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In a truly cryptographically secure system, there wouldn't be a master key, and a signing key would not be able to enable access to private data. Security would
by dheera 11y ago
In a truly cryptographically secure system, there wouldn't be a master key, and a signing key would not be able to enable access to private data. Security would be guaranteed by mathematics, not by the UI. The data would be encrypted in a fashion that even a modified OS would not be able to decrypt without a user-generated high-entropy passphrase or key that Apple does not have. If iPhones were truly secure, Apple would technically and mathematically be unable to help, and the FBI wouldn't have a case to begin with.
- mordocai 11y agoI'm not an expert on such things, but I believe people have been saying that the newer iPhones are more or less impossible to do this kind of thing for. The iPhone in question is old enough that it doesn't have the new security features apparently.
- pcl 11y agoYes, and more-recent iOS devices have stronger security features than the one in question here. Regardless of the outcome of this case, I expect that trend to continue as a result.
- quicklyfrozen 11y agoThey are probably looking for the code signing key, not a data encryption key.
- dheera 11y agoThe problem is, with the code signing key, they can load a new modified OS, brute force the password and get at the data because the data isn't mathematically secure to begin with. iPhone data shouldn't be encrypted on the basis of a 4-digit PIN. It should have a much longer password that's entered at startup. The 4-digit PIN can be a "screen lock" to prevent casual friends grabbing your phone and swiping pictures but shouldn't be the thing that encrypts your data. There isn't enough entropy in a 4-digit PIN, period. The iPhone then adds a feature to self-destruct after N attempts. This is where a modified OS comes in. This isn't true security. Get rid of the self-destruct feature and you have brute forcing ability and can decrypt the data in minutes. In a truly secure system, I would be able to safely just give you an image of the flash storage and all the signing keys. You pick your tools, OS, hardware, and you would still have no shot at decryption, at least not with classical computers and as long as P!=NP.
- beeboop 11y agoOn the most recent iPhone, data isn't encrypted based on a 4 digit PIN. It uses a tremendously long piece of data as the encryption key, but the encryption key is only accessible through some special hardware they have (which is essentially tamper proof and brute-force proof) with the 4 digit PIN. But as you said, since they can remotely update the software for this special piece of hardware, it is still susceptible to being compromised. A lot of the conversation happening in regards to this FBI case is only due to it being an older iPhone that doesn't have this special hardware. Which is why people are confused with the FBI chose this case as their poster child when it would have made a lot more sense with the most recent iPhone.
- hartator 11y agoWhat's the "tremendously long piece of data as the encryption key"? Are you refering to the 6 digit code?
- russgray 11y agoNo, they're referring to the 256-bit AES keys in the CPU and Secure Enclave, which are entangled with the user PIN to derive the crypto key.
- bogomipz 11y agoWould you explain how 256-bit AES keys CPU and Secure Enclave and user PIN all work together to provide encryption on the iPhone? Is this documented anywhere? Is this same method employed across different generations of iPhones? Thanks
- russgray 11y agoApple's description is here https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, and you can find varying quality of discussion in the media by searching for Secure Enclave. Basically, the Secure Enclave contains a 256-bit AES key physically fused into the silicon during the chip fabrication process. Apple don't know this key, and neither do the manufacturers. It's different on every iPhone. The key cannot be read by any software, or the OS, or even firmware. All that can be seen is the result of using it in a crypto operation. The key used for actual encryption on iOS is derived by taking an intermediate key derived from the PIN, and then entangling it with the Secure Enclave key (and, I believe, the CPU's key, which is also unique and fused into the hardware, but not quite so secretive). This effectively ties the crypto process to the phone - if you take a data dump of storage and try to brute force it on some more powerful kit, cracking the PIN isn't enough. You'll also have to crack both the AES keys. This isn't universal across all iPhones - I think the 5S onwards have it.
- rcthompson 11y agoYou've pretty much described the secure enclave already included in newer iPhone models.
- studentrob 11y agoThat's true, but a bit off topic. The question here is whether or not the law says the DoJ can compel Apple to hand over these items. We do not need to allow the DoJ to win in order to get to a point where Apple and others provide us with self-controlled data security. We can both fight the DoJ's position and demand better security from Apple. Let's focus on the DoJ for now because that is the immediate threat. This case should be discussed in Congress, not the courts, and the American people should have a say in the matter. I was heartened to see the video of Senator Lindsey Graham's questioning of US Attorney General Loretta Lynch today on this topic [1]. His delivery and conclusion was perfect. Mike Lee also did a good job [2]. Feinstein was scary to watch (51:00 in the C-Span full video). [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk4hYAwCdhU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk4hYAwCdhU [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOZLEhTlr6E https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOZLEhTlr6E [3] http://www.c-span.org/video/?406201-1/attorney-general-loretta-lynch-testimony-justice-department-operations http://www.c-span.org/video/?406201-1/attorney-general-loret...
- matwood 11y agoGood videos. Graham summed up a lot of the layman's evolving thoughts on the topic. The first days of the PR war had the FBI winning, but their hubris caused them to underestimate Apple's PR machine. As the public learned more about the case, they have definitely turned against the FBI. It also helps that Apple is on the right side of this issue, but thinking about the (children|terrorists|guns|drugs|boogyman) has unfortunately worked before in similar situations.
- briffle 11y agoPretty sure Lavabit tried to fight this exact same type of ruling, and lost: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit While i'm not a legal expert, it seems the major difference is the size and name recognition of the companies.
- pmontra 11y agoYes, and it makes a hell of difference in lobbying fire power. I'm not really a Apple fan but I hope they win on this. Lavabit eventually decided to close instead of giving access to the data of their customers. Apple won't close but I wonder if they would go as far as leaving the USA, both the country and the market. That would be more than extreme but if they lose it would be the only alternative to caving in. My very safe bet: it's not going to happen (leaving the USA).
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- jeff_tyrrill 11y agoWhat you describe is already how the iPhone works. The FBI has vaguely threatened to seek the signing key (not any master encryption key, which doesn't exist) so they can make an operating system that disables software-imposed wipe-on-10-incorrect-attempts and software-imposed-delay-ramp-up, so they can run a brute-force attack. If the phone had used a long passcode, this would be impossible. The only reason this is even a case is because this phone has a numeric passcode, which is within the reach of brute forcing with these UI barriers removed. The mathematics already impose an 80ms duration ("delay") of each attempt. The FBI knows there is no way around that. Contrary to other replies, even phones without the secure enclave are protected in this way.
- tlrobinson 11y agoThat is in fact how iPhones' encryption works, except the vast majority of users don't set a high-entropy passphrase [1] because a) it's not enabled by default (because of (b) and (c)), b) it's not great user experience, and c) most people don't understand or care. This is why Apple also implemented the brute forcing protections that the FBI is trying to bypass via a firmware update. However, I do think that it should be impossible to update the firmware (including via DFU) without either a) the passcode, or b) wiping the phone. If the owner doesn't know their passcode they'll need to wipe the phone anyway. Anyone else doesn't have any business updating the owner's firmware without their permission. [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204060 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204060 "Change your passcode. Enter a new, six-digit passcode. Or tap Passcode Options to switch to a four-digit numeric code, a custom numeric code, or a custom alphanumeric code"