4 ms·
Full disk encryption (FDE) is a UX issue, not a technical one. You don't need a secure cryptographic processor, but the UX sucks without one. A simple, working
by koolba 10y ago
Full disk encryption (FDE) is a UX issue, not a technical one. You don't need a secure cryptographic processor, but the UX sucks without one.
A simple, working, FDE setup would be something like LUKS running at boot:
1. Turn on phone
2. Phone loads up initial bootstrap OS
3. Phone prompts user for master key
4. Master key is used to unlock volume
5. Regular OS boot continues
If the master key has enough entropy, brute forcing it becomes impossible. The phone won't "disable" as there's no self-destructing component (i.e. "secure crypto chip") but that doesn't mean it can be cracked. Boil as many oceans as you'd like, you're not going to brute force 256 bits of entropy.
The UX problem is that the master key is a PITA to enter if it's long enough to be cryptographically secure. That's what a crypto chip is supposed to solve. A limited number of attempts with a shorter passphrase.
- williamscales 10y agoWait, Android doesn't use LUKS? Argh. Just give me a stinkin' smartphone that runs Linux. These are solved problems, people.
- halviti 10y agoJolla / Sailfish ?
- josteink 10y agoLast I checked, it does. I'm pretty sure for instance the Nexus 5X relies on standard LUKS for FDE. What may be protected through other means is the key used to encrypt that filesystem. The user enters a pin or a pattern to unlock said key on boot, and that key is used to initiate LUKS. Maybe that's what they have cracked here?
- Sarkie 10y agoIsn't Android running a really old Linux because they can't rebase? So they have to cherry pick... or has that stopped now?
- kllrnohj 10y agoNo, but they tend to stick to the LTS releases and the kernel tends to not get a version update for the life of the device. So it doesn't track the latest, but it's also not "really old" in that upstream Linux still considers it a supported version.
- josteink 10y agoNo it's actually very old. This is from my Nexus 5X, running Android N preview build: $ uname -a Linux localhost 3.10.73-gef93fe9 #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri May 20 20:48:13 UTC 2016 aarch64 Android There was a technical reason for pinning it at this version (also known the "Android kernel"), but I don't remember what that specific reason was.
- Dylan16807 10y agoOn the other hand, phones do not need to be rebooted often. And if I'm upgrading my OS the stupid thing is going to make me wait 20 minutes while it precompiles every app, so screw it I don't care if I have to spend 40 seconds inputting a password.
- herge 10y agoRight, but it may reboot at the most inopportune moments, like after the battery runs out, and where you may not have access to the 20 character long master password which is impossible to remember.
- koolba 10y agoHow about a QR code on a business card kept in your wallet? Scan the QR code (with you phone's camera) to input the long passphrase (or even better just random bits). There could still be a short pin/passphrase in addition to that. Keepass allows for something similar by having a local file + passphrase to unlock a password vault. Backups of the QR code could be as easy as photocopying it!
- Dylan16807 10y agoIf you're putting it in your wallet, just use plaintext.
- koolba 10y ago> If you're putting it in your wallet, just use plaintext. That has the same issue of not being able to input it into the phone. The QR code can be easily scanned. Sure OCR of plain text is possible but some more standardized like a QR Code would be better.
- Dylan16807 10y agoI'd rather just type than fuss with getting a QR code to scan in possibly-bad lighting. I just tested a password of 30 random lowercase letters, which is total overkill for security, and it took less than 30 seconds to type into my phone. Doing that perhaps once a month, or once you find a charger after your battery dies, is no problem.
- dlitz 10y agoYou also want the passphrase to be easily changed, separately from the master key (because changing the master key is slow and resource-intensive). Even if you have a strong passphrase, there's some probability of leaking some number of bits of it via side-channels every time it's entered (e.g. surveillance cameras, fingerprints on the screen, shoulder surfing, vulnerable code, TEMPEST, etc). Plus, people often keep a backup copy of their passphrases (unique, strong passphrases are hard to remember), so there's also a cumulative risk of the backup leaking over time, as well. Long-term confidentiality is just surprisingly hard in the real world.
- hiermtt 10y agoAnd with a crypto chip it's much easier to share the device. Think of family or classroom/work devices.
- ComodoHacker 10y ago>Full disk encryption (FDE) is a UX issue, not a technical one. Most of the secutity is pretty much a UX issue. Otherwise century-old one-time pad would fit all.
- DenisM 10y agoQR code maybe? I think that might work...
- cbsmith 10y agoThe other UX problem is you need to make sure that someone doesn't replace the initial bootstrap OS with something else that captures the master key. So, that's where you need the secure cryptographic processor and the trusted environment, etc.