusion simply because even the most ideal attack on a target like an airport would have some casualties even if it's the assailants only. Claiming that somehow security makes you less safe is moronic, this to some extent even includes the TSA which isn't an effective security measure but it doesn't makes you less safe. The lines and clusters would still be there regardless of security or not they'll just be at different places.
teslaberry 10y ago
israel's security is by far the best for airlines and it actually spends a fractionth of the money and time and manpower that is spent BY THE TSA and european agencies per passenger minute spent waiting for intake . remember that metric ---$ spent per passenger minute spent in intake. that is the only metric that makes any difference. it turns out violating everyone in line and touching their body takes too much time and does not add to security, while irritating travellers. the key here is obviously using israeli methods, which are predominantly based on hiring HIGHLY educated young attractive women who are then TRAINED INTENSIVELY in the art of interviewing and lie detection and profiling of anxious or other emotional states of people-------AND THEN taking appropriate action to notify security officers. this requires a different culture and education level. the american system is simply to big and subject to the lowest common denominator as well as the inherent demands of using the tsa as a welfare job program in addition to a contracting profit welfare program. the result is unlike israel's exclusively government operated program where a government job is attainable only by the elite, you get a security system where government jobs are given to unqualified or given to private profiteers whose incentive is to extract more profit , not to provide more efficient security. the problem here is privatization heaped on top of government culture becoming a lowest common denominator. THE PROBLEM IS NOT TECHNOLOGY. also, counter to what many narrow minded anti-semites like to think-------israelis look like people from all over the western world, and MANY like my iraqi brother in-law look exactly semitic like arabic speaking peoples. SO....israeli security is not all about skin color and racial profiling. in fact, it's mostly NOT about that at all. like most things israeli, it's about using your brain as much as possible, and then just using some more of your brain when it hurts.
kowdermeister 10y ago
Can someone explain what's the purpose of prohibiting taking liquids onboard, but I can buy highly flammable alcohol in the duty free shops? I could set the whole plane on fire easily.
- thesimon 10y ago
  Liquid explosives are probably a bit more harmful than the <= 75% alcohol you can buy at the duty free. Not saying that the rules make sense, but that seems to be the reasoning behind them. Dealing with a bit of fire is easier than a hole in the fuselage.
- nradov 10y ago
  Diluted ethanol doesn't burn very hot and is easily extinguished by cabin fire extinguishers. Cabin materials are fire retardant.
deleted 10y ago
[deleted]

72 points by dankohn1 10y ago

In the last few months we have: 1. Paris 2. Brussels 3. Russian plane back from Egypt 4. Plane en route to Egypt 5. Couple of attacks in Turkey - assorted 6. Turkey airport 7. Orlando 8. Pakistani attack in the kids playing area 9. I am sure I forget a lot more. Any gathering of people is valid terror target. More security won't help. Terrorism is here to stay. We must accept that we won't be safe and we can only do damage control.

wmeredith 10y ago
The real story is that we're all safer than ever[1], but there are huge sums of money being poured into a media structure designed to keep us afraid and tuned in. [1] http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-ever-and-heres-data-prove http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-e...
- thatcat 10y ago
  Wonder why? Considering the conclusion the media generally comes to is: >“Perhaps the most cost-effective measure is policing and intelligence — to stop them before they reach the target,” Mr. Stewart said.
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]
- adevine 10y ago
  > but there are huge sums of money being poured into a media structure designed to keep us afraid and tuned in. Perhaps true, but I see this argument a lot by engineering folks, and I think it misses a major point of human nature. Large, violent, deadly events, in places where you completely don't expect them, are always going to be a lot scarier than the random low-lying "background" events, like car accidents. The fact that the world is so safe only magnifies how unexpected and terrifying it would be to walk around enjoying the mundane events of modern life - going to a concert, taking a trip somewhere, dancing in a club - and suddenly meet a violent death.
- illumin8 10y ago
  “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” - Joseph Goebbels “Think of the press as a great keyboard on which the government can play.” - Joseph Goebbels “The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly - it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over” - Joseph Goebbels
raldi 10y ago
> We must accept that we won't be safe But we are safe, at least from terrorism. The probability that you'll be killed by a terrorist on any given day is far lower than the probability that you'll be killed by something mundane. Source: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10571077 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10571077
- Natsu 10y ago
  One could say that we're (mostly) safe from dying, but not safe from the terror of it.
  - mindslight 10y ago
    We really need to start condemning all terrorists. We obviously strongly condemn the few that commit the violent crimes. But we've given a pass to the ones responsible for most of the terror - the ones that sit comfortably behind "news" desks and government podiums.
- venomsnake 10y ago
  But you have sane definition of safety. Which is "relatively safe". If a definition for safety (which media, powers that be and majority of population are using) is "no one ever dying for terrorism" - then we cannot be safe.

heartsucker 10y ago

I'm not convinced the TSA is the best solution, but I still think bag checks helps. Let's say we "move the target" from on board a plane to the people clustered at the security check itself. A bomb goes off and kills 100 in the airport. That's bad. A smaller bomb goes off on the plane, decompresses the cabin of an international flight, and 600 people die. You get more bang for your buck if you take out the plane, so maybe some of this makes sense? Someone correct me if I'm wrong.

raldi 10y ago
If you want to kill 600 people, it's a lot easier to put ten bombs on ten buses, or six bombs on six security lines, than one bomb on one airplane.
- adevine 10y ago
  Putting 10 bombs on 10 buses requires a lot more planning and terrorists, which greatly enhances the chance of getting caught. Especially in the US, where much of the risk is currently centered around "lone wolf"-type attacks, anything that would require a greater number of people seems like it would be a significant deterrent.
  - raldi 10y ago
    I don't follow. Overnight bus parking lots tend to have very little security. Luggage loaded onto buses gets very little screening. A single person could easily put bombs on multiple buses and then slip away. Or ten people could do it. It's probably a lot easier to find ten recruits willing to load bombs onto buses and escape than to find one recruit willing to die by bringing a bomb onto a plane.
    - jacalata 10y ago
      Even easier to find one person willing to give ten recruits a carefully wrapped package of "drugs" that they think they will deliver at the other end....
    - 10y ago

iofj 10y ago

So at Istanbul airport terrorists attacked the airport screening lanes at the entrance to the airport. Instead^H^H^H^H^H^H In addition to normal security screenings, Istanbul also makes people queue at the entrance, and has a security screening there. A terrorist apparently waited in that line, blew himself up, about 30 dead. What happens to security when a bomb goes off ? Well, apparently it is abandoned, and fails open. So you can walk straight through, unopposed. The 2 remaining terrorists (and hundreds of civilians) did just that, and while a police officer shot one of them before he could run into a crowd and that bomb went off in the middle of an open space, apparently without victims [1]. The other one, however did succeed. According to this article the solution to this is what Baghdad airport does ... which is to have vehicle screening before the vehicles get near the airport building. One can only imagine what a nightmare it would be to do this at a high traffic airport but ... How about we do the other alternative ? Obviously static defenses with long queues effectively make it easier, not harder, for terrorists to strike (talk about obvious). Let's use this opportunity to make sure people don't ever have to wait in security screening, avoiding creating a vulnerable point, and making air travel far more attractive for everybody concerned while we're at it. [1] (note: VERY graphic violence https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA )

raldi 10y ago

The primary way overly-intrusive TSA measures just move the danger around is by making flying unpleasant. If a new indignity -- like making people take their shoes off or wait in a 20% longer line -- pushes even a small percentage of travelers to drive instead of fly (and it does) the increased human risk from the added driving easily outweighs the tiny risk mitigation gained by the new airport rule.

dmoy 10y ago
Does it? What's the growth of flights compared to population? Edit: for at least last year, I'm seeing ~5% air travel growth compared to <1% population growth. So I don't know if your premise has taken effect yet...
- clarkmoody 10y ago
  Considering that driving is -- by far -- the most dangerous activity that most undertake on a daily basis... <Insert appropriate discussion of how people are very bad at estimating risk, especially when those risks involve death> <Also insert something about (risk of occurring) * (consequence of occurrence)> I would say the GP's point is true to first order.
  - dmoy 10y ago
    But what if TSA actually causes people to fly more, because they're bad at estimating risk and it gives them a false sense of security?
    - Nullabillity 10y ago
      There are other variables in play as well. The TSA and its equivalents can retard growth without managing to turn it around.
- raldi 10y ago
  > What's the growth of flights compared to population? That's irrelevant. For all we know, if we still had pre-2001 TSA rules, air travel would be growing 6% or 7%.

virgil_disgr4ce 10y ago

I mean, increasing security (or "security" if you want) moves the targets, by definition. In principal you would want to increase the security of all potential attack vectors to some acceptable threshold. Increasing vector one above another vector just makes the other vector an easier target. This is how it works for all security in any context.

paulsutter 10y ago

The problem is the /length/ of the line at security. Apparently they plan for average rate not the peak rate. Capacity for peak rate would mean a small line, and a lousy target. It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be covered by adding fees to tickets. Then you start firing TSA managers that allow the lines to get long. EDIT: Budget can be solved with ticket fees, I'm happy to pay more to get a predictable wait at security. in Japan I never, ever had to wait in line for security so it's definitely possible.

Spooky23 10y ago
>It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be covered by adding fees to tickets. It's actually a really hard problem. You have to balance dollars, demand and shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. You can't schedule people to come in for two hours, and reassigning staff introduces wastage as they redeploy from one place to another. That said, TSA manages it poorly, but the root issue is not enough money for the task at hand.
- enraged_camel 10y ago
  >>You have to balance dollars, demand and shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. Don't forget events. Austin airport is usually pretty nice, with short lines. During SXSW however, it gets insanely crowded, with security checkpoints containing hundreds of people in close proximity. It's just not a good situation.
  - nradov 10y ago
    TSA can get approximate passenger counts and departure times from airlines weeks in advance. They could schedule extra shifts and overtime if they wanted to, and had the budget to pay for it. Perhaps a better solution to the budget problem would be to increase the security fee during peak travel periods at each airport, sort of like charging a congestion fee to drive on busy roads during rush hour. That would fund the overtime for security personnel, and encourage some travellers at the margins to schedule their flights at less busy times.

jackhack 10y ago

Neither. It neither changes safety nor moves targets. It is worse -- a distraction that leads away from solving the underlying problem in the same way as the Gun Control/Knife Control issue obscures and redirects passions. Machines and locations of queues are not to blame. The real problem is (multi)cultural -- hate in people's hearts and evil plus incompatibility of cultures & religions. That is the root of the problem and moving a queue to a new location on the sidewalk won't solve it. We are distracted and quibbling about irrelevant details. I refuse to accept the premise. Cutting to the root of the issue as best I can, civilizations must determine whether to abandon multiculturalism and insist on a homogeneous culture or continue down the current path.

callalex 10y ago
I'm not sure I quite understand what you're saying. Are you arguing that increased isolation between cultures will create less conflict and hate between them?
- tamana 10y ago
  "homogenous culture" is a modern racist dog whistle. It can only be achieved via the genocide+isolationism. The original Afghan-West battle wasn't about multiculturalist conflict, it was about imperialism.
yason 10y ago
You're absolutely right but unfortunately that's only one side of the equation. We do need practical measures as well while waiting to reach that very stage where that hate has dissipated and cultures and religions have made peace with each other.
petemc_ 10y ago
Sorry but that's bunkum. There are many examples in history of cultures embracing diversity and prospering.

iredwards 10y ago

Because global warming is a threat orders of magnitude greater than aviation-based terrorism, to the extent that the TSA discourages flying it makes us all safer.

TheCoelacanth 10y ago
What if it causes people to drive instead? Wouldn't that make climate change worse?
- rosser 10y ago
  Per traveler-mile, commercial aviation is radically worse than automobiles, even if they're all only carrying the driver. Net, it would be a reduction in emissions for everyone to drive instead.
  - vonmoltke 10y ago
    Where are you getting that from? Airbus claims the A380 gets 3L/100km per passenger when fully loaded[1], which is better than all but the must fuel-efficient passenger cars. Even the Concorde got ~17L/100km, putting it in line with large pickups. [1] http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus.com/en/myairbus/airbusview/the_a380_the_future_of_flying.html http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus....
    - rosser 10y ago
      You're basing your calculation on one of the densest possible configurations of the aircraft — one denser than almost every production deployment. Only one actual seat configuration exceeds your Airbus press release's density, offered by Emirates, and is nearly all economy class. Everyone else's offerings are from ~5-40% less dense, yielding comparable decreases in efficiency. [1] So, sure, the largest, most efficient jumbo we currently make has an absolute passenger-mile emissions rate lower than many cars — when it's carrying as many people as possible. You're also ignoring the fact that emissions at altitude have an increased impact. "For perspective, per passenger a typical economy-class New York to Los Angeles round trip produces about 715 kg (1574 lb) of CO₂ (but is equivalent to 1,917 kg (4,230 lb) of CO₂ when the high altitude "climatic forcing" effect is taken into account)." [2] Even the most fuel-efficient car isn't dumping tons of NOx at cruising altitude, inducing excess ozone formation. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_A380 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviati...

pyabo 10y ago

If you put an alarm in your house it means that thieves will choose another, not that thieves will find a job.

techthroway443 10y ago
What happens when all houses have alarms?
- pyabo 10y ago
  It just increase the effort the thieves need to invest. If all houses have alarms, it may be not worthy to rob houses which reward isn't good enough, so they would look for houses with more rewards. Of course, some thieves won't be able to learn this new technology. If all airports had good security it would be more difficult to have attacks but it isn't the case now.

saluki 10y ago

As far as pushing the queue further out I think one solution could be a plinko style entry at the beginning of the security system. Build it so that passengers get separated and spread out. Make it out of a blast resistant material. You could make it more complex where they are identified by cameras and biometrics and have the system channel them a secure location/blast proof holding area if they are flagged as high risk. I think having passengers in a large mass at the beginning of security at the airport or at a stadium is a huge target and risk since what happens when a screener finds a passenger with a suicide vest. I think there should be some type of screening container that is blast resistant checking someone face to face for weapons isn't effective. No one gets paid enough for that job. Roll Matrix Security Check Point Scene https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc

dogma1138 10y ago

I have a bone to pick with this article. First of all the security at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport did partially stop the attackers. At least one of them was shot by security before detonating his suicide vest. When you have 3 suicide bombers that attack a fixed target like an Airport for the most part you can only minimize casualties and while it's hard to admit it 41 deaths is low compared to what can happen in these kinds of situations (Israel in the early 2000's shows you just how many casualties a single suicide bomber can incur). The whole idea of layered security (often modeled after the Ben Gurion Airport) is to reduce lines you have finer and finer security checkpoints at each layer this increases the attackers being caught while reduces the population density at the external checkpoints. Ben Gurion goes further than that and it has incorporated security to how it was built, there is a hairpinned roads ~5min drive from the external security checkpoint to the terminal building (preventing anyone from just rushing pass the checkpoint). The check in counters and the initial security screening is done over a very wide area in order to not to create choke points. Passengers are pre-screened before they enter the security checkpoint which really doesn't care about liquids, shoes, or nail scissors. From the passport control to the main lounge you have quite a long walk through a corridor which has no shops or any thing to gather around just some photographs this again is an anti-rushing measure if some one passes security and decides to rush the gates they are pretty much funneled through a tunnel. The main terminal lounge is fairly small compared to other airports (even of the size of TLV or smaller) it's round with a large fountain in the middle and with fairly low density seating. The gates are clustered over several branches and are separated from the main terminal lounge again by another fairly long defacto tunnel without any shops which again gives security the ability to close off any of them and prevents basically a leap frog rush. There will always be choke points and clusters in an airport or any other public area, the airline counters, the check in desks, the information counter, restaurants, restrooms, the duty free liquor/tobacco store etc and of course the boarding gates. And of course even the most lax security check that is intended to do nothing but to ensure you don't have an RPG in your bags would create them as well. Good security is built around performing as much checks as possible before the people are centralized in one place and cluster, good security is about building the airports in such a manner that would enable security to react promptly while reducing the effectiveness of both armed assaults and suicide attacks. So no security doesn't make you less safe sure intelligence and enforcement is still better than securing an airport but that's a given you don't need to analyze anything to come to that conclusion simply because even the most ideal attack on a target like an airport would have some casualties even if it's the assailants only. Claiming that somehow security makes you less safe is moronic, this to some extent even includes the TSA which isn't an effective security measure but it doesn't makes you less safe. The lines and clusters would still be there regardless of security or not they'll just be at different places.

teslaberry 10y ago

israel's security is by far the best for airlines and it actually spends a fractionth of the money and time and manpower that is spent BY THE TSA and european agencies per passenger minute spent waiting for intake . remember that metric ---$ spent per passenger minute spent in intake. that is the only metric that makes any difference. it turns out violating everyone in line and touching their body takes too much time and does not add to security, while irritating travellers. the key here is obviously using israeli methods, which are predominantly based on hiring HIGHLY educated young attractive women who are then TRAINED INTENSIVELY in the art of interviewing and lie detection and profiling of anxious or other emotional states of people-------AND THEN taking appropriate action to notify security officers. this requires a different culture and education level. the american system is simply to big and subject to the lowest common denominator as well as the inherent demands of using the tsa as a welfare job program in addition to a contracting profit welfare program. the result is unlike israel's exclusively government operated program where a government job is attainable only by the elite, you get a security system where government jobs are given to unqualified or given to private profiteers whose incentive is to extract more profit , not to provide more efficient security. the problem here is privatization heaped on top of government culture becoming a lowest common denominator. THE PROBLEM IS NOT TECHNOLOGY. also, counter to what many narrow minded anti-semites like to think-------israelis look like people from all over the western world, and MANY like my iraqi brother in-law look exactly semitic like arabic speaking peoples. SO....israeli security is not all about skin color and racial profiling. in fact, it's mostly NOT about that at all. like most things israeli, it's about using your brain as much as possible, and then just using some more of your brain when it hurts.

kowdermeister 10y ago

Can someone explain what's the purpose of prohibiting taking liquids onboard, but I can buy highly flammable alcohol in the duty free shops? I could set the whole plane on fire easily.

thesimon 10y ago
Liquid explosives are probably a bit more harmful than the <= 75% alcohol you can buy at the duty free. Not saying that the rules make sense, but that seems to be the reasoning behind them. Dealing with a bit of fire is easier than a hole in the fuselage.
nradov 10y ago
Diluted ethanol doesn't burn very hot and is easily extinguished by cabin fire extinguishers. Cabin materials are fire retardant.

deleted 10y ago

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