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A C.I.A. Grunt’s Tale of the Fog of Secret War
- chillaxtian 11y ago> "The C.I.A. initially declined to comment when it was asked earlier this week about Mr. Laux’s book. On Friday afternoon, a spokesman said in a statement that maybe “with age and greater maturity” Mr. Laux might at one point have a different perspective on his time at the agency"
- frandroid 11y agoExcellent response to aid in recruitment efforts for an agency which is sorely lacking in humint!
- wtbob 11y agoI'll give him credit for carrying out his oath and getting his book reviewed, as well as for not blabbing about the classified portions. That alone marks him as a hell of a lot more mature than the numerous folks one reads of in the papers who speak despite not being authorised to, who take it upon themselves to release classified information, or who are careless with information which may cause damage to the security of our nation. edit: s/careful/careless. Whoops!
- nxzero 11y agoGuy wrote a book to make money and had it reviewed so he could keep the money.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- davorb 11y ago> That alone marks him as a hell of a lot more mature than the numerous folks one reads of in the papers who speak despite not being authorised to, who take it upon themselves to release classified information, or who are careless with information which may cause damage to the security of our nation. You know, there is a reason people went to the press -- it's because when they followed the official route they were ignored, threatened and had the full force of the US government turned against them. I suggest you read up on people like William Binney and Thomas Drake, before you so lightly dismiss people who have lost their careers and more, fighting for your freedom. http://www.npr.org/2014/07/22/333741495/before-snowden-the-whistleblowers-who-tried-to-lift-the-veil http://www.npr.org/2014/07/22/333741495/before-snowden-the-w... > Binney says he and two other NSA colleagues who also quit tried sounding the alarm with congressional committees. But because they did not have documents to prove their charges, nobody believed them. Snowden, he says, did not repeat that mistake. > "He recognized right away, it was very clear to me, that if he wanted anybody to believe him, he'd have to take a lot of documentation with him — which is what he did," Binney says.
- wtbob 11y ago> You know, there is a reason people went to the press -- it's because when they followed the official route they were ignored, threatened and had the full force of the US government turned against them. They were not ignored; their concerns were founded in an incorrect understanding of the Constitution and the law. They didn't follow the official route, which is to file a complaint with an inspector complaint. The government did nothing to them until they broke their oaths and the law. There's a better quote in there: > "Snowden could've come to me," says George Ellard, the NSA's inspector general. "In fact, he would have been given some protections." It applies equally to Drake & Binney. Anyone has the ability to go to an inspector general and raise issues of misconduct. What folks don't have the right to do is invent their own Constitution and laws. Another good quote is: > "Perhaps it's the case that we could've shown, we could've explained to Mr. Snowden his misperceptions, his lack of understanding of what we do," Ellard said. But we're already far off the topic; this isn't the thread to discuss how Binney, Drake & Snowden shared a fatally flawed misunderstanding of what is & is not licit under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution. I'm just honestly glad that this young man actually fulfilled his oath. That really shouldn't be remarkable, but these days it is.
- meric 11y agoIt should be noted these people who swear oaths have a greater responsibility to the constitution and the nation as a whole than to the individual organisations within government.
- ipsin 11y agoYeah, if, with age and greater maturity we look back on all the CIA projects that have been declassified, it's not a flattering picture.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- 616c 11y agoAs someone who has spent a lot of time in the region, and learned Arabic to fluency, sadly with the goal of ending up like Mr. Laux in mind, I am glad I went to the Arab world as a student. Having traveled all over, and working as an expat now for many years, it became clear early on there is a whole very naive narritive justifying US foreign policy in that part of the world. The moment you go to live there, it stares in the face. I quickly gave up my hopes of serving in the US armed forces or intelligence community after one year of study in Egypt. It only took a few weeks really to do the damage. I can show you consistent examples for almost all American students, many who wanted government work on USG language scholarships, after such a short amount of time. I still knew countless others, however, who continued in the line of duty, and their racist and moronic comments about the Arab world, before, after, and during service, despite expesnive US top-20 univerisity coursework in Arabic and Arab history and culture flabbergasts me, every time. These people rose through the ranks, and balked at the education they used to get there. Notice Laux did not have that kind of education prior. I suspect that is why he burnt out and knew to withdrawal from that life quickly. If he spoke Dari or Pashto, and God forbid, read the local media, he would have burnt out even faster as the stupidity would glare even brighter. The one year ten times in a row comment gets me. As just-outside-the-inside perimeter guy, living in one Arab capital 5+ years, it never ceases to amaze me the greater political project of "taming the Arab world" goes at the civil, political, and military level, soft and hard power alike at the hands of outside nations. I assume it might be this way everywhere, but my interest in professionally engaging in even non-government East-West cultural projects ended quickly as I became jaded. I routinely think my interest in computing and open source originates from my frustration with this problem, and our hubris to not simply record things and focus on problems. We keep reinventing based on impression, not on result, with new people and a rapid turnover rate. No industry except global political terraforming would find that a useful strategy. As for the kicking the addiction and self-help jokes: wanna know where you need to help yourself? Pick any Arab country. Great read, thanks for posting.
- wtbob 11y ago> it became clear early on there is a whole very naive narritive[sic] justifying US foreign policy in that part of the world. I think that was obvious at least when Mr. Bush was talking about how freedom was the desire of every human heart, which is quite clearly naïve nonsense. Simply put, the vast majority of mankind doesn't care about freedom, wouldn't know what to do with it, and will misuse it when given it. That fundamental misunderstanding caused his government to try to install democracies, when it could have installed confessional republics instead.
- EliRivers 11y ago"The American people should know that his former colleagues continue to do extraordinary work despite his departure, and do so without the need for public recognition" said the spokesman, Ryan Trapani. Classic passive-aggressive. Ignore the real issues raised, find a way to indicate that there's something wrong with the source without outright saying so. Ryan Trapani's credibility; zero.
- nxzero 11y agoGiven he's likely making 200k+ a year from the government for restating what he's told to say says enough to me about how credible he might be as a source.
- cstross 11y agoThis gave me so many flashbacks to the various histories of the Vietnam war that I've read. One key insight from John Ranelagh's histories of the CIA (pre-9/11): the CIA was always famously crap at HUMINT. Reason: you don't get promoted for freezing your butt off on a mountaintop in Afghanistan, you get promoted for attending lots of meetings with managers in Maryland. The institutional set-up of the CIA was tilted heavily towards analysis and reporting by consensus. It was originally intended to be a Central Intelligence Agency, tasked from the late 1940s onwards with acting as a giant fusion center for intel from all the US government's external agencies and feeding it up the chain to the NSC: analysis and committees are its life-blood, and the spies were always a side-project, much as INFOSEC is a side-project to the NSA (whose primary focus is on ELINT and SIGINT). When the CIA began expanding again after 9/11, it looks like it carried its previous institutional culture forward -- and didn't really know how to use the grunts in the field effectively and retain their hard-won insights. Almost as if the OSS had never existed ...
- jacobolus 11y agoFor other readers: HUMINT = human intelligence, human observers embedded somewhere. ELINT = electronic intelligence, e.g. radar systems. COMINT = communications intelligence, spying on human communication systems. SIGINT = signals intelligence, including both ELINT and COMINT. INFOSEC = information security, defending information from outside attackers. It seems to me that post-WWII, the US diplomatic apparatus and military (also including USAID, etc.) have also been pretty crap at human intelligence, at least judging from the outcomes of the policies they end up pursuing. I’m having trouble thinking up examples where the US intervened anywhere with good timing or good sense, whereas it’s easy to list dozens of terrible failures. Edit, this — “Mr. Laux said he was struck by how little the military seemed to know about Afghanistan after so many years in the country, and that many C.I.A. officers had developed little more insight. Soldiers and spies served short tours of duty — with much of that time spent just becoming familiar with their surroundings — and then turned their jobs over to new arrivals forced to make the same mistakes as their predecessors.” — sounds pretty similar to the normal practice in anthropology and other social sciences in academia, too. Scholars have a couple years during grad school and occasional 1-year sabbaticals to do field work, but spend the rest of their careers teaching and writing papers based on their out-of-date and usually misinformed remembrances. Also similar for a large proportion of journalists, who have only been in some particular place for a limited time before they’re expected to explain its intricacies in a few hundred words at a time.
- voltagex_ 11y agohttp://www.amazon.com/Left-Boom-Officer-Penetrated-Al-Qaeda/dp/125008136X http://www.amazon.com/Left-Boom-Officer-Penetrated-Al-Qaeda/... is the book, but it's unclear if Macmillan will be allowing a Kindle edition
- nxzero 11y agoFunny thing is New York Times (as in the printed edition of the paper) was a primary source of intell for the CIA, which was pretty telling. Most of there other intell comes from paying people stupid amounts of cash, as the story mentioned, and most the intell is worthless.
- nxzero 11y agoWorth noting that there are subsets of the CIA that are not just secret compartments, but actively lie to the rest of the CIA, which is telling.
- dforrestwilson1 11y agoSo I served in the Marines from 2005-2010 and I worked in intelligence from 2010-2013. I speak Pashto and Arabic as well and would argue that people have built up the cultural and religious bugaboos to excess. We still could win, but the problem fundamentally is a lack of political will here to accept the costs of making war. Those costs being: 1. Time - rotating green units in every 9-12 months and veteran units out is a recipe for failure. They have to relearn everything and rebuild any trust you build up with local leaders. The closest we got to that was 2 year deployments of reservists, which was effective in Iraq. 2. Casualties - holing up in a FOB for fear of KIAs does not help the locals. Another example is Bergdahl. We spent countless hours and millions of dollars looking for a single MIA private. Everything else went on the backburner for months and it did cost lives, but it served as PR that we were doing something to recover one screw-up in a war involving millions. 3. Governance vs Headhunting - Drones are great at cheap effective kinetic action, but worthless in police functions. We emphasize drones along with low-quantity troop deployments, because murderbot losses do not matter and SF casualties are bucketed as volunteers. I could go further into the detriments of cannibalizing your best soldiers from line units, but that's a whole other issue. To stabilize a country like Afghanistan you need to get violence down to zero long enough for a generation to know what peace looks like. To do that you need to prove that you are there to govern, that means deploying troops/police in massive numbers and a court system that works. We spent too much time seeking out werewolves to shoot silver bullets at, playing whack-a-mole. There is an intense focus by politicians on casualty numbers. We've been doing it on the cheap, but cheap adds up if you don't win and the wars go on for decades. I don't see that changing unfortunately.
- mladenkovacevic 11y agoHere's a great overview of the how and a complete absence of the why which is more central to "success in the middle east". But I also understand why there would be no political will for US deciders to start asking themselves "why" 15 years into an ongoing conflict. It's kind of how a crackhead never asks himself "why am I doing this" mid-hit.
- dforrestwilson1 11y ago