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While I don't doubt that's true for closed-source products, would it also be true for open source products? I've heard that some methods of IPSec key exchange a
by epistasis 11y ago
While I don't doubt that's true for closed-source products, would it also be true for open source products? I've heard that some methods of IPSec key exchange are compromised, but don't know details. Would it also be good to suspect OpenVPN's method of key exchange?
- jcrawfordor 11y agoThe vast majority of defects groups like intelligence agencies are exploiting are not going to be intentionally-placed backdoors - they're going to be typical vulnerabilities discovered the normal way, just by an organization with immense resources and no motivation to share. So the bottom-line is that it comes down to how much you trust the people that made the software. Is it a very high quality vendor? Is it a very high quality open-source project? The nice thing about open-source software is that you have a much better ability to evaluate this from the inside. Get on mailing lists, poke around trackers, and see how they usually deal with security disclosures. Do they even have a formal program to do so? I'm not sure that OpenVPN does, although a lot of distros watch that carefully.
- armitron 11y agoI'm sorry but this all comes to moot. For any opensource project of substantial size, you absolutely "have not a much better ability to evaluate this from the inside by getting on mailing list and trackers". All of that is irrelevant and a waste of time at best (at worst you're deluding yourself). Unless you're one of the few people on the planet who are good at auditing code for security vulnerabilities and devote the time to do it (or pay someone else to do the same), you have no stable basis to be making any assumptions as to the security status of a codebase. If this doesn't convince you, look at all the security-critical opensource projects that are riddled with security bugs. There is not a single one of them that hasn't been compromised time and time again. Sad but true.
- vox_mollis 11y agoSince it's now clear that "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" is patently false, the MO for said agencies to compromise OSS projects is to play the long game of making numerous benign commits, becoming trusted, then committing subtly compromised code. This would be much easier than compromising specific algorithms or KE protocols. Cheap, too. All it takes is plenty of patience.
- nyan4 11y ago> Since it's now clear that "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" is patently false "patently false". Proof needed, please, we have enough FUD.
- vox_mollis 11y agoGnuTLS and Heartbleed are pretty good examples for starters.
- MikeNomad 11y agoAnd for counter examples, I refer to the CERT emails I get regarding the latest software vulnerabilities and patches. Software security is unfortunately, a goal, not an absolute. The process is both fluid and dynamic, and the improvements iterative. To directly address the tenor of your comments, perhaps it would be better to say, "More eyes make bugs more shallow."
- nickpsecurity 11y agoOn contrary, the person making that claim needs to prove it's true or else we reject it as FUD against proprietary software. For a long time, the only software to resist prolonged pentesting by NSA were proprietary products certified to B3/A1 and Type 1 respectively. If NSA could hack them, they couldn't pass. Likewise, in safety, we've seen a number of high assurance systems fielded where every state (including failure) it could be in was known ahead of time. Some setups, like mainframes, hit 17-30 year uptime. All proprietary. Meanwhile, in OSS land, we have a steady stream of easily-prevented or detected defects that compromise security. Just like in most proprietary shops. Like proprietary, those OSS projects producing highly-secure stuff are done by great designers/coders with careful review and testing processes. The community-developed OSS hasn't reached the assurance of aforementioned proprietary systems or some in academia. Yet, highly correct or secure stuff seems equally rare in both types of development with proprietary having a bit more just because there were people paying professionals to build those. In theory, with free/cheap labor, OSS could eventually produce more but there's not enough interest. So, the endless stream of bugs in both closed and OSS software that are often really old disproves many eyes argument. It didn't work for even shallowest bugs consistently, much less deep ones. Software quality comes from people taking responsibility and putting time into QA, esp design/code review. OSS, shared-source proprietary, closed-source... always same requirement that gives quality.
- superuser2 11y agoTake a look at the CVEs. People find vulnerabilities in trusted open source projects all the time. The NSA hires a lot of smart people to spend all day looking for them and not share their findings with the Internet. No infiltration required.
- sitkack 11y agoKinda makes CERT a backwater. By the time it is public, you are already owned.