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Wow. tl;dr - the recent SWIFT / Bangladesh heist has been followed from outside by BAE systems of all people and they analyse some malware. It reminds me littl
by lifeisstillgood 10y ago
Wow.
tl;dr - the recent SWIFT / Bangladesh heist has been followed from outside by BAE systems of all people and they analyse some malware. It reminds me little more than what I would expect a (malicious) set of scripts developed by a good inhouse IT team to look like as they solve some MIS problem. It's that custom-built.
The main .exe replaces the eponymous two bytes in the swift system, preventing it from executing code if a check fails (presumably a swift authorisation check to access the underlying Oracle DB). This is a JNZ instruction in the target application and even I remember this one.
Then there is code dealing with SQL statements, so it can both delete malicious swift instructions from the local database and inject its own(?) and even tampers with the local printer to delete confirmation messages (where presumably hard copies of each transaction as printed). The actual printer model is it seems hard coded in the attackers toolkit.
This has several lessons, firstly if you have something valuable someone will really work hard to attack you specifically. Second there is really no excuse anymore not to move every OS over to randomised memory location access, and more. But even so I am not convinced this would help here. The specificity of the attack is incredible.
Lastly, Already modern software development seems to be about duct taping together other people's code and stopping once it "works". The cost of developing secure systems is way beyond the cost of developing "works on my machine" systems, and that cost needs to be raised at a business level as an insurance premium. Then we can make sensible trade offs. Not sure there is a 961M dollar trade off but still.
- matheist 10y agoSecond there is really no excuse anymore not to move every OS over to randomised memory location access, and more. But even so I am not convinced this would help here. It might make it harder... but in this case couldn't an attacker search the entire address space for the location of the library? ASLR protects against buffer overflows as an attack vector, but here the attacker already has access. (I'm no expert and would appreciate correction.)
- lifeisstillgood 10y agoTo be honest the attack space for 2 malicious bytes in a system of phones, routers, servers and applications consisting of what, trillions of bytes of code, is so mind bogglingly huge that even the experts arent experts. At some point we need to go back to secure kernels only a few thousand lines long and they ddole out permissions and access - making all attack vectors ridiculously harder. Can we do it? Will Facebook hand over its billions to the project? Will anyone?
- noir_lord 10y ago> Can we do it? Will Facebook hand over its billions to the project? Will anyone? At some point the cost of not doing it will exceed the cost of doing it, I'm not sure what it would actually take, shit security already costs tens of billions a year to the global economy and people just accept it.
- marcosdumay 10y ago> At some point the cost of not doing it will exceed the cost of doing it Will something like this really cost more than $900M?