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Honestly, someone using Tor should know that your communication details are being held by exit nodes. Isn't it kind of common among the community to not trust y

by rtpg 11y ago

Honestly, someone using Tor should know that your communication details are being held by exit nodes. Isn't it kind of common among the community to not trust your exit nodes? I would say that the assumption is that your communication is public.

harry8 11y ago
It is reasonable to assume that you are attempting to keep the information private. It is reasonable to assume that the US govt would not hack the information on that basis. If you assume it's public, why the hell are you using TOR at all? Use of TOR shows the assumption pretty clearly.
- rtpg 11y ago
  if you're attempting to keep the information private, you're not doing a good job by handing it to a third party. Expectation of privacy is kind of based around self-incrimination, and you lose a lot of those when you hand information to a third party. Even if it's "public" (in the legal sense of 'not protected'), Tor can be useful against non-state actors, or against weaker state actors. I'm not saying there isn't a colloquial expectation of privacy, but that the jurisprudence on privacy doesn't apply to Tor (or at least, that there is an argument that it doesn't).
  - mc808 11y ago
    You could also say if you don't want people photographing your genitals, don't use a third-party restroom or dressing room or tanning salon. The expectation of privacy really has (or should have) nothing to do with the existence of someone's ability to violate that privacy.
    - murjinsee 11y ago
      I agree with you emotionally, but question your argument legally. What, 'is,' and what, 'should be', are rarely the same thing. If government wants something forbidden, it creeps towards it. Expectations are meaningless without threats.
btilly 11y ago
Someone using TOR should know that exit nodes will know that you used TOR, but by design they are not supposed to be able to find out who you were talking to, or what you were talking about. The general assumption back when Silk Road was created was that TOR itself was safe, and the most likely way to be discovered was for your personal machine to be compromised. This belief was only strengthened by the FBI's repeated failures to take down Silk Road. Heck, this was still a widespread belief AFTER Silk Road was taken down! For example http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-deep-web-raid-seized-a-bunch-of-fake-sites http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-deep-web-raid-seiz... quotes a security researcher who came to the conclusion in late 2014 that the FBI was just scanning TOR, and TOR itself had not been compromised. For a comparison to phones, the Supreme Court has held that a list of people you called is not protected, but the contents of your phone calls are. Similarly I think they should rule in this case that the fact you're using TOR is not protected, but the details of what you were doing on TOR is covered by the 4th amendment.
- ikeboy 11y ago
  By design, if the three or six nodes that you used compare notes, they can tell who you were talking to. That seems roughly the same as breaking a key into 6 parts and giving it to 6 different parties. I think the government would be able to go to each party and ask for their part, then put them together. Therefore, there's no expectation of privacy. What actually happened is the researchers found a way to bypass the middle guy and reconstruct the info just from the two ends. That's still just comparing notes, but from fewer people.
  - btilly 11y ago
    Yes, I know how it was broken. But the question is what the expectation should have been. And given that expectation, then whether they should have had a warrant. In our surveillance society, the government's theory is that it should never need a warrant, because terrorism. I strongly oppose that theory. I'm OK with taking down Silk Road, but get the warrant first.

by rtpg 11y ago

harry8 11y ago

It is reasonable to assume that you are attempting to keep the information private. It is reasonable to assume that the US govt would not hack the information on that basis. If you assume it's public, why the hell are you using TOR at all? Use of TOR shows the assumption pretty clearly.

rtpg 11y ago
if you're attempting to keep the information private, you're not doing a good job by handing it to a third party. Expectation of privacy is kind of based around self-incrimination, and you lose a lot of those when you hand information to a third party. Even if it's "public" (in the legal sense of 'not protected'), Tor can be useful against non-state actors, or against weaker state actors. I'm not saying there isn't a colloquial expectation of privacy, but that the jurisprudence on privacy doesn't apply to Tor (or at least, that there is an argument that it doesn't).
- mc808 11y ago
  You could also say if you don't want people photographing your genitals, don't use a third-party restroom or dressing room or tanning salon. The expectation of privacy really has (or should have) nothing to do with the existence of someone's ability to violate that privacy.
  - murjinsee 11y ago
    I agree with you emotionally, but question your argument legally. What, 'is,' and what, 'should be', are rarely the same thing. If government wants something forbidden, it creeps towards it. Expectations are meaningless without threats.

btilly 11y ago

Someone using TOR should know that exit nodes will know that you used TOR, but by design they are not supposed to be able to find out who you were talking to, or what you were talking about. The general assumption back when Silk Road was created was that TOR itself was safe, and the most likely way to be discovered was for your personal machine to be compromised. This belief was only strengthened by the FBI's repeated failures to take down Silk Road. Heck, this was still a widespread belief AFTER Silk Road was taken down! For example http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-deep-web-raid-seized-a-bunch-of-fake-sites http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-deep-web-raid-seiz... quotes a security researcher who came to the conclusion in late 2014 that the FBI was just scanning TOR, and TOR itself had not been compromised. For a comparison to phones, the Supreme Court has held that a list of people you called is not protected, but the contents of your phone calls are. Similarly I think they should rule in this case that the fact you're using TOR is not protected, but the details of what you were doing on TOR is covered by the 4th amendment.

ikeboy 11y ago
By design, if the three or six nodes that you used compare notes, they can tell who you were talking to. That seems roughly the same as breaking a key into 6 parts and giving it to 6 different parties. I think the government would be able to go to each party and ask for their part, then put them together. Therefore, there's no expectation of privacy. What actually happened is the researchers found a way to bypass the middle guy and reconstruct the info just from the two ends. That's still just comparing notes, but from fewer people.
- btilly 11y ago
  Yes, I know how it was broken. But the question is what the expectation should have been. And given that expectation, then whether they should have had a warrant. In our surveillance society, the government's theory is that it should never need a warrant, because terrorism. I strongly oppose that theory. I'm OK with taking down Silk Road, but get the warrant first.