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It doesn't protect users from that yet (neither does Signal or any other alternative), but we are about to implement reproducible builds to help mitigate that b

by buu700 11y ago

It doesn't protect users from that yet (neither does Signal or any other alternative), but we are about to implement reproducible builds to help mitigate that by allowing users to independently verify that the deployed production build matches up with our source code on GitHub. That having been said, my cofounder and I are the only two people with the keys to sign releases (and as long Cyph exists they'll only ever be held by either ourselves or an equally small set of individuals deemed worthy to trust with our lives) — so you shouldn't ever expect that kind of deliberate backdoor, even if I end up in prison for refusing. We're also maintaining a strong focus on OpSec of these keys, e.g. we're about to migrate the release signing off of our (full disk encrypted) personal laptops to a dedicated air gapped environment. As far as how the tech works, we don't have a great explanation on the website yet, so this reddit comment will have to do for now: https://www.reddit.com/r/encryption/comments/4027ci/how_2_spacex_alums_are_using_encryption_for_good/cyywmc8 https://www.reddit.com/r/encryption/comments/4027ci/how_2_sp.... There's also a visualisation in http://cyph.team/producthandout http://cyph.team/producthandout, if that's helpful.

e12e 11y ago
Nice to hear that you say you have nothing up your sleeves. I believe you don't, but if you were an agent for a covert agency you would make the same claims, so they mean nothing. As for opsec on keys... the only thing making key extraction remotely difficult by a state actor is probably some form of hsm - but recalling the xbox 1 crack, I don't know how well even those stand up in practice. For everything else, I assume you're just a sneak-and-peak warrant and some cameras/listening-devices away from sharing your passphrase. Don't get me wrong, I think it's great that people are working on secure chat applications. I just think one needs to be very careful making claims that end up on the side of being secure against state actors.
- buu700 11y ago
  Definitely agreed re: the meaninglessness of my promises; if someone's threat model were to include that degree of trust in a complete stranger, then there would be no point in that person using encryption to begin with. Also agreed on all other counts; if all else failed, I have no doubt that a state actor could certainly extract our keys through targeted physical surveillance and/or force, which I don't think there's really a good workaround for short of raising our own army to protect a private bunker for air gapped release signing. What this first iteration of the air gapped environment is meant to accomplish is to simply make it that much harder. Sure, the CIA can still probably break into my home and set up a surveillance camera to steal the encryption passwords of my keys without my noticing, but what they will no longer be able to do is steal them by tampering with my laptop while my head's turned in broad daylight. As Cyph continues to grow as a company, we expect to have the resources to implement increasingly sophisticated OpSec measures.

by buu700 11y ago

e12e 11y ago

Nice to hear that you say you have nothing up your sleeves. I believe you don't, but if you were an agent for a covert agency you would make the same claims, so they mean nothing. As for opsec on keys... the only thing making key extraction remotely difficult by a state actor is probably some form of hsm - but recalling the xbox 1 crack, I don't know how well even those stand up in practice. For everything else, I assume you're just a sneak-and-peak warrant and some cameras/listening-devices away from sharing your passphrase. Don't get me wrong, I think it's great that people are working on secure chat applications. I just think one needs to be very careful making claims that end up on the side of being secure against state actors.

buu700 11y ago
Definitely agreed re: the meaninglessness of my promises; if someone's threat model were to include that degree of trust in a complete stranger, then there would be no point in that person using encryption to begin with. Also agreed on all other counts; if all else failed, I have no doubt that a state actor could certainly extract our keys through targeted physical surveillance and/or force, which I don't think there's really a good workaround for short of raising our own army to protect a private bunker for air gapped release signing. What this first iteration of the air gapped environment is meant to accomplish is to simply make it that much harder. Sure, the CIA can still probably break into my home and set up a surveillance camera to steal the encryption passwords of my keys without my noticing, but what they will no longer be able to do is steal them by tampering with my laptop while my head's turned in broad daylight. As Cyph continues to grow as a company, we expect to have the resources to implement increasingly sophisticated OpSec measures.