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"The FBI can simply remove this chip from the circuit board (“desolder” it), connect it to a device capable of reading and writing NAND flash, and copy all of i
by timr 11y ago
"The FBI can simply remove this chip from the circuit board (“desolder” it), connect it to a device capable of reading and writing NAND flash, and copy all of its data. It can then replace the chip, and start testing passcodes. If it turns out that the auto-erase feature is on, and the Effaceable Storage gets erased, they can remove the chip, copy the original information back in, and replace it. If they plan to do this many times, they can attach a “test socket” to the circuit board that makes it easy and fast to do this kind of chip swapping."
Right. They could do this, and risk destroying the device, or they could ask Apple to do the easy, reliable thing, and just install a build on this phone that allows brute-force attacks.
Given that Apple has a long history of complying with these kinds of requests for valid search warrants, and that this situation is about as clear as it gets when it comes to justifiable uses of government investigatory powers, it's obvious why they're taking the latter approach, and not the former.
There's a legitimate privacy debate in this case, but this isn't it.
Edit: I'm just stating facts here, folks. Downvoting me won't change those facts, or make the government change its tactic.
- facetube 11y agoWhen has Apple complied with a warrant that sought to compel a digital signature?
- timr 11y agoThey're not being asked to provide "a digital signature". They're being asked to enable a brute-force attack on a single phone. Here's the full text of the request: http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-Asst-iPhone.pdf http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-As... Order #2 is the relevant order. But to answer your question, they've complied with similar warrants on at least 70 cases in the past: http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-standoff-with-doj-may-have-been-sown-in-brooklyn http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-... The only difference in this case is whether or not the FBI can compel Apple to make and install a custom build of iOS to crack the phone.
- mikeash 11y ago"Make and install a custom build" means compelling a digital signature, since the custom OS build must be signed before the device will accept it.
- timr 11y agoThat's a distinction without a difference. Presumably Apple has done signed custom installs on the ~70 other iPhones they've brute-forced under warrant, because signed firmware has existed on iOS since (IIRC) the iPhone 3G. In any case, the legal question has nothing to do with encryption. It's an incidental detail.
- mikeash 11y agoThose 70 other cases didn't involve installing a custom OS. They were running older OSes that did not do as good a job protecting the user's data, and thus could be attacked without any changes to the OS. The whole reason this thing has blown up now is because Apple finally improved their security to the point where the old attacks no longer work.
- timr 11y agoYou are wrong. Apple cracked the other phones by installing software that brute-forced the password. They didn't have someone sit there and punch in 10,000 codes like a monkey. Moreover, Apple won't comply with valid warrants for phones running iOS7, so it doesn't really have anything to do with the security of the OS. This started only because a federal judge made an issue of the legal justification for the first time ever: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/feds-since-apple-can-unlock-iphone-5s-running-ios-7-it-should/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/feds-since-apple-...
- facetube 11y agoAgain, do you have any evidence whatsoever for your claim that a piece of brute-forcing software written by Apple already exists?
- 05 11y agoThe risk is really negligible if they try practicing on other phones first and use a proper lab.