5 ms·

I have a way to make it better. I think combining old-fashioned checks and balances, with technology controls can make online voting about as secure as it is t

by swalsh 10y ago

I have a way to make it better. I think combining old-fashioned checks and balances, with technology controls can make online voting about as secure as it is today (maybe more) and anonymous. To make it anonymous, its really just a password. When a user registers to vote, they create an online account. On the days that a user votes, they log into their account and create a ballot. They then create a password for the ballot. This password hashed with a salt, and than hashed with their registration id becomes the unique id of the ballot. This way, at any time a user can login and view their vote... but that vote is not reversible to the voter. Now for the checks and balances. 3rd party non-governmental parties should have a real-time replication of all data. (it's like an exit poll, but more reliable). Any time a registered voter creates a ballot, 2 things happen. An email is sent to the record holder, and a mail is sent to the address on record. Combine this with a public viewable record of all votes + registered voters who voted online (this information is already public) we should have a good idea at what business is going on. Perhaps we can't prevent hackers, but this should be sufficient to know if a hack occurred. Of course, all software should be open source, so we can continue to make it more secure. I think it's more secure than what is available today because today, I can't look at what is on public record as my vote. If someone changed it after I cast it... I'd never know. If I knew someone would use it, i'd write the software.

thecrow1213 10y ago
Interesting. I'm no subject expert so I can't critique this, but it sounds better than other online voting systems I've heard. I like the checks and balances in place too. Now I only skimmed this article, but I feel like most people who argue against online voting use arguments about how insecure it is that already apply to what's happening right now (voting software is a black box, can be hacked, etc etc, this also describes current voting machines). The only difference is there isn't a single voting db or site somewhere for people to manipulate a large number of votes (which like you said is protected as long as people can verify the open software / data). Yes paper does have indelible properties but paper doesn't scale well, and having a paper counting machine introduces the same black box that people use as argument against current voting machines. Yes security is an issue, but scalability is also an issue.
- blibble 10y ago
  not scaling well is a security feature! it's a lot harder to steal and alter 5000 ballot papers than 5, which is not the case with electronic systems.
  - thecrow1213 10y ago
    True, but not scaling well has its drawbacks in voter participation and data management, no? Like the post above me said, isn't the risk of peoples votes getting switched OK as long as people can verify their vote value?
tn13 10y ago
Only to be discovered later that NSA is spying on your votes too.
Ao7bei3s 10y ago
Electronic voting is an entire field of research. As with cryptography, do not come up with your own methods. Here are some problems with your method: allows coercion (is not receipt-free), violates vote secrecy (attacker can just force voter to reveal password), allows ballot stuffing, allows partial results (no voting under equal circumstances), probably completely relies on server for "security" of passwords, salted hashing orly?, hash tied to voter by timing info, ... There are voting schemes (the more sophisticated ones are cryptographic, but interestingly there are non-cryptographic voting schemes like Punchscan that have interesting properties) that address these. But it gets fairly complicated fairly quickly, and at some point normal voters won't be able to make sense of them. The cryptographic voting schemes also tend to get computationally unwieldy, e.g. by requiring huge mixnets.
- RangerScience 10y ago
  Is there any solution where I can verify my vote, but someone can't coerce me into showing them?
  - dibujante 10y ago
    Probably not. You could make it anonymous - the unique combination of your vote, your key, and the election blockchain could produce a password unique to you. This would allow you to verify that your vote was counted, but would not allow anyone else to do so - if they coerced you, you could run your key, the blockchain, and the opposite vote and produce a different password and your attacker would be none the wiser. But then if you find that your password has changed, how do you prove it? I don't think there's any way to prove election fraud without violating election confidentiality, even for paper ballots. How do you propose stopping election fraud with paper ballots? The current defense is merely "it is hard."
    - Natanael_L 10y ago
      Decoy votes. https://roamingaroundatrandom.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/an-mpc-based-privacy-preserving-flexible-cryptographic-voting-scheme/ https://roamingaroundatrandom.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/an-mp...
mclemme 10y ago
I can't see how that in any way can be anywhere near secure enough. Online voting for anything important, is a bad idea. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI
- alexd415 10y ago
  They are describing a system that can't be hacked by a single individual because there would be a third party with a record of every vote. The video you cited uses a poorly planned and executed example of an online vote. The US voting systems are also a poorly planned and executed set of systems.
- bauc 10y ago
  Electronic voting of any kind is dangerous, it's amazing how much trust is used in any voting but how little can be afford when it's electronic (online or in person machine based).
alexd415 10y ago
Are you saying you would be able to look and see what you voted for or just a hash of your vote? One important part of a secret ballot is that you can't sell your vote OR prove who or what exactly you voted for. (This is prevented by vote-by-mail ballots which could theoretically be sold, but it's worth considering for future systems.)
ElijahLynn 10y ago
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution Stops Secrecy in Vote Tabulation: OVC has a team of scientists ready to program computer software for voting machines and electoral tabulation that would be publicly owned or open source. Open source software could be checked by any party or group by hiring a capable computer programmer. Provides Paper Trail: The OVC recommended procedure for tabulating elections relies on a paper ballot that is then fed through a scanner into a locked ballot box so that all originals are saved in case of the need for a recount or audit (See Sample Ballot). Scientifically Verifiable: In addition to open source voting machine and tabulation software, the Open Voting Consortium is also working on a database checklist for standard practices in vote tabulation that would assure transparency and accountability. Some aspects of the OVC concept will soon be enfolded into California legislation. Saves Money: Typical voting machines cost between $2,000 and $3,000, but OVC open source software could be run on any personal computer (PC) and ballots could be printed on a normal printer. OVC envisions PCs with tamper-proof cases as the new voting terminals at a savings of hundreds or thousands of dollars per terminal.(See page on OVC Cost Analysis). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY OVC at LinuxWorld 2008
- tmat 10y ago
  Recounts and Audits are only as good as those running the recount and audit.. See Chicago, Arizona, NYC, etc, etc, etc, etc, etc....
realityking 10y ago
There's an important property of democratic voting that you're missing: Not only Computer Science PhDs with cryptography experience should be sure their votes aren't manipulated, everyone needs to be. That's much easier with physical systems.

by swalsh 10y ago

thecrow1213 10y ago

Interesting. I'm no subject expert so I can't critique this, but it sounds better than other online voting systems I've heard. I like the checks and balances in place too. Now I only skimmed this article, but I feel like most people who argue against online voting use arguments about how insecure it is that already apply to what's happening right now (voting software is a black box, can be hacked, etc etc, this also describes current voting machines). The only difference is there isn't a single voting db or site somewhere for people to manipulate a large number of votes (which like you said is protected as long as people can verify the open software / data). Yes paper does have indelible properties but paper doesn't scale well, and having a paper counting machine introduces the same black box that people use as argument against current voting machines. Yes security is an issue, but scalability is also an issue.

blibble 10y ago
not scaling well is a security feature! it's a lot harder to steal and alter 5000 ballot papers than 5, which is not the case with electronic systems.
- thecrow1213 10y ago
  True, but not scaling well has its drawbacks in voter participation and data management, no? Like the post above me said, isn't the risk of peoples votes getting switched OK as long as people can verify their vote value?

tn13 10y ago

Only to be discovered later that NSA is spying on your votes too.

Ao7bei3s 10y ago

Electronic voting is an entire field of research. As with cryptography, do not come up with your own methods. Here are some problems with your method: allows coercion (is not receipt-free), violates vote secrecy (attacker can just force voter to reveal password), allows ballot stuffing, allows partial results (no voting under equal circumstances), probably completely relies on server for "security" of passwords, salted hashing orly?, hash tied to voter by timing info, ... There are voting schemes (the more sophisticated ones are cryptographic, but interestingly there are non-cryptographic voting schemes like Punchscan that have interesting properties) that address these. But it gets fairly complicated fairly quickly, and at some point normal voters won't be able to make sense of them. The cryptographic voting schemes also tend to get computationally unwieldy, e.g. by requiring huge mixnets.

RangerScience 10y ago
Is there any solution where I can verify my vote, but someone can't coerce me into showing them?
- dibujante 10y ago
  Probably not. You could make it anonymous - the unique combination of your vote, your key, and the election blockchain could produce a password unique to you. This would allow you to verify that your vote was counted, but would not allow anyone else to do so - if they coerced you, you could run your key, the blockchain, and the opposite vote and produce a different password and your attacker would be none the wiser. But then if you find that your password has changed, how do you prove it? I don't think there's any way to prove election fraud without violating election confidentiality, even for paper ballots. How do you propose stopping election fraud with paper ballots? The current defense is merely "it is hard."
  - Natanael_L 10y ago
    Decoy votes. https://roamingaroundatrandom.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/an-mpc-based-privacy-preserving-flexible-cryptographic-voting-scheme/ https://roamingaroundatrandom.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/an-mp...

mclemme 10y ago

I can't see how that in any way can be anywhere near secure enough. Online voting for anything important, is a bad idea. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI

alexd415 10y ago
They are describing a system that can't be hacked by a single individual because there would be a third party with a record of every vote. The video you cited uses a poorly planned and executed example of an online vote. The US voting systems are also a poorly planned and executed set of systems.
bauc 10y ago
Electronic voting of any kind is dangerous, it's amazing how much trust is used in any voting but how little can be afford when it's electronic (online or in person machine based).

alexd415 10y ago

Are you saying you would be able to look and see what you voted for or just a hash of your vote? One important part of a secret ballot is that you can't sell your vote OR prove who or what exactly you voted for. (This is prevented by vote-by-mail ballots which could theoretically be sold, but it's worth considering for future systems.)

ElijahLynn 10y ago

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution Stops Secrecy in Vote Tabulation: OVC has a team of scientists ready to program computer software for voting machines and electoral tabulation that would be publicly owned or open source. Open source software could be checked by any party or group by hiring a capable computer programmer. Provides Paper Trail: The OVC recommended procedure for tabulating elections relies on a paper ballot that is then fed through a scanner into a locked ballot box so that all originals are saved in case of the need for a recount or audit (See Sample Ballot). Scientifically Verifiable: In addition to open source voting machine and tabulation software, the Open Voting Consortium is also working on a database checklist for standard practices in vote tabulation that would assure transparency and accountability. Some aspects of the OVC concept will soon be enfolded into California legislation. Saves Money: Typical voting machines cost between $2,000 and $3,000, but OVC open source software could be run on any personal computer (PC) and ballots could be printed on a normal printer. OVC envisions PCs with tamper-proof cases as the new voting terminals at a savings of hundreds or thousands of dollars per terminal.(See page on OVC Cost Analysis). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY OVC at LinuxWorld 2008

tmat 10y ago
Recounts and Audits are only as good as those running the recount and audit.. See Chicago, Arizona, NYC, etc, etc, etc, etc, etc....

realityking 10y ago

There's an important property of democratic voting that you're missing: Not only Computer Science PhDs with cryptography experience should be sure their votes aren't manipulated, everyone needs to be. That's much easier with physical systems.