5 ms·

I honestly wonder if there should be some sort of signature or approval process on the OS vendor's part before any cert can serve as a root. I'm not sure what

by sparky_ 11y ago

I honestly wonder if there should be some sort of signature or approval process on the OS vendor's part before any cert can serve as a root. I'm not sure what that would look like and I do realize there are some 'walled garden' implications here. But honestly, I don't get how or why a userland application has any right to touch the OS' trusted CA roots. Perhaps some model similar to driver/kext signing would make sense - self signed and/or untrusted could be loaded when the system is booted with some development mode flag, but on a general user system, the only path to get your cert trusted as a root COULD be via update/push from the OS vendor.

taspeotis 11y ago
A lot of big enterprises run their own, internal, CA infrastructure. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/dd448615.aspx https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/dd448615.a... In these instances, the fact that you can add a root certificate (your own) is a feature that facilitates security.
- chinathrow 11y ago
  "feature that facilitates security." That is debatable. The device/system then doing the MITM is a prime target for attacking/exfiltration of data since everything is de- and re-encrypted there. A huge single point of failure in my opinion.
  - taspeotis 11y ago
    There are plenty of legitimate uses for your own PKI that don't involve MITM'ing your users. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a8f53a9b-f3f6-4b13-8253-dbf183a5aa62.aspx https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a8f53a9b-f3f6-4b... > Organizations can use AD CS to enhance security by binding the identity of a person, device, or service to a corresponding private key. AD CS gives organizations a cost-effective, efficient, and secure way to manage the distribution and use of certificates. > Applications supported by AD CS include Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), secure wireless networks, virtual private network (VPN), Internet Protocol security (IPsec), Encrypting File System (EFS), smart card logon, Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), and digital signatures.
    - michaelt 11y ago
      What is there in that list that you couldn't do with a legitimate CA?
      - voltagex_ 11y ago
        Should every company have to become their own CA to issue certificates?
      - taspeotis 11y ago
        Issue certificates for free and have complete control over them? Imagine if you had all your infrastructure authenticating with DigiNotar issued certificates (that you paid for) only for them to be invalidated in one day. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar
        fulafel 11y ago
        It's much more likely that your IT staff will bungle things managing your own CA. And less likely that you will notice it and successfully manage the revocation process. There's a lot of fun to be had when someone steals your root CA private keys undetected, and a lot of time & money to be spent ensuring it doesn't happen despite Murphy's law...
      - kuschku 11y ago
        Do it for cheap? It’d be extremely expensive if every university would have to pay for a full CA root certificate. Instead, just having a self-signed one, limited to their own domains and subdomains allows them to use eduroam, or provide their own signed software, or sign certificates for people who want to provide their own software, etc. Safer, simpler, and cheaper. (Although some unis actually have a CA certificate limited to *.uniname.tld)
        germanier 11y ago
        The German universities do have such a thing: They fund a network with their own backbone and all, called DFN. This organization does have a full CA root certificate which is signed by the globally trusted Deutsche Telekom CA. The DFN then signs certificates for their members. So in short the German universities operate their own CA. I don't think running this is prohibitively expensive as almost every university is member there. Page in German: https://www.pki.dfn.de/ueberblick-dfn-pki/ https://www.pki.dfn.de/ueberblick-dfn-pki/
- sjwright 11y ago
  Sure, but unless a root cert is installed as part of an Active Directory group policy, Windows should pop up a mandatory full screen warning with a very clear explanation and "No" as the default option...
  - taspeotis 11y ago
    Uh... like it already does? (Sans full screen but, c'mon now, it's a pretty big dialog.) http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/images/faq/win7certs_ie8_20.png http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/images/faq/win7certs_ie8_20.p...
    - voltagex_ 11y ago
      Yes, but why isn't the cert installation popping up that warning in this case? Also, good job USyd, training people to click through warnings :/
    - sjwright 11y ago
      That's not a warning, it's a confusing wall of text that no non-technical person is ever going to read. Click Yes.
- tyingq 11y ago
  A lot of large companies also run things like websense, which has a MITM and fake root certs at it's core so it can decide if you're looking at company approved content.
- sparky_ 11y ago
  I could see enterprise management being an exception, as there is still some (presumably) informed authority approving the installation of a cert. What I was really getting at is an average, non-technical user's home device.
Animats 11y ago
Firefox does not use the OS's certificate store. They use their own, and each root cert must pass Mozilla's own policies. There are long discussions about some cert issuers; see Mozilla's "dev-security-policy" mailing list. Somebody should file criminal charges against some of these outfits for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. From the article: "the installers are so tricky and convoluted that we aren’t sure who is technically doing the “bundling,”". Now that's a good argument that the user gave the "bundler" permission, and they have thus "exceeded authorized access", as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act puts it.
- pjc50 11y ago
  That would be great if the CFAA and the relevant police resources were actually used against fraud and abuse, rather than being used against copyright infringers all the time.
  - Animats 11y ago
    A few years ago, the FBI's online crime staffing was 50% "national security", 40% kiddie porn, and 10% everything else. Don't know if that's changed. Someone hit by this should file a criminal complaint. If nothing is done about it, that can be publicized.
- sparky_ 11y ago
  Fair point (and kudos to Mozilla), but unfortunately this doesn't protect 90% of other traffic passing through the host. As many (if not all) of the victims of this kind of attack are laypeople, a broader approach may be warranted.

by sparky_ 11y ago

taspeotis 11y ago

A lot of big enterprises run their own, internal, CA infrastructure. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/dd448615.aspx https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/dd448615.a... In these instances, the fact that you can add a root certificate (your own) is a feature that facilitates security.

chinathrow 11y ago
"feature that facilitates security." That is debatable. The device/system then doing the MITM is a prime target for attacking/exfiltration of data since everything is de- and re-encrypted there. A huge single point of failure in my opinion.
- taspeotis 11y ago
  There are plenty of legitimate uses for your own PKI that don't involve MITM'ing your users. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a8f53a9b-f3f6-4b13-8253-dbf183a5aa62.aspx https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a8f53a9b-f3f6-4b... > Organizations can use AD CS to enhance security by binding the identity of a person, device, or service to a corresponding private key. AD CS gives organizations a cost-effective, efficient, and secure way to manage the distribution and use of certificates. > Applications supported by AD CS include Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), secure wireless networks, virtual private network (VPN), Internet Protocol security (IPsec), Encrypting File System (EFS), smart card logon, Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), and digital signatures.
  - michaelt 11y ago
    What is there in that list that you couldn't do with a legitimate CA?
    - voltagex_ 11y ago
      Should every company have to become their own CA to issue certificates?
    - taspeotis 11y ago
      Issue certificates for free and have complete control over them? Imagine if you had all your infrastructure authenticating with DigiNotar issued certificates (that you paid for) only for them to be invalidated in one day. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar
      - fulafel 11y ago
        It's much more likely that your IT staff will bungle things managing your own CA. And less likely that you will notice it and successfully manage the revocation process. There's a lot of fun to be had when someone steals your root CA private keys undetected, and a lot of time & money to be spent ensuring it doesn't happen despite Murphy's law...
    - kuschku 11y ago
      Do it for cheap? It’d be extremely expensive if every university would have to pay for a full CA root certificate. Instead, just having a self-signed one, limited to their own domains and subdomains allows them to use eduroam, or provide their own signed software, or sign certificates for people who want to provide their own software, etc. Safer, simpler, and cheaper. (Although some unis actually have a CA certificate limited to *.uniname.tld)
      - germanier 11y ago
        The German universities do have such a thing: They fund a network with their own backbone and all, called DFN. This organization does have a full CA root certificate which is signed by the globally trusted Deutsche Telekom CA. The DFN then signs certificates for their members. So in short the German universities operate their own CA. I don't think running this is prohibitively expensive as almost every university is member there. Page in German: https://www.pki.dfn.de/ueberblick-dfn-pki/ https://www.pki.dfn.de/ueberblick-dfn-pki/
sjwright 11y ago
Sure, but unless a root cert is installed as part of an Active Directory group policy, Windows should pop up a mandatory full screen warning with a very clear explanation and "No" as the default option...
- taspeotis 11y ago
  Uh... like it already does? (Sans full screen but, c'mon now, it's a pretty big dialog.) http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/images/faq/win7certs_ie8_20.png http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/images/faq/win7certs_ie8_20.p...
  - voltagex_ 11y ago
    Yes, but why isn't the cert installation popping up that warning in this case? Also, good job USyd, training people to click through warnings :/
  - sjwright 11y ago
    That's not a warning, it's a confusing wall of text that no non-technical person is ever going to read. Click Yes.
tyingq 11y ago
A lot of large companies also run things like websense, which has a MITM and fake root certs at it's core so it can decide if you're looking at company approved content.
sparky_ 11y ago
I could see enterprise management being an exception, as there is still some (presumably) informed authority approving the installation of a cert. What I was really getting at is an average, non-technical user's home device.

Animats 11y ago

Firefox does not use the OS's certificate store. They use their own, and each root cert must pass Mozilla's own policies. There are long discussions about some cert issuers; see Mozilla's "dev-security-policy" mailing list. Somebody should file criminal charges against some of these outfits for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. From the article: "the installers are so tricky and convoluted that we aren’t sure who is technically doing the “bundling,”". Now that's a good argument that the user gave the "bundler" permission, and they have thus "exceeded authorized access", as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act puts it.

pjc50 11y ago
That would be great if the CFAA and the relevant police resources were actually used against fraud and abuse, rather than being used against copyright infringers all the time.
- Animats 11y ago
  A few years ago, the FBI's online crime staffing was 50% "national security", 40% kiddie porn, and 10% everything else. Don't know if that's changed. Someone hit by this should file a criminal complaint. If nothing is done about it, that can be publicized.
sparky_ 11y ago
Fair point (and kudos to Mozilla), but unfortunately this doesn't protect 90% of other traffic passing through the host. As many (if not all) of the victims of this kind of attack are laypeople, a broader approach may be warranted.