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The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one. I agree it should be the user's job and not Apple's to enf

The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one. I agree it should be the user's job and not Apple's to enforce security, however I also think that is something that we can focus on later. We can both support Apple now in this fight against government overreach and put pressure on them later to make their phone securable by the user. Those two ideas are not mutually exclusive, despite appearing to be both pro Apple and anti-Apple.

timr 11y ago
"The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one." I don't think that's true, but even if I'm wrong, you could say that about any skirmish in the privacy debate. Every legal case sets some precedent that affects the next one. Also, I don't agree that this is government overreach. This case seems about as clear-cut an example of a "good" investigatory behavior as we're likely to see. If you can't get behind the idea of compromising privacy when there's a valid warrant, in the case of a known mass murderer with probable ties to international terrorist groups, well...you've set an exceptionally high bar. I'm a reasonable person, I see your position, and I disagree with you on the merits of your argument.
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
- studentrob 11y ago
  >> "The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one." > you could say that about any skirmish in the privacy debate. Every legal case sets some precedent that affects the next one. Yes and no. The role of the judiciary is to interpret and implement the law. They are not supposed to create law. That is the job of Congress. This case is so unprecedented that there's a chance the precedent here will effectively create a law. It will come down to a matter of interpretation by the justices. If they rule against Apple, the message is, "This is covered by the AWA, and the AWA was intended to compel companies to weaken their products' security". In that case, many of us in the public feel that the justices will have unfairly created a new law. If they rule for Apple, the message is, "This is an undue burden being forced upon Apple. That is not the intention of the AWA. If you want them to comply, go to Congress and ask for a law" Obama was a lawyer, he knows this, and in light of the public's disapproval of mass surveillance, he chose the path (the AWA) that is most likely to get him what he wants, which is to grant law enforcement access to all iPhones. The public currently will not re-elect congressmen and women who push through new surveillance laws. P.S. I like your site vayable.com
  - rtpg 11y ago
    >This case is so unprecedented that there's a chance the precedent here will effectively create a law. This case is actually super with precedent, if you ignore the digital nature of things. Apple has keys to a safe (digital signage key for iOS updates), FBI has warrant to search safe, court orders keys to safe. Fourth amendment doesn't apply because Apple can't incriminate themselves by giving signage keys. There is the whole "asking Apple to write the OS changes and sign it", instead of just "Asking Apple for the signing keys." I would call this a compromise ruling to avoid having Apple have to give the actual for real skeleton key. Asking a judge to not force Apple to surrender the digital signage keys requires more subtle arguments about burden. Asking for any ruling on encryption itself is asking a court to legislate from the bench
    - studentrob 11y ago
      > if you ignore the digital nature of things That is a gigantic "if"
    - parenthephobia 11y ago
      The precedent you reference doesn't really apply because, as you say, the FBI isn't actually asking for the signing keys. The big difference between what's being asked and the signing keys is that Apple already have the signing keys. There is certainly plenty of precedent for a court to ask Apple to produce something they already have, but less precedent for a court to ask Apple to make something that doesn't exist yet. In the analogy, the FBI doesn't have a warrant to "search the safe". What is protected by the signing keys is the ability to distribute iOS updates, but the court wants the data on the phone, which is protected by a different key Apple don't have. A more correct non-IT analogy is to imagine that the safe has two locks: one pickable, the other unpickable. Apple don't have a matching key for either, but knows how to cut a key for the unpickable one. The FBI has asked Apple to set up a key-cutting facility, definitely only for use on this one occasion, so they can make a key for the unpickable lock.
- a_c_s 11y ago
  There isn't a valid warrant in this case though: instead there's a writ (aka an order by the government) under the All Writs Act. This act allows the government to compel a person/company to do something when there isn't any specific law on the books for that particular situation. However, the writ in question is to compel Apple to write a new version of the OS (not to hand over keys, not to hand over data in their possession, not to provide technical support to the FBI - all of which are things Apple has done when presented with a valid warrant). From Apple's motion to vacate: "In the section of CALEA entitled “Design of features and systems configurations,” 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1), the statute says that it “does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer — (1) to require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services. (2) to prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services." So the writ appears to be in direct contradiction to other law, which would make it an invalid use of the All Writs Act.
  - timr 11y ago
    No, you're completely wrong. There's a valid warrant. The owner of the phone also consents to the search. Apple's refusal has nothing to do with any of that. What's happening here is that Apple is claiming that it can't comply with the warrant, because encryption. The FBI is invoking the All Writs Act to try to compel Apple to brute force the weak password on the phone. http://fortune.com/2016/02/18/fbi-iphone/ http://fortune.com/2016/02/18/fbi-iphone/
- EdHominem 11y ago
  But that's just an outrage line. Not a necessity line. There's no ticking time-bomb. Nobody expects to get anything from the phone. It's the guy's work phone and they already have all the call logs, etc. I hear that you're willing to trade liberty for safety, but what safety do you expect to get and are you considering any costs?

timr 11y ago

"The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one." I don't think that's true, but even if I'm wrong, you could say that about any skirmish in the privacy debate. Every legal case sets some precedent that affects the next one. Also, I don't agree that this is government overreach. This case seems about as clear-cut an example of a "good" investigatory behavior as we're likely to see. If you can't get behind the idea of compromising privacy when there's a valid warrant, in the case of a known mass murderer with probable ties to international terrorist groups, well...you've set an exceptionally high bar. I'm a reasonable person, I see your position, and I disagree with you on the merits of your argument.

deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
studentrob 11y ago
>> "The thing is, if privacy advocates lose this fight, we have a greater chance of losing the next one." > you could say that about any skirmish in the privacy debate. Every legal case sets some precedent that affects the next one. Yes and no. The role of the judiciary is to interpret and implement the law. They are not supposed to create law. That is the job of Congress. This case is so unprecedented that there's a chance the precedent here will effectively create a law. It will come down to a matter of interpretation by the justices. If they rule against Apple, the message is, "This is covered by the AWA, and the AWA was intended to compel companies to weaken their products' security". In that case, many of us in the public feel that the justices will have unfairly created a new law. If they rule for Apple, the message is, "This is an undue burden being forced upon Apple. That is not the intention of the AWA. If you want them to comply, go to Congress and ask for a law" Obama was a lawyer, he knows this, and in light of the public's disapproval of mass surveillance, he chose the path (the AWA) that is most likely to get him what he wants, which is to grant law enforcement access to all iPhones. The public currently will not re-elect congressmen and women who push through new surveillance laws. P.S. I like your site vayable.com
- rtpg 11y ago
  >This case is so unprecedented that there's a chance the precedent here will effectively create a law. This case is actually super with precedent, if you ignore the digital nature of things. Apple has keys to a safe (digital signage key for iOS updates), FBI has warrant to search safe, court orders keys to safe. Fourth amendment doesn't apply because Apple can't incriminate themselves by giving signage keys. There is the whole "asking Apple to write the OS changes and sign it", instead of just "Asking Apple for the signing keys." I would call this a compromise ruling to avoid having Apple have to give the actual for real skeleton key. Asking a judge to not force Apple to surrender the digital signage keys requires more subtle arguments about burden. Asking for any ruling on encryption itself is asking a court to legislate from the bench
  - studentrob 11y ago
    > if you ignore the digital nature of things That is a gigantic "if"
  - parenthephobia 11y ago
    The precedent you reference doesn't really apply because, as you say, the FBI isn't actually asking for the signing keys. The big difference between what's being asked and the signing keys is that Apple already have the signing keys. There is certainly plenty of precedent for a court to ask Apple to produce something they already have, but less precedent for a court to ask Apple to make something that doesn't exist yet. In the analogy, the FBI doesn't have a warrant to "search the safe". What is protected by the signing keys is the ability to distribute iOS updates, but the court wants the data on the phone, which is protected by a different key Apple don't have. A more correct non-IT analogy is to imagine that the safe has two locks: one pickable, the other unpickable. Apple don't have a matching key for either, but knows how to cut a key for the unpickable one. The FBI has asked Apple to set up a key-cutting facility, definitely only for use on this one occasion, so they can make a key for the unpickable lock.
a_c_s 11y ago
There isn't a valid warrant in this case though: instead there's a writ (aka an order by the government) under the All Writs Act. This act allows the government to compel a person/company to do something when there isn't any specific law on the books for that particular situation. However, the writ in question is to compel Apple to write a new version of the OS (not to hand over keys, not to hand over data in their possession, not to provide technical support to the FBI - all of which are things Apple has done when presented with a valid warrant). From Apple's motion to vacate: "In the section of CALEA entitled “Design of features and systems configurations,” 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1), the statute says that it “does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer — (1) to require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services. (2) to prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services." So the writ appears to be in direct contradiction to other law, which would make it an invalid use of the All Writs Act.
- timr 11y ago
  No, you're completely wrong. There's a valid warrant. The owner of the phone also consents to the search. Apple's refusal has nothing to do with any of that. What's happening here is that Apple is claiming that it can't comply with the warrant, because encryption. The FBI is invoking the All Writs Act to try to compel Apple to brute force the weak password on the phone. http://fortune.com/2016/02/18/fbi-iphone/ http://fortune.com/2016/02/18/fbi-iphone/
EdHominem 11y ago
But that's just an outrage line. Not a necessity line. There's no ticking time-bomb. Nobody expects to get anything from the phone. It's the guy's work phone and they already have all the call logs, etc. I hear that you're willing to trade liberty for safety, but what safety do you expect to get and are you considering any costs?