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This is really annoying. I wrote a blog post last week making this exact same point, posted it here, and it promptly got flagged to death, most likely by the s
by lisper 11y ago
This is really annoying. I wrote a blog post last week making this exact same point, posted it here, and it promptly got flagged to death, most likely by the same people who were commenting that I was "absolutely, totally wrong".
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11199093 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11199093
Nice to be vindicated though.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- c3t0 11y agoThanks for bringing it up. Last week I read your article and I found it very interesting. You did receive harsh RTFM comments (stark contrast with the tone of the comments on this thread). Glad that you can see your work corroborated.
- bduerst 11y agoIf it's any consolation, you're faster at describing this than the ACLU. Hasn't it always been known, since the beginning of this issue, that this was a penetrable 5c phone and thus a red herring for the FBI's request?
- lisper 11y agoIt has been known in the abstract, but AFAIK I was the first to publish a specific attack. (Not that I really claim that as much of an accomplishment. Sometimes it's hard to navigate the line between educating people and insulting their intelligence, particularly when it comes to security.)
- look_lookatme 11y agoOther people have brought this up but in a kind of hand-wavy way. https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-destroy-pandoras-iphone https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-destroy-pandoras-iphone
- vatotemking 11y ago> The author is absolutely, totally wrong. > I flagged the article, as the entire argument is predicated on a factually false premise. Wow those comments are harsh
- Godel_unicode 11y agoNot inaccurate, however.
- timr 11y agoTo be fair, this isn't an especially relevant argument, even if it's true. The FBI isn't going to rip open a phone, unsolder a chip and risk destroying the device, when it can do what it's done successfully, many times in the past, and ask Apple to unlock the phone for them: http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-standoff-with-doj-may-have-been-sown-in-brooklyn http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-... This thread is a real-world demonstration of the XKCD comic about pipe-wrench security: https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/ Nerds think that proving that there's some theoretical, high-tech attack against the this specific phone means that the FBI should therefore lose. But that's irrelevant. This case is about the pipe wrench.
- csydas 11y agoWell, no, I think it's still very relevant. To use the classic XKCD comic, the crux of the case is that FBI is the one arguing the first panel (i.e., some bogus magical encryption we can never break), and because of that claim, they need to be able to compel Apple to compromise the security features using the old wrench trick. The reality of there being practical alternatives for the FBI to pursue should give pause as to whether they can compel Apple to compromise the security features, and arguably the method described/discussed is indeed very practical. All in all, it's less about the FBI's ability to do any of this and instead more about "should be the allowed to force a company to do something like this?". By demonstrating the claim that it's impossible to proceed without Apple's help is not true, I would think it should give pause to any court as to how to rule, since the implication of the ruling is pretty big.
- timr 11y agoThe point is that the definition of "practical" is debatable -- any reasonable person can see that there are more risks associated with mucking around with the circuit board than having Apple install a custom software build, which carries no technical risk at all. It doesn't matter that you can come up with some theoretically plausible attack that works in this one case. If it's harder or riskier or slower or less effective than Apple complying with the warrant, then the question stands.
- agwa 11y agoNo, there's an essential difference between your post and the ACLU's: you suggested that the FBI would be able to brute-force the key off-chip, which is not true because the encryption key is derived in part from the device ID, which can't be extracted. This is not what the ACLU/DKG is suggesting - they are suggesting making a backup of the flash storage and restoring it after the auto-erase kicks in. The decryption would still happen on the iPhone itself. Granted, you updated your post to suggest what the ACLU is now suggesting, but that was after the commenters correctly criticized your post for being wrong.
- andromeduck 11y agoHe said mount on their own hardware but that doesn't preclude using the original chips as part of the setup.
- lisper 11y agoYou must not have read my original post very carefully: "they could use a copy of the chip to try five different PIN codes, and then replace the chip with a fresh copy of the original and try five more" I don't know how I could have made it any clearer that I was proposing an attack on the PIN, not the key.
- agwa 11y agoAccording to your post, the FBI would only need to do that if they were "completely incompetent." You wrote, "unless they are completely incompetent, having read out the contents of the chip they should be able to decrypt its contents in a matter of minutes if not seconds." Details matter, and it was fair to call you on your mistake. You shouldn't get all upset now that the ACLU has published a post which gets the details right.
- lisper 11y agoYou're right, I got that one detail wrong. Nonetheless, the substance of my post was correct. If every post that had a minor error like this was flagged to death the home page would be empty.
- kordless 11y agoSo you are annoyed someone who was wrong to begin with said you were wrong. :) I'm happy you were right!
- lisper 11y agoNo, the annoying part was being flagged to death, which cut off the discussion. I don't mind people telling me that I'm wrong. Sometimes they're right (but not this time).
- Gibbon1 11y agoHighlights something I'm annoyed with, the pernicious idea that truth can be determined by 'voting'
- kordless 11y agoTruths are whatever you make them, as long as that is what you really believe. "Truths" rationalized by an entity holding conflicting information may need sampling to ascertain the origin of the conflict. That's where voting comes in handy, but it's not a perfect solution by any means.
- orik 11y agodo you think they could back up the nand chip and replace it with a read only nand chip with the same memory, and then try to unlock is as much as they want?
- lisper 11y agoI don't know, but it's fairly pretty to find out. Just try it. I don't have the skills to desolder a surface mount chip but I personally know people who do. It would probably cost about $1000 to buy an iPhone and hire one of these people to do the experiment.
- tremguy 11y agoPretty sure it would throw some kind of low level error as that would disable all kinds of basic IO.
- TazeTSchnitzel 11y agoAIUI your blog post was nonetheless wrong. As the OP explains, there are multiple layers of encryption. The first is at the hardware level, performed by the SSD itself.[0] It encrypts all data on it with a key stored in rewriteable memory. By changing the key, you can "erase" the drive. The FBI could backup that key if they wanted to undo the "secure erase" feature. However, this is not the only layer of encryption. The second is done in software, performed by iOS. It encrypts all user data with a key derived from the user's passcode and a unique key burned into the chip. The FBI cannot get past this layer, and this is what they wanted Apple's help for. You were right in that the FBI could trivially get past the first layer of encryption, but it's not the one we care about. There's more than one layer. [0] Or rather, by the flash controller. At least, I assume it is. It might actually be an iOS software feature too, but the OP's description reminds me very much of how some SSDs implement secure erase. Whether it's actually done in hardware or software is immaterial, anyway.
- lisper 11y ago> The FBI cannot get past this layer Yes, it can, and I explained exactly how in the original post. It's true I got some of the technical details wrong, but the substance of the post was and is correct.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- oldmanjay 11y agoThe technical details in this case really are everything, so it would make sense to get flagged out of existence if you got them wrong. To be clear, I'm not one of the flaggers, but I can understand some potential motivation there. There is already a lot of noise on this topic.
- lisper 11y ago
- retrogradeorbit 11y agoHacker News filled with people who don't know what they're talking about but talking like they are infallibly right? Say it isn't so! Your real issue was going up against the cult of Apple fanboys that hang out here. You will find this response with anything that remotely suggests that Apple isn't perfection. You can see them still getting huffy in the responses to this comment.
- lisper 11y agoBut I wasn't even being critical of Apple, I was being critical of the FBI! I thought that would go over well here.
- retrogradeorbit 11y agoI know. But you illustrated flaws in the Apple iPhone security that in their minds they see as perfect.
- StreamBright 11y agoWell, HN is -just like any other community- biased and also suffers from echo chamber problem. Even if it is much smaller scale than any other online forum, still there is a chance for getting down voted even though your are absolutely 100% right about something and most of the down voters are wrong. You can either live with this and just ignore it or getting annoyed by it. I am not sure if this is going to be fixed or it needs to be fixed at all.
- lisper 11y agoThe problem is not so much the voting and the community, but the extreme non-linearity of the flagging mechanism. Getting flagged is mostly invisible until you cross a threshold and then -- poof! -- your article is dead. It was intended to keep spam and kitten pix off the front page. Vouching was introduced as a counter-measure to inappropriate flagging, and indeed my article was vouched for once and was briefly resurrected before it was flagged to death a second time. Keeping control of an on-line curated forum as it grows is still an unsolved problem.
- StreamBright 11y agoI was thinking about this a lot, how could you protect the integrity of you content and at the same time keep up quality but still I got as far as introducing weight to the votes, and scale up how much somebody's vote means based on their karma. I don't think that HN does that, and also not sure it would fix this problem. We need probably some model to verify. Curious if anybody has a good idea.