10 ms·
Multiple 7-Zip Vulnerabilities Discovered
- hcs 11y agoThe discovered vulnerabilities are in the 7-Zip application's UDF and HFS+ filesystem image support.
- striking 11y agoI didn't even realize 7-Zip could open those.
- infogulch 11y ago7-Zip is the VLC of file containers.
- giancarlostoro 11y agoIt is my default whenever I'm on Windows. Everyone loves to close the "trial" window on software when there's usually a better open source alternative. The hidden gem in 7-Zip is you can set file association, it's just not enabled by default which makes it seem more complicated to newcomers than it really is.
- nwah1 11y agoPeaZip is like a friendly version of 7zip, and uses the 7zip code. 7zip is not very well maintained, whereas PeaZip has regular releases.
- poizan42 11y ago> 7zip is not very well maintained, whereas PeaZip has regular releases. 16.00 2016-05-10 15.14 2015-12-31 15.12 2015-11-19 15.11 beta 2015-11-14 15.10 beta 2015-11-01 15.09 beta 2015-10-16 15.08 beta 2015-10-01 15.07 beta 2015-09-17 ... How is that not regular?
- nwah1 11y agoPerhaps lately. Prior to this past November, the stable release advertised on their site had been stuck on the same version for years, without even any point releases. And they use SourceForge for hosting. The code quality may be excellent, but it just seemed to me that they were not too well organized, logistically, compared to other projects.
- poizan42 11y agoThe version they consider "stable" is rarely updated. That just means they have a very high standard for when it's considered stable. If you look through the changelog you'll see that the largest gaps between any releases was from 9.25 alpha (2011-09-16) to 9.30 alpha (2012-10-26).
- TeMPOraL 11y agoWhy would they need regular releases? This is not a web startup, it's an archive compression/decompression tool. It worked perfectly well 5 years ago.
- giancarlostoro 11y agoI was wondering the same. Unless it involves a security being ignored for a year or more, I don't see much of an issue with a lack of updates. I rather a developer takes their time to write their code vs. speed coding and publishing new bugs left and right.
- nwah1 11y agoI find it unlikely that there would be no memory leaks needing patching, no important compiler updates, and no API-compatible dependency updates that should've been applied to the stable release. The Linux Kernel, Firefox, and lots of projects have some sort of Long Term Service branch where simple uncontroversial improvements are added. Modern best practices for releasing open source software are important, and a project that doesn't seem aware of any of them makes me concerned about their attention to detail.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- arkitaip 11y agoNot really sure why you would need regular releases for handing zip files, though.
- valarauca1 11y agoWindows handles zip files horribly. The time to extract a 100MB zip in windows explorer is 4-6minutes (if not more). Compare this to ~30seconds in 7zip.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- dave2000 11y agoWindows ignores the partition you're unzipping to and writes to the c drive, then does a very slow, tedious move to the destination partition. It's obvious it should use the destination partition in the first place.
- skoczymroczny 11y agoToo bad it doesn't support unpacking .tar.gz files in a single step like their competition (WinZip) does.
- mamurphy 11y agoI'm a tad confused. Say I had 7-zip installed - how would I be vulnerable? Hacker Henry knows I use UDF or HFS+ filesystem, AND gets me to trust them and download their maliciously compressed file, AND I extract it with 7-zip, which is exploited by one of these vulnerabilities? If Henry can do all that, why couldn't Henry just get me to trust them and download a more robust malicious file in the first place without worry to what type of filesystem and decompression software I use?
- adamnemecek 11y agoWhat exactly do you mean by more robust malicious file? Like an executable? Because I'm relatively OK with extracting files from dubious sources, I'm not OK with running executables from dubious sources.
- kbenson 11y agoYes, there are trust levels associated with running untrusted code, and processing untrusted data. It's possible (but often hard and annoying) to access some external/untrusted resources such as the internet and items on them without running untrusted code, it is not possible to do so without processing untrusted data (at a minimum it's going to traverse your network stack and display/disk drivers).
- lqdc13 11y agoMany people put more trust in unzipping something than running untrusted code. Archives are supposed to be read only.
- excalibur 11y agoBecause Henry is Hardcore.
- laumars 11y agoThe vulnerability isn't to do with what file system you're running, it's to do with using 7-zip to view the contents of archives in those file formats. Which means if someone wanted to view ala DVD ".iso" which used the UDF specification, then they could be vulnerable if they use 7-zip. I remember it used to be common place to open .iso files with WinRar back in the 90s. I wouldn't be surprised if a sizeable number of people now use 7-zip similarly
- Animats 11y agoNow this is a case for sandboxing. A decompressor has one input file and one output directory. It should not have the power to change any state outside those files. A key point here is that not all code needs to be secure. Some code just needs to be kept in a box.
- mentat 11y agoSame with transcoders
- Splines 11y agoEven if it's in a box, you need to pull the thing you want back out of the box. A malicious file could put a payload into the destination file.
- tekklloneer 11y agoYes, by containing the payload and decompressing it. The difference is that by not sandboxing it, that malicious file could also cause its payload to be executed in the permission scope of the decompressor.
- Animats 11y agoThat's pointless. Putting the malicious file in the archive would accomplish the same result.
- doomrobo 11y agoI think OpenBSD's `pledge` syscall would be sufficient in this case. Calling pledge("stdio rpath wpath", {"path/to/input", "path/to/output"}); would blacklist any subsequent syscall that are not in the stdio or rpath or wpath lists [0] or pertain to a file that is not the input or output. [0] http://man.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man2/pledge.2 http://man.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man2/...
- nickpsecurity 11y agoWe're at the point where tools can automatically transform code for safety with OK penalties and some MAC implementations have about no penalties. Yet, still no use on the exact types of tools they're easiest to apply to. (Shakes head.)
- paulfr 11y agoI am appalled at how unseriously 7-zip seems to take security. The changelog only says "Some bugs were fixed", with no mention that there are serious security flaws. The homepage doesn't mention any vulnerability. The installer is not signed, downloads are over HTTP only, and there is no hash available neither on the homepage or on the forum announcement linked from the homepage (the latter is served over HTTPS so it would be a reasonable option); thankfully you can dig around Sourceforge downloads to find a SHA-1 automatically generated by Sourceforge. So I can personally verify the integrity of downloads, assuming Sourceforge can still be trusted, but 99% of users won't do this, and more worryingly it's a strong signal that the developers may not understand or value security very much: you have to wonder if maybe they're not themselves downloading unsigned software over HTTP all the time.
- lqdc13 11y agoThere are plenty of ways of defeating authenticode sig. They should have hashes though.
- paulfr 11y agoCan you give me pointers about authenticode flaws? After a quick search the two issues I found were with MD5 collisions (solution: the signer should never emit MD5 certificates) and certificate padding (solution: the user should set a registry key to enable verification of padding; search for "EnableCertPaddingCheck").
- lqdc13 11y agoHere's a good pres: https://recon.cx/2012/schedule/attachments/54_Signed_executables.pps https://recon.cx/2012/schedule/attachments/54_Signed_executa...
- paulfr 11y agoTheir conclusion is simply that "the major part has been fixed" in MS12-024, and that you should be careful if you write a self-extracting installer. No big deal.
- ck2 11y agoDarn 16.0 upgrade insisted on rebooting my Windows. Should not be necessary in 2016
- wfsfw4w44 11y ago> Windows
- abcd_f 11y agoExplorer integration is a finicky business. One huge tangle of dependencies, most of which concealed by COM abstractions. Even if you kill explorer.exe, something somewhere may end up holding a reference to your binary with a reboot being the only way around it.
- cloudjacker 11y agocollective yawn
- dewyatt 11y agoI always found it strange that 7-zip appears to be developed by a single individual, despite being very popular. I know the fact that this lone developer apparently resides in Russia has caused 7-zip to be outright banned in certain places.
- jszymborski 11y ago> I know the fact that this lone developer apparently resides in Russia has caused 7-zip to be outright banned in certain places. That's a particularly ignorant approach, especially considering the whole thing is open-source and auditable.
- dewyatt 11y ago> ignorant That's my tax dollars at work. :)