3 ms·
I thought one of the key difficulties in analysing (and writing) good crypto implementations was making sure that they are both efficient and that there are no
by e12e 10y ago
I thought one of the key difficulties in analysing (and writing) good crypto implementations was making sure that they are both efficient and that there are no allocations of memory or branching that is key dependent. While it may be easy to prove an implementation insecure (find an example where there are obvious timing issues), isn't it still a matter of code analysis to show an implementation is actually secure?
- bdamm 10y agoI am just saying that you don't need code analysis to find out that there's a side channel attack (e.g. through memory allocation analysis, power analysis.) In fact, I believe actual physical testing is the way to prove security of an implementation, given the subtle bugs that can appear in optimizing compilers, runtimes, downstream packagers, etc.