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Answers to your questions about Apple and security

• dkopi 11y ago
  "Law enforcement agents around the country have already said they have hundreds of iPhones they want Apple to unlock if the FBI wins this case. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks. " Actually - the master key, the backdoor, already exists. The master key is Apple's ability to sign a new version of IOS, and update the software on a locked phone. The Federal government isn't asking Apple to create a backdoor. Their asking apple to use the backdoor that already exists.
  • bad_user 11y ago
    Actually that's irrelevant because the government can always coerce companies or individuals to introduce backdoors if there aren't any. Software developers have the arrogance to think that technology can solve political issues.
    • interpol_p 11y ago
      The difference in this case is that a backdoor can be introduced after the fact. That is, it is possible to load a new version of iOS onto this locked phone with the backdoor in place. Ideally, one should not be able to update a locked phone in such a way as to introduce a backdoor to allow for brute force passcode attempts.
      • bad_user 11y ago
        First of all this isn't about brute forcing passcode attempts, it is about bypassing the passcode altogether. If the phone is open and can be made to automatically download and install a software upgrade, then this is possible, even if the storage is encrypted. Also, given that Apple is the phone maker, they can of course be coerced to produce phones with this capability, whether they want it or not. There is is no "ideally" ;-)
    • matwood 11y ago
      > Actually that's irrelevant because the government can always coerce companies or individuals to introduce backdoors if there aren't any. The FBI is trying to do just that and Apple is fighting it. That is why this case is so important.
      • noelsusman 11y ago
        Except they're not. If the FBI was trying to force Apple to keep this avenue of attack open in all future versions of iOS then I would be 100% behind Apple, but that's not what's going on. The FBI is asking Apple to exploit an already existing vulnerability.
        • matwood 11y ago
          Do you not think this is where it is headed? The FBI has been complaining about device security for awhile. They finally have a 'terror' case to use in order to try and swing public opinion. To think that the FBI only wants a single phone (we have found out later they have many) unlocked, and only wants it to work until Apple closes the security hole is naive.
    • sbov 11y ago
      Not that I agree with backdoors, but Congress should be able to. The courts shouldn't.
  • zaphar 11y ago
    The key analogy starts to break down at some point. The "master key" as you put it is that Apple has the engineers, experience, and digital key that enables them to create a second key for any IPhone manufactured pre secure enclave. The argument here is that once Apple creates that second key the effort required to steal it is significantly lowered. You can't steal something that doesn't exist yet. It's more analogous to forcing everyone to use a shorter password composed of only numerical digits because it makes brute forcing easier. The mere existence of this new less secure IOS makes Apple even more of a target. The slightest chance that it could leak would render more than the hundreds of iPhones the FBI want's to unlock completely insecure.
    • ikeboy 11y ago
      > The argument here is that once Apple creates that second key the effort required to steal it is significantly lowered. You can't steal something that doesn't exist yet. The key exists. If someone were to steal it, they could sign any version of iOS they want. I think the resources required to successfully steal Apple's private key for signing updates, which is presumably locked down very robustly, is an order of magnitude greater than the resources required to modify iOS to remove the erase and timeout features. The latter is very difficult especially without the source code, but it's hard for me to believe that it's harder than stealing Apple's key.
      • zaphar 11y ago
        Just having the key doesn't automatically make it easier for you to create the new IOS. That task is significantly easier for Apple to do than for you to do. Much of security is raising level of effort for an exploit to a high enough level that it's not worth the investment required to create it. If Apple creates the new IOS for you though and all you have to do is get your hands on it then the investment required just got smaller. Any reduction in the investment required for an exploit should be very carefully evaluated. Saying things like "This can't possibly be used by someone else." is either disingenuous or signifies that you don't adequately understand the issues, or you are lying to yourself. Whichever one of those that it is. It's in Apple's and frankly my best interest that someone highlight the truth of the situation. [EDIT]: The below is more hyperbolic than I intended after a second reading. I'm leaving it since I already hit submit but I wanted to apologize for going there. :-( This is like saying Look... We'll create a nuclear bomb but it's okay we're the only ones who will have it and nobody else is going to be able to get one. Maybe you can guarantee that no one else get's enough information from you to build one. However once you've built one the chance that someone could get the information from someone involved in your project to accelerate their creation of a nuclear bomb just increased by a non-trivial amount. And the potential risks are really high. Pretending otherwise would be foolish.
  • zaroth 11y ago
    It's sloppy to call a vulnerability a backdoor. Yes, Apple failed to fully secure the 5c and may even possibly have failed to fully secure the 6s against this attack. So it is vulnerable to this attack, but the backdoor doesn't currently exist. Also, I would expect if it is technically possible, that Apple will be pushing an iOS update which closes this particular vulnerability going forward. Obviously not an update the FBI will be installing on this particular phone! I believe their intent is to make iOS secure even against an adversary that has physical possession of the phone and even against an adversary with the ability to sign custom builds.
    • teacup50 11y ago
      In cryptography and computer security, a vulnerability (a backdoor) exists whether or not an exploit exists.
      • peeters 11y ago
        Your reply does nothing to justify why "backdoor" and "vulnerability" should be considered synonyms. What you say is true of "vulnerability", I've never heard someone call a buffer overflow vulnerability a "backdoor".
        • teacup50 11y ago
          A vulnerability is a backdoor if it's placed there intentionally. That's what Apple has done.
      • superuser2 11y ago
        >vulnerability (a backdoor) This is at best imprecise. The HN privacy advocates have taken to calling all vulnerabilities backdoors on the (not insane) belief that manufacturers are out to get them, but there is a distinction. Backdoors are a special case of vulnerabilities inserted intentionally by an attacker into ostensibly secure designs to allow the attacker back in once the device has left his control. For example, if Apple configured iPhones to accept two PINs, one set by the user and the other set by Apple at manufacturing time, we could say the iPhone is backdoored. If some engineer went rouge and marked his own code signing key as trusted, that's a backdoor. When you say something is a backdoor, you assign blame for its actively malicious and undisclosed insertion. Either the organization is evil or someone subverted the organization, and this person must be caught and punished. Most vulnerabilities happen because their creators didn't know better, or found mitigation to be not worth the cost. Apple is a little bit extraordinary in considering "itself, under legal coercion" under its threat model at all. You might disguise a backdoor as an ordinary accidental vulnerability, and this is a reasonable assertion to throw around when someone who should have known better, whose peers were doing better chose an insecure design. i.e. Juniper switching their design to use known-broken cryptography. The signs here certainly point to a vulnerability that ought to be mitigated (and possibly has been under the Secure Element system), but not a deliberate flaw in iOS's design. Vulnerability, not backdoor.
  • zepto 11y ago
    Are you supportive of the government's position in this? There is clearly a vulnerability on top of which a backdoor could be built. But equating the two seems to be interpreting things in favor of the government.
    • otterley 11y ago
      Are you saying the Government has no legitimate interest in the contents of a suspect's or deceased's mobile phone?
      • zepto 11y ago
        I believe that police forces have an interest in using whatever resources are legally available to them to pursue their inquiries, and as such, the FBI is acting according to its mission. My position is that the government as a whole - including the legislative, executive, and Supreme Court, have a duty to national security and civil liberties that would be severely compromised if the FBI prevails here. I agree with the ex director of the NSA, that strong encryption and secure devices are good for national security, and protect us against cyberterrorism, and that this is far more important than this individual case, and so the FBI should not be allowed to prevail.
  • WireWrap 11y ago
    > The Federal government isn't asking Apple to create a backdoor. Their asking apple to use the backdoor that already exists. Basically. Unfortunately, most of the reporting is focused on the payload Apple is being asked to create and doesn't draw enough attention to that "existing backdoor" that will allow such a payload to be successfully installed. Eliminating that "existing backdoor" should be a priority. I see some, here, expressing the thought that Apple might be working on that. I think Apple needs to be pressed, hard, on that very subject.
    • chiph 11y ago
      Is this the same key that Apple uses to publish updates to iOS?
    • icebraining 11y ago
      Supposedly, the backdoor has already been fixed by the Secure Enclave, which was included in newer models of the iPhone.
      • mikeash 11y ago
        Supposedly, and also supposedly the Secure Enclave doesn't defend against this, depending on who you ask and how they're speculating. I've yet to see anything authoritative on this from someone in a position to know for sure. The good news is that if you have a good password, not just a simple numeric passcode, you should be safe against this sort of thing regardless, unless the authorities can coerce or trick you into revealing your password.
    • GBond 11y ago
      Apple is reframing it this way to the media but not technically untrue.
  • btreesOfSpring 11y ago
    Tom Cross[0] in this tweet[1] was the first person I saw with the distinction in calling the FBI request an exploit rather than backdoor. This Vectra Networks blog post[2] explains this distinction in better technical detail. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Cross_%28computer_security%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Cross_%28computer_security... [1] https://twitter.com/_decius_/status/699932604737417216 https://twitter.com/_decius_/status/699932604737417216 [2] http://blog.vectranetworks.com/blog/apple-vs-the-fbi-some-points-to-consider http://blog.vectranetworks.com/blog/apple-vs-the-fbi-some-po...
• tacos 11y ago
  There comes a time where the only competition for a huge corporation is the government. And you can't win that one (AT&T) -- even when you do (Microsoft).
• ikeboy 11y ago
  >The digital world is very different from the physical world. In the physical world you can destroy something and it’s gone. But in the digital world, the technique, once created, could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. They leave out the fact that Apple would need to sign (literally, using their private key) every time it is used. >Unfortunately, we learned that while the attacker’s iPhone was in FBI custody the Apple ID password associated with the phone was changed. Changing this password meant the phone could no longer access iCloud services. Why can't Apple change the password back, reset the flag that says the password was changed, and have them turn it on again?
  • nicky0 11y ago
    Just speculating, but if they changed the password using a "forgot my password" email verification method, then there may no longer be any record of what the old password was.
    • ikeboy 11y ago
      But then the data was on Apple's servers, and could possibly be recovered with data recovery. Also, I doubt Apple deletes that when there's no need to. I know Google stores previous passwords, and will alert you if you try logging in with a previous password.
      • deleted 11y ago
        [deleted]
        • ikeboy 11y ago
          Hashes or whatever. The point is they have the ability to tell if I typed in an old password, so they must store some form of it somewhere.
  • jsjohnst 11y ago
    You are assuming the password is the key to authenticating. It might be, but it also might be that there's a two way handshake that sets up an encryption key for transmission of backups in a somewhat similar manner to how PFS works with SSL.
• interpol_p 11y ago
  This letter comes off very strongly. It's as if they treat the government as just another customer. The way they describe their process for assisting law enforcement almost reads like their process for providing developer support: > We also provide guidelines on our website for law enforcement agencies so they know exactly what we are able to access and what legal authority we need to see before we can help them. The concerning portion of this letter is: > Yes, it is certainly possible to create an entirely new operating system to undermine our security features as the government wants. I have a feeling Apple is currently working on preventing updates to the Secure Enclave ROM from happening while a phone is locked (or at least ensuring the keys are wiped if it does happen while a phone is locked).
  • saryant 11y ago
    > We also provide guidelines on our website for law enforcement agencies so they know exactly what we are able to access and what legal authority we need to see before we can help them. Why is that sentence objectionable? Every tech company has guidelines like that on their website.
    • kogus 11y ago
      He didn't say it was objectionable. He just said it treats the government like a customer. I, for one, would like to live in a country where the government is a servant, not a master.
    • interpol_p 11y ago
      I didn't mean to imply that it sounded objectionable. I was impressed with that public statement by Apple.
  • delinka 11y ago
    "It's as if they treat the government as just another customer." Shouldn't they? Albeit a customer with different 'needs' under the law. There's a process to follow to get assistance from Apple. Their products are in wide use and they can't reasonably be expected to have a dedicated support person for every request from every customer every minute of every day. "You want our help? Try these things first. If that fails, here's the process for queueing up to get help." Further, there's a process to make sure law enforcement are behaving well and not, say, stalking some random member of the public. Get the courts involved, provide the right legal paperwork, their lawyers will review it, and they'll respond appropriately. The idea (and I realize not included in your comment) that governments are above the law, and that government agencies will only use these powers in proper ways is ridiculous. They've proven repeatedly that they can't be trusted with the power they've been given.
• pilif 11y ago
  >>The government says your objection appears to be based on concern for your business model and marketing strategy. Is that true? > Absolutely not. Nothing could be further from the truth. This is and always has been about our customers. so it is about marketing :-) All joking aside though, I agree strongly with this document and I'm both a bit surprised and very happy about their detailed arguments and about the passion they put into this issue. As a customer I'm happy to see that they are really fighting for me and not giving in, even to the point of refusing a comparatively reasonable request out of fear of producing a precedent.
  • cthulhujr 11y ago
    >so it is about marketing I read that line the same way. Under everything, their business isn't privacy; it's making money. They just happen to take a strong public stance on customer privacy. That seems really difficult to explain to readers without patronizing.
• panarky 11y ago
  This FAQ has more than 1000 words, but these are the words that matter: The only way to guarantee that such a powerful tool isn’t abused and doesn’t fall into the wrong hands is to never create it. Can a court force a company or an individual to create something that does not exist? China required Google to actively censor search results about sensitive topics, and Google quit China. (They may now be heading back [1].) Bing stayed in China and silently replaced their organic results with government-approved propaganda [2]. The best way to prevent governments from oppressing their citizens is to refuse to create tools that enable oppression. [1] http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/why-google-quit-china-and-why-its-heading-back/424482/ http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/why-go... [2] http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/11/bing-censors-chinese-language-search-results http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/11/bing-censo...
  • hahainternet 11y ago
    > The best way to prevent governments from oppressing their citizens is to refuse to create tools that enable oppression. Are search warrants oppressive? Can you distinguish this request from the FBI requesting a safe manufacturer modify the firmware on a single safe? I doubt either of these can be reliably argued.
    • JoeAltmaier 11y ago
      That's the whole issue, isn't it? You can't create software that operates only on a single instance of a computer. It'll run on all of them.
      • hahainternet 11y ago
        Apple could write code that checks the hardware ID supplied and sign only that version. It's been sufficient to prevent hacking so far and is the major protection relied upon until the latest generation, so I don't think this is an issue at all.
        • 11y ago
• cballard 11y ago
  > Yes, it is certainly possible to create an entirely new operating system to undermine our security features as the government wants. But it’s something we believe is too dangerous to do. The only way to guarantee that such a powerful tool isn’t abused and doesn’t fall into the wrong hands is to never create it. Is this just security through obscurity, then?
  • patch_cable 11y ago
    No? Not if it requires a key to sign the software.
    • mattb314 11y ago
      I think the argument here is that stealing a private key isn't fundamentally more difficult than stealing this iOS backdoor (were Apple to create it). Under this model, Apple's refusal to create a backdoor is in some sense an appeal to security through obscurity because it implies that engineering knowledge is the main obstacle to adversaries, whereas the true obstacle is the ability to steal protected information from Apple (the key or the backdoor). If the key and backdoor were equivalently useful, the existence of a backdoor wouldn't impact the safety of customers because the key already exists. Of course, whether stealing a backdoor is actually as hard as stealing a key is a legitimate question, but (I thought) Apple had the option to unlock the phone in-house, which would at least keep the backdoor out of FBI hands (the legal precedent, however, could still pose a real threat to user security).
    • noelsusman 11y ago
      So then why couldn't Apple create this exploit so that it only runs on this specific device? That way the security of all iPhones is still reliant on the security of Apple's key, just like before.
  • micampe 11y ago
    Is GPG security through obscurity, since it only relies on you not knowing my private key?
• rtpg 11y ago
  Disclaimer: kind of glad that Apple's making noise, but kind of frustrated that it's about this specific case. The answers to these questions has some pretty deceitful phrasing.... >First, the government would have us write an entirely new operating system for their use. Only "new" in the sense of not being exactly the same as the current one. Implies much more work than we know to be the case. >Law enforcement agents around the country have already said they have hundreds of iPhones they want Apple to unlock if the FBI wins this case. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks. The master key analogy falls apart because the order specifically calls for making a version that only works on a targeted phone. At best it would be the equivalent of Apple being asked to make many individual keys. Unless, of course, they want to make a version of iOS with the exploit that would work on any iPhone. > Of course, Apple would do our best to protect that key, but in a world where all of our data is under constant threat, it would be relentlessly attacked by hackers and cybercriminals. A This is implying hackers could do anything with a version of iOS that is made to only work on one phone. You could absolutely release the update file that the FBI is asking for and have no risk of compromising anything because (again) this is for a specific phone. >Has Apple unlocked iPhones for law enforcement in the past? >No. (The answer then proceeds to say "Actually yes we have, just not past iOS 8) >For devices running the iPhone operating systems prior to iOS 8 and under a lawful court order, we have extracted data from an iPhone. >We feel strongly that if we were to do what the government has asked of us — to create a backdoor to our products Using a backdoor already existing in your product... >One of the strongest suggestions we offered was that they pair the phone to a previously joined network, which would allow them to back up the phone and get the data they are now asking for. Unfortunately, we learned that while the attacker’s iPhone was in FBI custody the Apple ID password associated with the phone was changed. Changing this password meant the phone could no longer access iCloud services. Seriously FBI? I know this letter isn't for me. I want to be on Apple's side based off of how they present the case. But if you look at the court order, off of the fact that the FBI got a warrant for a specific device, off of the fact that they're asking for an unlock of a specific phone, off of the fact that its technically feasible to do this without compromising all iPhones thanks to digital signage... My impression is that Apple's position is that its technically infeasible to make this exploit, which isn't really true. There's the other "but with this, we'll have to do a bunch of phones" argument... is there a term for being overburdened with writs from the court? What's the constitutional protection against that? That feels like the only valid defence at this point for them (from a legal standpoint)
• hahainternet 11y ago
  > I, for one, would like to live in a country where the government is a servant, not a master. Would you? Why not Somalia?
  • kogus 11y ago
    I don't see the point you are trying to make. I'm simply suggesting that "treating the government as no better than a customer" is probably a healthy attitude. In general, I think society is a lot better off when the government has to beg for data, fight for it in court, and loses more often than not. Government should only be "powerful" in the sense that it has great power to protect the liberty of the citizens who own it. I recognize this as an idealistic attitude. I've always leaned libertarian.
    • hahainternet 11y ago
      > I don't see the point you are trying to make. Somalia is a country where the government are beholden to the citizenry. > I'm simply suggesting that "treating the government as no better than a customer" is probably a healthy attitude I see no evidence for that. Being able to treat a search warrant as if it's a polite request would help pretty much nobody. > I recognize this as an idealistic attitude. I've always leaned libertarian. By typical libertarian logic, Apple would be justified in torturing and executing the FBI agents on their property, as property is private and the Government is subordinate. The FBI agents violated the Non Aggression Principle by attempting to coerce Apple's employees to act. Where have I mistaken your logic there?
      • kogus 11y ago
        1 - To whom do you suggest the government should be accountable? 2 - I believe a search warrant is a completely valid and enforceable way to compel information, including in this case. But if Apple cannot comply without endangering every iPhone owner, then the other owners of iPhones have a stake in the outcome. The government's right to investigate this crime doesn't expand to the right to endanger millions of people's privacy and security. 3 - Torture would be a crime against the individual agents, and punishable as a crime unto itself. Libertarian philosophy doesn't suggest that you have a right to hurt other people, unless in self-defense.
• coldcode 11y ago
  To me this post explained a lot of the legal side of the issue: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 I think it may have been on HN earlier.
• madez 11y ago
  When Apple says that they’ve never unlocked a device for the authorities one should keep in mind that the authorities have and use the power to force entities to respond this way.
  • sillysaurus3 11y ago
    They have the power to force people to keep quiet, but not to lie.
    • shostack 11y ago
      But lies of omission are fairly easy to construct, and the government seems particularly adept at coming up with them. In this case, I'd feel much better if there were some sort of ToS canary or something. Does Apple have anything like that?
• zeveb 11y ago
  The contradict themselves: > Is it technically possible to do what the government has ordered? … Yes, it is certainly possible to create an entirely new operating system to undermine our security features as the government wants. And yet: > We have done everything that’s both within our power and within the law to help in this case. If it's possible for them to do it, then it's within their power, and it's perfectly within the law for Apple to write a custom OS and deploy it onto a device with the device's owner's permission (in this case, the owner is the County of San Bernardino). They don't want to do it. Heck, I don't want them to be able to do it. But they can, because they designed a system which they can backdoor.
  • hahainternet 11y ago
    > Heck, I don't want them to be able to do it. Why? Having talked to a lot of people who hold this position, the only underlying thought I've been able to discern is that you can't conceive of any time someone else holding encrypted data could hurt you. If this phone instead belonged to a living rapist or paedophile instead of a terrorist, and was the only evidence proving their guilt, would you feel the same?
    • barrkel 11y ago
      The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few; if it's a choice between no encryption and a marginal increase in the conviction rate, or strong encryption and a marginal decrease in the conviction rate, I'm in favour of the latter. But of course bad people can still use extra encryption, so lack of default encryption will mostly hurt good people. This increases the amount by which the detection and conviction rate needs to improve to justify the intrusion. I think it comes down to how willing you are to let bad people get away with their crimes vs lose your own right to privacy in a world where more and more of your private life and thoughts are stored digitally. I know I find myself increasingly self-censoring in case what I write gets taken out of context and used against me. I have to second-guess some third party reading my emails, my private notes, etc., and I really don't like that feeling. It doesn't take long for political winds to change, and we're not long past times where people were put to death for what they wrote or who they were.
• specialist 11y ago
  I was surprised to learn that iOS 4 - 8 permits updating the firmware without first entering the PIN. Device Firmware Update mode https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/DFU_Mode https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/DFU_Mode This technical factoid is relevant to the current discussion. I did not understand how creating a custom firmware was useful. To further ground the discussion, I found this informative: Legal Process Guidelines U.S. Law Enforcement https://ssl.apple.com/privacy/docs/legal-process-guidelines-us.pdf https://ssl.apple.com/privacy/docs/legal-process-guidelines-... Whereas before I was firmly against Apple helping to crack the San Bernadino iPhone, I'm now merely mostly against. I don't understand how this action can help FBI. What additional, unique information could possibly be on this phone that they couldn't discover by alternate means? I don't understand how an error by FBI obligates Apple to clean up their mess. My understanding is that iOS 9 changed things so that this kind of forensics backdoor is no longer possible, mooting this discussion. FBI should take their lumps and learn from their mistakes.
  • ascagnel_ 11y ago
    > My understanding is that iOS 9 changed things so that this kind of forensics backdoor is no longer possible, mooting this discussion. The question Apple would like to avoid is if, in the future, creating such a backdoor-resistant OS will be illegal. iOS 9.2.1 (the latest pre-ruling release) is legal; however, any future releases of the OS with this capability may be considered a circumvention of or non-compliance with the ruling.
    • specialist 11y ago
      Aha. I just reread the letter. I would like them to use your direct language. The use of encryption is a human right (to privacy). I utterly oppose any measure to curtail my right to privacy. Arguing about the technical whatnots, and who did what when, as I've done here, is a trap, to better obscure the fundamentals. And I fell for it. So thank you. I know it feels like restating obvious. But I needed to be reminded what's at stake here.
• hahainternet 11y ago
  > The issue is the precedent that is made That searching the effects of a dead terrorist is acceptable? I really don't find this objectionable in any way whatsoever. > Apple could no longer argue they had to create something to fulfill the warrant, since it was already created. Good, Apple's desires to not be subject to the laws of nations where they do business has historically hurt their customers. Even now people argue that Apple are doing this to protect their customers of which there's no evidence whatsoever.
  • zaroth 11y ago
    Do you really not understand how precedent works or are you being deliberately obtuse? The criminal act being investigated is irrelevant. They want data on a device in their possession that they have permission to search. That is all that matters. It could just as easily be a drug investigation or, as Comey said last week in front of congress, investigating a car accident.
    • hahainternet 11y ago
      > Do you really not understand how precedent works or are you being deliberately obtuse? Please do not insult people on HN. This false dichotomy is offensive to me. > The criminal act being investigated is irrelevant. They want data on a device in their possession that they have permission to search. That is all that matters. Then why are you concerned about precedent? They have met all of the requirements to search this device. Apple is impeding them for no good reason purely to advance their corporate interests.
      • oldmanjay 11y ago
        You would prefer not to be queried as to the limits of your understanding, but we would prefer you stop commenting assertively on the basis of your ignorance.
    • dang 11y ago
      > Do you really not understand how precedent works or are you being deliberately obtuse? Please be civil, regardless of how wrong you think somebody is.
• euroclydon 11y ago
  I would like to know the technical limitation law enforcement is facing when trying to decrypt data in iOS 8. I assume the data is encrypted using a key derived from the user's passcode, and that that key is purged from device memory after an idle period. Brute force attempts to guess the passcode are throttled, and too many attempts cause the device to delete the encrypted data. Can someone confirm I'm on track so far? Then, law enforcement would be limited to trying to circumvent the passcode entering throttling logic on the device, which Apple has physically engineered to be a destructive operation, thus it's outside the capabilities of even the most sophisticated technology labs in the US government? Am I still on track?
  • tommyd 11y ago
    Although focussed on the Secure Enclave, this may be of interest: https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-the-secure-enclave.html https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-...
• johnrob 11y ago
  Could Apple alter the icloud account in question such that a login succeeds with any password or session key? I wonder if there is some variant of that which would allow the remote backup strategy to work.
  • dkokelley 11y ago
    I imagine the issue is that the iPhone has non-backed up information on it. From what I've read Apple has already turned over the latest backup from ~6 weeks before the shooting. Getting a current backup would require the phone's hardware to cooperate.
• ryanmarsh 11y ago
  Our forthright discussion on this issue on HN, while valuable, will not help the broader problem of educating the voting public. It's kind of like John Oliver's interview with Edward Snowden[1]. This issue needs to be translated into "pics of my junk" and become a sort of meme. Is the issue being framed wrong more of a problem than it not being framed at all? 1. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XEVlyP4_11M https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XEVlyP4_11M
• kingnothing 11y ago
  In all likelihood, the NSA has already created this hacked version of iOS that does exactly what the FBI is requesting. The government can probably already get the data off of the phone if that's all they're after. But it probably isn't. I imagine all of this is so the government can try to set precedent in order to publicly use that technology in courtrooms and investigations instead of having to keep it hidden from the world.
  • 6stringmerc 11y ago
    Ah, the 'parallel reconstruction' approach. That's an interesting consideration, but I don't think a domestic phone for a domestic entity (employer) would probably get scooped up in the collection. An interesting thought though.
  • philip1209 11y ago
    What would the NSA's motivation be for creating this? They are mainly SIGINT. This software is only useful when you are in physical possession of a phone.
    • sesutton 11y ago
      Some of the Snowden leaks showed that the NSA was intercepting servers in transit and installing firmware with a backdoor.
  • user8341116 11y ago
    Winner winner chicken dinner! The reason this is such a public matter is because it is going to be used as impetus to change laws so that data gained using such methods can be legally used as evidence in a court of law.
• nebulous1 11y ago
  They could have/should have circumvented all this by not allowing firmware to be forced onto a locked phone without it wiping its own key store. Admittedly users could also solve the issue for themselves by using much longer passwords instead of short passcodes.
  • ajross 11y ago
    That would have eliminated their ability to fix bugs in the firmware, though. They literally did this last week with the "Error 53" patch. There are tricks to allow this, but broadly no: what we're talking about here is Apple engineering a snoop-proof architecture that remains resistant when the attacker is Apple itself. And that's just not going to happen in any practical way. Eventually, if the government wants to compel an backdoor in iOS encryption there will be a backdoor to iOS encryption. Arguing otherwise is just fooling ourselves. And it's a silly issue anyway. If you want snoop-proof encryption on your personal device, install Linux, select "encrypt my drive", and memorize a secure pass phrase. Done. Relying on a third party hardware vendor to do it for you won't ever work.
    • nebulous1 11y ago
      Well, it would have to wipe the keys to update the firmware. Alternatively the update process could ask for the password/passcode. I agree with you, but even if you install something open source you're still trusting the hardware, so at the moment there's basically no practical method of not trusting any hardware vendor at all. Obviously when you get all your hardware and software from the same vendor then it makes a move on the government's behalf much more practical for them.
      • ajross 11y ago
        > even if you install something open source you're still trusting the hardware Not for the encryption. That's done in software. A seized linux laptop with an encrypted partition using a strong key is effectively snoop proof by the definition we're using here. It's true that hardware could have other attack vectors: a key logger to intercept the pass phrase would be an obvious one. But again, that's just my point: Apple is in no privileged position here. If they get compelled to backdoor the iPhone then no amount of security architecture along the lines you posit is going to help us, because they can just be compelled to defeat it.
• jonpaine 11y ago
  Can someone ELI5 a typical opinion in support of the Government's case? I've read through various comments and I haven't seen a concise opinion in favor and am genuinely curious. Does it boil down to (1) trust that the Government won't abuse the existence of the tool and (2) trust that the tool will never be leaked? Or is it more fundamental - that the target data is so valuable that the ends justify the means? I know it's more nuanced than that, but I think - in particular -someone's view on the All Writs component just follows their view on the above in most cases. [edit]: I'm considering this a research sub-thread, not a debate sub-thread. Trying to understand, not convince. So forgive me for not responding one way or the other.
  • grecy 11y ago
    I'm staying with a friend who is is retired LEO, and he strongly believes Apple should/must comply. He wants big jail time if they don't. He thinks a it's a matter of safety because terrorists. 14 people were killed, therefore the ends justify the means as you say. We got into it the other night, and I think the case boils down to if we should be allowed to have secrets from the - secrets the government can never unlock, no matter what. he feels strongly that we should not be permitted to do so, because when a legal warrant is written, the government must have access to everything. He also doesn't believe the Snowden leaks, and thinks that when it comes to the pursuit of justice, the government should be trusted with everything.
    • jonpaine 11y ago
      Thanks for writing - The 'legal warrants' part that you said is interesting. I'm not sure I'd heard that thought clearly articulated. The idea that when a legal warrant is issued the Gov't should have access to everything. Something to consider. OK - thanks for the input!
      • user8341116 11y ago
        This is not really a new issue though. If a guy has a safe in his house and the cops get a warrant to search his house, they'll ask him what the code to the safe is. At that point he can tell them, or tell them he doesn't know and got it at a yard sale and was hoping to crack it one day. Of course I guess they could just take a diamond cutter to it at point. Can't really do that with software (barring quantum computers).
• an_account 11y ago
  Why can the FBI just create a modified operating system? I haven't seen this question answered anywhere.
  • theandrewbailey 11y ago
    It needs to be signed by Apple in order for it to be loaded.
    • an_account 11y ago
      Why couldn't the FBI subpoena Apple's signing key? That way the FBI isn't asking Apple to create any software, it's only asking for something that already exists. Obviously that would be bad for Apple and computer security in general, but is there precedent that prevents it?
• atourgates 11y ago
  One thing I don't understand is, what prevents the FBI (or Apple or anyone else) from duplicating the contents of the iPhone in question to a virtual machine, then trying the 10,000 possible 4-digit unlock combinations on virtual machines until they find the correct one? I assume that since this seems like a fairly easy solution that it's not possible, but what makes it not possible?
  • tbassetto 11y ago
    Wouldn't your solution also duplicate the fact that the iPhone should erase its memory after 10 failed attempts?
    • atourgates 11y ago
      Right, but my assumption is that you'd just be able to load up a new VM every 10 failed attempts.
  • ksk 11y ago
    Just a guess :- Maybe the decryption needs to happen through means present on the device and not in any old VM. Maybe the decryption requires multiple keys :- the 4 digit code, a per-device key, a per-session key generated on every boot-up, etc. And they all could be stored such that they never leave the h/w making sniffing difficult.
  • vlod 11y ago
    Not sure if 100% applies to the iPhone in question, but the secure enclave was designed to prevent this sort of thing. Here's an intro to it: https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-the-secure-enclave.html https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-...
    • jml7c5 11y ago
      This applies to later models of iPhone; the 5c doesn't have a secure enclave. All password attempt limiting and erasure of data is implemented by the operating system.
• allemagne 11y ago
  The only two reactions to this news seems to be cynicism and praise. I think both voices in response to Apple's letters are valid and useful for improving user security in the future, and yet incomplete by themselves. Sure, Apple should be praised for refusing to give government agencies the ability to unlock an iPhone, but a significant part of their motivation is not altruistic. It's in Apple's self-interest to make a stand in this case, but we can't always trust corporations to prioritize customer privacy over caving to government pressure. Similarly, Apple has already admitted that a backdoor exists for all iPhones. In my opinion, this is an inexcusable security hole at best, and at worst an implication that Apple intended at some point to comply with government requests for encrypted information. However, the fact that the FBI has made this request in the first place, and that Apple is in a position to decline (at least initially) and make it public, is a good sign that the three-letter agencies may not be as all-knowing as some may fear.
  • jonknee 11y ago
    > Similarly, Apple has already admitted that a backdoor exists for all iPhones. In my opinion, this is an inexcusable security hole at best, and at worst an implication that Apple intended at some point to comply with government requests for encrypted information. A backdoor does not exist and Apple is fighting the government to create one.
    • KZeillmann 11y ago
      I think the implication is that Apple can push an iOS upgrade with security holes, and without an open-source system, we can't know if it has security issues or not. (At least that's the impression I've gleaned from the other comments) I don't own an iPhone, so I don't know how the update process works.
    • allemagne 11y ago
      The backdoor is the fact that Apple has the ability to push updates without a user's permission, as multiple other users have pointed out.
  • mindslight 11y ago
• jmount 11y ago
  Certainly claims to be a different Apple than the one that released the iPhone3 that claimed it encrypted Exchange 2007 data (when it did not).
• af16090 11y ago
  One thing that I don't think has been covered enough in this whole debate about forcing Apple to unlock the iPhone is that "Farook and his wife destroyed their personal iPhones, and the hard drive from their computer was removed and has never been found"[1]. The iPhone the FBI is after is one that was issued to him by his employer. It seems to me to be very unlikely that Farook and his wife would go to the trouble to destroy all their other electronics but somehow forget to destroy his work phone (assuming his work phone had incriminating information on it in the first place). [1]: http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/18/apple-court-order-iphone-fbi-syed-farook-editorials-debates/80572492/ http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/18/apple-court...
  • notatoad 11y ago
    This is the piece of information that makes it clear to me that this case is not about this phone in particular. The FBI is trying to use an act of terrorism to acquire the tools to hack iPhones. They can't actually expect to find anything valuable on the work phone the attacker chose not to destroy.
    • _1 11y ago
      "Never let a good crisis go to waste."
  • peter303 11y ago
    I am guessing they have the call records from the phone company and found something interesting enough to go through all this effort. We dont know what they found in the lake.
    • jonlucc 11y ago
      What would they get? Best case, there is a contact name associated with a phone number they think is suspicious? Wouldn't that have been backed up on iCloud? Also, what's the endgame? They want to convict the dead guy? They want to convict the neighbor who sold them guns, maybe?
    • 11y ago
• hipaulshi 11y ago
  Maybe I shall starting offer 1m USD dollars for leaking this said software to me. O.k. I am just kidding, but just imagine how much some organizations are willing to offer to get hands on this. Will you ever trust Apple again if it known this software is leaked? What if such software is leaked to a competitor corporate? What is such software is leaked to an enemy spy agency? Apple will be very doomed.
  • vectorjohn 11y ago
    That's a lot of money to pay for a piece of software that only works on one phone that you don't even have access to.
• staunch 11y ago
  If it wasn't for Tim Cook...all the other tech giants are failing ethically.
• frogpelt 11y ago
  One question for the FBI: why so much investigation over a crime committed by someone who is dead? Based on the nature of the crime, I'm guessing there weren't many accomplices. The one guy who helped him get the guns is probably where they need to be focusing their investigation and interrogation. If ISIS helped him, how? He took a gun to work and killed people. That's not an elaborate scheme. It does not benefit the FBI to lose goodwill with the American people over this case.
  • niels_olson 11y ago
    Something about law enforcement causes practitioners to stop seeing themselves as peers of the citizenry. It is probably similar to the paternalism physicians exhibit toward patients despite the fact that they recognize the problem and train themselves against it.
    • user8341116 11y ago
      Also see: Stanford prison experiment.
  • developer2 11y ago
    What's very sad is that there are actually people out there who would read your comment and believe you to be a terrorist sympathizer. Maybe you're not even just a sympathizer... maybe you're a potential future risk! Once you say anything that could be interpreted as defending a terrorist, a pedophile, or similar evil being... you may as well be one of them.
• geekrax 11y ago
  Thing that bugs me most is the url `/customer-letter`. Is this the one and only "Customer Letter" they're ever going to write?
• gboudrias 11y ago
  I dislike Apple as a matter of principle, but I really love them when they are kicking and screaming for the right cause.
• cpt1138 11y ago
  My primary concern here is that there are 14 people dead and the powers that are asking for this obviously failed to protect them. To me the arguments people are making for Apple to comply are like abstinence education. Despite all facts pointing to the effect that with all that they ALREADY have on us they are completely useless at "protecting the American public" why are they using that as an argument here? Obviously because people are still buying it, but at some point shouldn't we point back to fact that they were unable to stop 14 people being massacred?
• exodust 11y ago
  >"hundreds of iPhones they want Apple to unlock if the FBI wins this case." Only hundreds? It's not "unlocking" anyway, it's exposing the phones to an opportunity of cracking them open. A non-trivial time-consuming task, hardly the domain of opportunistic hackers with stolen iPhones. >"government-ordered backdoor." "Backdoor" is not what is being asked for, so they shouldn't use the word "backdoor". Encryption is not under threat by this request. If raw computing power can break the encryption, then Apple should improve their encryption. Use more bits, more salt or whatever. Make it so a computer needs 50 years to crack a password, even with electronic brute force. Then it wouldn't matter whether the self-destruct kicked in or not. And no mention of the compromise offer for Apple to keep the alternative OS on their premises and destroy it after. Apple are trying just a bit too hard to "not put customers at risk". The risk is almost zero. If Apple's security was as good as they claim, then not even Apple, no matter what they did to help, could crack the phone. That's where we want to be. At the point where it simply doesn't matter what the FBI asks for, the phone is uncrackable. Sounds to me like we're not there yet. Apple helping crack this phone will help us get there. And that's why I don't agree with Apple's position here. Let's see this phone cracked open, and then evolve the security to a point where a similar request would be impossible to achieve no matter what Apple or anyone did.
  • kstenerud 11y ago
    > It's not "unlocking" anyway, it's exposing the phones to an opportunity of cracking them open. A non-trivial time-consuming task, hardly the domain of opportunistic hackers with stolen iPhones. Semantic nit picking aside, it takes a trivial amount of time for a computer electronically submitting passwords to crack a 4 digit code. > "Backdoor" is not what is being asked for, so they shouldn't use the word "backdoor". More semantic nit picking. They're asking for Apple to write software to disable the very security features that make the 4 digit passcode secure. > Make it so a computer needs 50 years to crack a password, even with electronic brute force. Then it wouldn't matter whether the self-destruct kicked in or not. Says the armchair security expert. > Apple helping crack this phone will help us get there. No, it won't. All it will do is open a new security hole where one didn't exist previously.
    • 11y ago
• ericfrederich 11y ago
  > Is it technically possible to do what the government has ordered? >>Yes, it is certainly possible to create an entirely new operating system to undermine our security features as the government wants. So... something to fix in the next release. Apple could be doing this all along. Maybe they've already done it in the past via a FISA warrant. My point is, if you rely on software for security, and that software can be "upgraded" at any time by the manufacturer, it's a problem. This is the definition of a back door. They could design their OS so that it has to be unlocked to "upgrade", but they didn't...
  • endergen 11y ago
    What you said. They do not address this in this letter.
• hahainternet 11y ago
  > Should we put in place ubiquitous video and audio surveillance in every square foot of the country just in case the FBI ever wants to review something that happened? In public areas that are often visited? Absolutely yes, an unbiased source of evidence available to the public? Excellent. > Law enforcement has apparently lost the ability to do on the ground investigation work in favor of whiz bang-ery Apple has provided a child porn trading network protected by the very principles of mathematics and their refusal to cooperate with the FBI. What they're doing is precisely what any law enforcement agency would.
  • sitharus 11y ago
    Can we not drag this down to the media scare tactic that is child pornography? For every sicko who's trading child porn there's dozens, if not hundreds, more who're trying to escape an abusive partner, leaving gangs, getting away from sexual slavery, or whistleblowing on government or companies breaching the law. Additionally, should the millions of us engaged in perfectly legitimate activities have a dossier created on our lives just in case? Imagine what could happen to that information, you could be facing secret blacklists like the UK. If Apple create this ability its use will extend past the immediate issue and affect people who genuinely need this security. In the digital world, as Apple said, you cannot destroy something or lock it away once it's used.
    • hahainternet 11y ago
      > Can we not drag this down to the media scare tactic that is child pornography? You mean can we not use the crime Apple has essentially made impossible to secure a conviction on? No, I'm sorry. Kids being raped matters. > For every sicko who's trading child porn there's dozens, if not hundreds, more who're trying to escape an abusive partner, leaving gangs, getting away from sexual slavery, or whistleblowing on government or companies breaching the law. None of which is remotely related to phones being unbreakable by law enforcement. > If Apple create this ability its use will extend past the immediate issue and affect people who genuinely need this security A fallacious slippery slope. If you let the Police search my house, they will search everyone's house without a warrant and therefore it's bad to have any searching ever.
• deleted 11y ago
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• mikeash 11y ago
  The question I'm most interested in is whether newer iPhones are still subject to this attack. Unless I missed it, no answer to that question is presented here. It sure feels to me like Apple is dancing around that issue. I'm betting that newer iPhones are still vulnerable, and Apple is a bit embarrassed at dropping the ball there. (The Secure Enclave stuff doesn't necessarily protect against this attack, it depends on how it's implemented and the official documentation doesn't quite say.) If nothing sooner, it's going to be interesting to see what happens in the fall when iOS 10 and the iPhone 7 presumably will ship, along with a new version of Apple's iOS security guide. Diffing that with the 2015 edition could prove quite educational.
  • crystalmeph 11y ago
    Yes, it seems pretty certain the Apple is going to lose this in court, and will be required to break the security on the 5c. But newer hardware with Secure Enclave could be rendered Apple-proof by preventing an update to the Secure Enclave firmware without first unlocking the phone (or still allow a locked upgrade, but wipe all user data when upgrading in that manner). The fact that they haven't said unambiguously that they can't get into newer hardware at all definitely makes it seem like they allow non-destructive updates to SE on a locked device.
  • ilyanep 11y ago
    I am not a security expert, but my understanding is that the main problems for the FBI are: a) There is a timed delay for trying new passwords after enough unsuccessful attempts and b) The phone will wipe itself after 10 unsuccessful attempts. It's pretty much only sufficient to have (a) since the delays will make it take years to guess the password by brute force. I just ctrl-f'd for "delay" in the security guidelines[0], which claim that the secure enclave is the one that enforces the timed delay[1], so I guess the only attack vector would be if you could somehow backdoor code onto the chip. I can't find anything in the guide from a quick skim, but I'd suspect the code is on a ROM chip or is somehow prevented from an upgrade without an unlock? [0] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf [1] Page 12
    • 11y ago
• spiralpolitik 11y ago
  Isn't the solution for Apple to have the phone also sign the firmware update so that the user has to enter their passcode to accept the update and sign the signature of their key. If the firmware isn't signed by both keys (the users public key being stored in the secure enclave) then the phone should refuse to boot. That way even if Apple is compelled to sign a rogue firmware, it still requires the user must also be compelled to accept it.
  • wvenable 11y ago
    It would then be impossible fix to boot issues like the recent Error 53 problem.
    • spiralpolitik 11y ago
      In the specific case of the Error 53 problem I don't see a problem. In the case fingerprint sensor has been replaced with a non standard version I really want to the phone not to boot because there is a fair chance its been compromised. (That said I think Apple's handling of the issue was terrible and it should have given a much more specific error and Apple should have been much less douchebaggy about replacing the sensor with an official version)
      • wvenable 11y ago
        That error was factory test error code -- it was never meant for end users. It was a bug, that's all. Any other kind of bug could exist that prevents a device from booting (like the recent Jan 1 1970 issue).
• uptown 11y ago
  If corporations are people, would requiring a corporation to produce work product constitute a form of slavery? Or if writing code is a form of speech, would forcing them to write code violate their constitutional right to free speech?
• edibleEnergy 11y ago
  Can they not just clone the disk and bring it up in a vm? Is there anything that would prevent them from building some tooling for that?
• glasz 11y ago
  i want to believe. but i'm having a hard time. according to the new york times, for whatever they are still worth > Apple had asked the F.B.I. to issue its application for the tool under seal. But the government made it public, prompting Mr. Cook to go into bunker mode to draft a response, according to people privy to the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/technology/how-tim-cook-became-a-bulwark-for-digital-privacy.html http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/technology/how-tim-cook-be... is the nyt reporting correct? i know they tend to side with natsec bullshit. i fear this being a really big pr stunt. also, the nsa siding with apple is just an expression of rivalry, no?