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...and it's an entirely reasonable position to say that they should get it, if they have a warrant. Especially if the case as cut-and-dried as the San Bernardin

by timr 11y ago

...and it's an entirely reasonable position to say that they should get it, if they have a warrant. Especially if the case as cut-and-dried as the San Bernardino one. The public debate on this has reached truly sad, nigh-Trumpian levels of hysteria and uninformed commentary. There is no "back-door" here. Encryption is not being compromised. This has very little to do with encryption at all, really: if the criminals in question were to use a strong password instead of a four-digit PIN, Apple could just shrug, say "not possible in our lifetimes", and that would be the end of it. But these criminals have easily brute-forceable PIN codes, and the investigators want to brute force them. This situation is about a legal fight of very narrow parameters: should it be possible for the government to compel a company to help extract its customers' "secure" data, via this specific, very old law. Reasonable people can disagree on this point. Unfortunately, the public debate has gone completely round the bend, with famous people grandstanding on totally irrelevant things (like "encryption back doors"), which have no bearing on anything at all. Moreover, as it turns out, Apple has been doing this for years for police investigations, and the empire has not yet fallen. If you're worried about the slippery slope, well...we're already well downhill, and our bottoms are wet. Perspective. I realize that it's not popular amongst the tinfoil-hat set that has set up residence here, but I think that there are times when we want our government to be able to do things like break into a suspect's phone. There should be safeguards (like warrants), of course, but it's a perfectly reasonable position to say that privacy is not absolute.

erkkie 11y ago
Fully agree with your comment about the discussion going full on hyperbole but at the same time agree that it's not Apple's job to intentionally weaken the security parameters of their firmware. Asking for encryption back doors is just another step from this, are you confident enough that it's not a risk worthy of consideration?
threatofrain 11y ago
I agree with you that people capitalize on events to fit into their political narratives, and I also agree that privacy is not an absolute value, and that tensions between values calls for tradeoffs to be made. But I do believe that calling this a backdoor is proper framing. Apple provided a weak password knowing that convenience often beats security, but Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security). I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes. The FBI cites a law from 1789 that says that the court may issue "...all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law". It does not sound easy to predict what case law shall determine to be "necessary or appropriate" 5-10 years from now.
- timr 11y ago
  "Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security)." I don't deny any of that, but there's still a bright-line distinction between "circumventing security features" for a single, badly protected phone, given a warrant, and weakening security across-the-board for everyone. This is a case of the former, not the latter. "I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes." The legal fight is, factually, centered on the question I stated. It doesn't involve any of the other technical stuff that's being tossed around this debate. That was my point. But like I said: I think it's a legitimate question, so I'm not sure who you're arguing with right now?

by timr 11y ago

erkkie 11y ago

Fully agree with your comment about the discussion going full on hyperbole but at the same time agree that it's not Apple's job to intentionally weaken the security parameters of their firmware. Asking for encryption back doors is just another step from this, are you confident enough that it's not a risk worthy of consideration?

threatofrain 11y ago

I agree with you that people capitalize on events to fit into their political narratives, and I also agree that privacy is not an absolute value, and that tensions between values calls for tradeoffs to be made. But I do believe that calling this a backdoor is proper framing. Apple provided a weak password knowing that convenience often beats security, but Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security). I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes. The FBI cites a law from 1789 that says that the court may issue "...all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law". It does not sound easy to predict what case law shall determine to be "necessary or appropriate" 5-10 years from now.

timr 11y ago
"Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security)." I don't deny any of that, but there's still a bright-line distinction between "circumventing security features" for a single, badly protected phone, given a warrant, and weakening security across-the-board for everyone. This is a case of the former, not the latter. "I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes." The legal fight is, factually, centered on the question I stated. It doesn't involve any of the other technical stuff that's being tossed around this debate. That was my point. But like I said: I think it's a legitimate question, so I'm not sure who you're arguing with right now?