"Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of secur

"Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security)." I don't deny any of that, but there's still a bright-line distinction between "circumventing security features" for a single, badly protected phone, given a warrant, and weakening security across-the-board for everyone. This is a case of the former, not the latter. "I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes." The legal fight is, factually, centered on the question I stated. It doesn't involve any of the other technical stuff that's being tossed around this debate. That was my point. But like I said: I think it's a legitimate question, so I'm not sure who you're arguing with right now?