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Juniper hack has U.S. fearing foreign infiltration
- Animats 11y agoDoes Juniper not have source control? Don't they know who inserted this code?
- dietrichepp 11y agoLots of source control systems don't offer that level of verification. Even Git, with SHA-1 hashes everywhere, lets you claim to be anybody when you write a commit. The only thing you can verify the origin of in Git is the author of a tag signature, for tags that are signed with a PGP key.
- Pxtl 11y agoWell, that's the commit. Usually the "push" operation to the origin is auth'd, isn't it?
- dietrichepp 11y agoIn most common configurations, authenticated but not logged, and there is no association between the push origin and the contents. If multiple employees have push access to a common repo, then Alice can push a commit which claims to be written by Bob, and nobody would probably notice, and there would be very little forensic evidence, if any.
- TheOtherHobbes 11y agoWhich is why commercial crypto and git should never be in the same room together.
- elsjaako 11y agoWhat do you recommend instead?
- jMyles 11y ago> nobody would probably notice Really? Most two-bit cat selfie startups are at least aware enough to notice a phantom commit from Bob, but Juniper isn't?!
- PakG1 11y agoDoesn't it depend on how good their code reviews and release engineers are? You also forget how the negative attributes of big corporations (eg. size, bureaucracy, etc) can make it difficult to notice a phantom commit from Bob, especially if Bob is asleep at the wheel or not motivated.
- Bjartr 11y ago'Minor changes'
- meesterdude 11y ago> In more recent versions of Git (v1.7.9 and above), you can now also sign individual commits. https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Tools-Signing-Your-Work https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Tools-Signing-Your-Work does this resolve the issue for git? or is it still possible to subvert?
- dietrichepp 11y agoThat only solves authentication, not authorization.
- tajen 11y agoSo you can trace for sure who made every commit, but you're saying an unauthorized actor can add a commit? Well you would detect that in the code review before the release.
- chei0aiV 11y agogit supports signed pushes as well as signed commits and tags. The signed pushes thing had a vulnerability though: http://mikegerwitz.com/papers/git-horror-story http://mikegerwitz.com/papers/git-horror-story https://developer.atlassian.com/blog/2015/05/git-horror-story-loose-nonces/ https://developer.atlassian.com/blog/2015/05/git-horror-stor...
- TwoBit 11y ago"even git"? I'm not sure git is the best example of a secure system. Commercial source control systems have more serious authentication.
- dietrichepp 11y ago"Even git" because Git is known to use cryptographic hashes and cryptographically signed tags to verify contents, whereas older systems like SVN and CVS had no such structure.
- nolok 11y agoYeah but what I think he means is that in any field were security is important svn and cvs aren't relevant in anyway. Compared to other in that area, git is not the best.
- jlgaddis 11y agoOf course, OpenBSD uses CVS exclusively.
- frankzinger 11y agoSo another poster mentioned Perforce. Which "others" are you referring to?
- kingosticks 11y agoWhat do they use?
- pfortuny 11y agoProbably something with Dual_EC in it...
- raverbashing 11y ago"Commercial source control systems" are usually a steaming piece of crap and I take git over anything that was bought by the higher-ups in ties
- nickpsecurity 11y agoOne would hope. Yet, SCM security is so lax and such an afterthought that Wheeler had to write a whole piece on it: http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html After all that, only one OSS project responded with claims to meet many of the requirements. I figure the commercial situation isn't much better with most "benefits" existing on paper rather than with strong security. To top it off, anyone defending against nation-states must remember they always attack what's below and around the software. Possessing 0-days in OS or management software should let them bypass build-system security to insert stuff in. I'd say OpenBSD, memory-safe implementation, and highly-assured guard for protocol-level at a minimum if better stuff wasn't available.
- nightcracker 11y agoWe clearly need to give up more privacy and add more fast-lane backdoors to protect against these attacks.
- jaywunder 11y agoIndeed! The best thing to do would to be to ban encryption all together! /s
- mtgx 11y agoEncryption? We need to go a step further. Let's ban anything remotely secure so we can stop these backdoors with our own dozens of other backdoors!
- jonesb6 11y agoIf we make enough back doors the hackers won't know which door to take! They'll be trapped by indecision!
- marcusgarvey 11y agoRelevant and from last night's Democratic Debate. RADDATZ: You'll be happy. I'll let -- I'll let you talk then. Secretary Clinton, I want to talk about a new terrorist tool used in the Paris attacks, encryption. FBI Director James Comey says terrorists can hold secret communications which law enforcement cannot get to, even with a court order. You've talked a lot about bringing tech leaders and government officials together, but Apple CEO Tim Cook said removing encryption tools from our products altogether would only hurt law-abiding citizens who rely on us to protect their data. So would you force him to give law enforcement a key to encrypted technology by making it law? CLINTON: I would not want to go to that point. I would hope that, given the extraordinary capacities that the tech community has and the legitimate needs and questions from law enforcement, that there could be a Manhattan-like project, something that would bring the government and the tech communities together to see they're not adversaries, they've got to be partners. It doesn't do anybody any good if terrorists can move toward encrypted communication that no law enforcement agency can break into before or after. There must be some way. I don't know enough about the technology, Martha, to be able to say what it is, but I have a lot of confidence in our tech experts. And maybe the back door is the wrong door, and I understand what Apple and others are saying about that. But I also understand, when a law enforcement official charged with the responsibility of preventing attacks -- to go back to our early questions, how do we prevent attacks -- well, if we can't know what someone is planning, we are going to have to rely on the neighbor or, you know, the member of the mosque or the teacher, somebody to see something. CLINTON: I just think there's got to be a way, and I would hope that our tech companies would work with government to figure that out. Otherwise, law enforcement is blind -- blind before, blind during, and, unfortunately, in many instances, blind after. So we always have to balance liberty and security, privacy and safety, but I know that law enforcement needs the tools to keep us safe. And that's what i hope, there can be some understanding and cooperation to achieve. RADDATZ: And Governor O'Malley, where do you draw the line between national security and personal security? O'MALLEY: I believe that we should never give up our privacy; never should give up our freedoms in exchange for a promise of security. We need to figure this out together. We need a collaborative approach. We need new leadership. The way that things work in the modern era is actually to gather people around the table and figure these things out. The federal government should have to get warrants. That's not some sort of passe you know, antique sort of principle that safeguards our freedoms. But at the same time with new technologies I believe that the people creating these projects -- I mean these products also have an obligation to come together with law enforcement to figure these things out; true to our American principles and values. My friend Kashif, who is a doctor in Maryland; back to this issue of our danger as a democracy of turning against ourselves. He was putting his 10 and 12-year-old boys to bed the other night. And he is a proud American Muslim. And one of his little boys said to him, "Dad, what happens if Donald Trump wins and we have to move out of our homes?" These are very, very real issues. this is a clear and present danger in our politics within. We need to speak to what unites us as a people; freedom of worship, freedom of religion, freedom of expression. And we should never be convinced to give up those freedoms in exchange for a promise of greater security; especially from someone as untried and as incompetent as Donald Trump. RADDATZ: Thank you, Governor O'Malley. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/19/3rd-democratic-debate-transcript-annotated-who-said-what-and-what-it-meant/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/19/3r...
- im2w1l 11y agoCan we have a discussion about not every nation state being NSA and what that means?
- PakG1 11y agoOccam's Razor would say that the code was modified by a disgruntled employee just before leaving, no? Why is the jump being made to foreign governments?
- beambot 11y agoBypassing VPN encryption is only broadly useful if you can get access to packets in transit. Nation-state agencies are the only actors that probably already have such wiretaps. (As discussed here: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/12/19/juniper.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/12/19/juniper.html)
- umanwizard 11y agoNon-nation-states could still get access to a reduced set of packets. I can sit next to you in a coffee shop with public wifi and see everything in the clear if I can decrypt your VPN. Also, maybe they never intended to use it, and just wanted to make their company look bad.
- csandreasen 11y agoIs this guy sitting in a coffee shop with a 2U rackmount ScreenOS-based hardware VPN connected to his laptop? If not, this particular attack that the article is discussing wouldn't work.
- JaRail 11y agoI choose to blame Comcast -- with that backdoor in place, they have the resources to decrypt about... 300 gb/month per customer of traffic. Very interesting :D
- colordrops 11y agoOccam's Razor is heavily abused. It has a specific definition, and is typically used for scientific and metaphysical hypothesis [1], not human behavior, which is not a universal law. It is used as "a heuristic technique" and "is not considered an irrefutable principle of logic or a scientific result." Occam's Razor says nothing about what the actual truth is - it's just a tool use when choosing hypotheses to pursue. Even if we were to contort Occam's Razor into this use-case, there is countless evidence for state actors adding or requesting back doors to major routing hardware. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor
- yodsanklai 11y agoIs that a big deal? after all, it's common knowledge that the US spy routinely on their allies [1,2]. Nobody really seemed to care at the time. [1] http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/08/nsa-tapped-german-chancellery-decades-wikileaks-claims-merkel http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/08/nsa-tapped-ge... [2] https://wikileaks.org/nsa-france/ https://wikileaks.org/nsa-france/
- pekk 11y agoYou can't consistently maintain that real or alleged spying by NSA is a big bad deal, but the same thing happening to the US isn't a big bad deal, unless you just make a special exception for the sake of anti-Americanism.
- singiht34-02 11y agoI think the undercurrent that in implied is that there are countries like China who don't play by the normal rules of international espionage. Since they are so tightly coupled to Chinese industry they abuse their resources and power to feed domestic industry. To most people this seems very scummy. Are there examples the other way? Where the US stole secrets and then handed them off to domestic companies? Maybe in defense? but otherwise?
- janekm 11y agoYes, there have been such allegations. A recent case involves Airbus who allege industrial espionage in the context of revelations that the German BND helped the NSA spy on European businesses: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32542140 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32542140
- staunch 11y agoYour link does not support your confirmation. > Leaks from a secret BND document suggest that its monitoring station at Bad Aibling checked whether European companies were breaking trade embargos after a request from the NSA. If all the NSA did was look for illegal (off the books) sales of military equipment, that's exactly the kind of thing that's easy to justify ethically. If they were taking Airbus data and funneling it to Boeing, that would be highly unethical. Is there any evidence the NSA has ever been motivated by economic espionage?
- memracom 11y agoIf you have access to the build server you can modify the code, after pulling from the repo. Or, if you have access to the binary repo where the code is pushed by the build server after building (often just a file server and FTP) then you can place your own binary. Of course it us possible to use crypto hashes throughout the process to prevent these kinds of hacks from working, but... If you do that, then the security process itself is what hackers will attack. To prevent installation of exploits you really need to pay serious attention to the whole release process and not assume that anything is simple or secure. Only the paranoid can succeed in security.
- logn 11y agoLazy reporting: "The U.S. officials said they are certain U.S. spy agencies themselves aren't behind the back door." If you're not going to provide context or get a quote from a disinterested party, then just omit the US saying the US didn't do it.
- obvmn 11y agoIt is guaranteed that they would say that regardless of the truth, so the quote source is irrelevant really.
- lvs 11y agoLazy? Try spoon-fed. This whole piece stinks of astroturf.
- TheCondor 11y agoOf course they said that... This feels incredibly uncomfortable to say but in a decade or two it seem possible or maybe even likely that China, Russia and South Korea may have an edge in encryption technology and products by virtue of them actually being secure. I mean if they take cyberwar seriously, and think their economy has anything to do with national security, they'll pour energy into securing their businesses whereas the west does the opposite.
- phkahler 11y agoThey're always certain about who was not behind something. Those statements never have supporting evidence.
- mtgx 11y agoWho are these "officials" and why are they anonymous here? Anyway, what's most likely to have happened is that other nation-states discovered NSA's own backdoors and started using them. The NSA then freaked out and told Juniper it's ok to patch them now. The reason why I'm implying cooperation between Juniper and NSA is because Juniper keeps refusing to eliminate the well known Dual_EC backdoor from their systems and are giving stupid reasons for keeping it.
- forgotpwtomain 11y agoCould there be a legal case involved here? I mean if I as a customer paid for a door-lock which was marketed as "secure" and you knowingly shipped me a door-lock which can be subverted by tools some particular burglars are known to have access to? That sounds quite malicious to say the least.
- microcolonel 11y agoAt least in the literal sense, that's what you are getting when you buy a door lock marked "secure". I don't think a product like this has really been "secure" since the early 1800s or earlier.
- obvmn 11y agoOops, we didn't notice that China/Whoever was using our own back door for 3 years! Clearly we need even MORE back doors! /s
- morgante 11y agoOf course, CNN leaves out the fact that the NSA shares substantial blame for this by putting a back door into Dual_EC. This is an incredibly poignant example of the inherent danger of any cryptographic back door. It's a real shame that the media is both too technically illiterate and too pro-government to explain that.
- dsharlet 11y agoCan you explain how they are related? My understanding of this is that malicious code was deliberately added to Juniper's software, not that it exploited some existing code that Juniper thought was safe. This could happen regardless of what kind of encryption is in use in the surrounding code/infrastructure. If my understanding is correct, why is Dual_EC relevant? edit: And a follow on question: If this back door only works by assuming Dual EC is backdoored, is that not incontrovertible proof that the NSA is behind the entire thing, which there is at least some doubt that they are? That, or someone else has found the hypothesized private key in Dual EC. Either scenario seems like far more significant news than this story already is.
- morgante 11y agoDisclaimer: I am by no means a cryptography expert and my understanding of this is based on [1] and [2]. Basically, Juniper used Dual_EC, which they knew was backdoored. Because they knew it was backdoored, they replaced the NSA key with their own, which they thought made it "safe." Now it turns out that a third actor might have somehow replaced the Juniper key with their own key. The point is that by using a CSPRNG with a backdoor, even when they tried to close that backdoor, they still left a backdoor open. Dual_EC is relevant because if the USG had never promoted it there never would have been a backdoor to leave open. Another CSPRNG would have been harder to leave insecure. > If this back door only works by assuming Dual EC is backdoored, is that not incontrovertible proof that the NSA is behind the entire thing, which there is at least some doubt that they are? Not necessarily. As Juniper is supposedly not using the NSA codepoints, it could have been "any" actor which changed the back door, including but not only the NSA. Personally, I don't think it is the NSA in this case. If it were, I don't think we'd be reading about it on CNN at all. [1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/12/19/juniper.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/12/19/juniper.html [2] https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=KB28205&pmv=print&actp=LIST https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=KB28...
- rodionos 11y ago> Note that a skilled attacker would likely remove these entries from the log file, thus effectively eliminating any reliable signature that the device had been compromised Sending logs off as they're written to a centralized logging server or a time-series database would have been useful in this context.
- wtbob 11y ago> Sending logs off as they're written to a centralized logging server or a time-series database would have been useful in this context. Schneier & Kelsey's paper Secure Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics[1] seems relevant here. At the time I know that they wished to patent the work; does anyone know if a patent were granted, and if so when it expires? [1] https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/paperfiles/paper-auditlogs.pdf https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/paperfiles/paper-audit...
- floatrock 11y agoI would also assume you could do a blockchain-type log -- ie the hash of an entry includes the hash of the previous entry so that if one entry is removed, the whole thing is tamper-evident. Of course, then you need to ensure the integrity of the latest hash (if you can change one log, you can change them all). If the centralized logging server(s) are protected with the same rooted ssh, then it's just an additional step for our sophisticated state-sponsored boogeyman.
- hidroto 11y agojust print the logs as they come in.
- t0mas88 11y agoSure... "The U.S. officials said they are certain U.S. spy agencies themselves aren't behind the back door." because if they were they would immediately tell everyone. It's not like they have a political agenda to both deny involvement and blame foreign agencies... /s Either way this will have a big economic impact for Juniper. In no way are they going to win the next big banking or government contracts.
- mschuster91 11y ago> Either way this will have a big economic impact for Juniper. In no way are they going to win the next big banking or government contracts. If I were in a three-letter position at any big company, I'd choose Juniper over Cisco gear now. Juniper has proven they do code audits and throw such stuff out if they find it. Cisco, not so much.
- jlgaddis 11y agoI like the reassurance of Juniper doing code audits. If they do them regularly, though, why did it take them over three years to find this "unauthorized code"?
- mschuster91 11y agoI can imagine that the software going into a typical router is as complex and huge as the kernel. I'd guess they do rolling audits because of the complexity.
- acd 11y agoOne can start to question using proprietary security software and devices with closed source vs using opensource. If its one device, it may be in others.
- gaius 11y agoOpen source is not a panacea. It doesn't matter if the code is perfect, if the algorithm it implements is flawed.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- GTP 11y agoI hope this may let them think more seriously about the potential security threat that a so-called "governamento backdoor" would pose.
- phjesusthatguy3 11y agoCNN is the People magazine of cable network news. I suppose this story is important because it's exposing this issue to the wider American audience, but anyone who is reading HN already knows about this issue.
- cm2187 11y agoMight be the NSA, might be a foreign competitor to the NSA. In any case, don't do to others, what you wouldn't want done to you!
- jcoffland 11y agoRight, that's the spy agency moto, isn't it?
- coldcode 11y agoWhy would anyone choose to use Dual_EC even with their own keys unless they are completely ignorant or coerced? It is especially galling for people who sell supposedly secure products. I can't imagine that any competent CTO/CSO would sign off on such a stupid choice.
- jug5 11y ago"has U.S. fearing *" The American way, be afraid of anything and everything.
- Jonoco 11y ago> A senior administration official told CNN, "... The administration remains committed to enhancing our national cybersecurity by raising our cyber defenses" I hope you can see my eyes because I'm rolling them as hard as I can. This does raise the question of whether the US government is foolish enough to use insecure US made electronics. And I suppose answers it.
- DyslexicAtheist 11y agoJuniper is providing crucial Radio-access and backhaul security features to mobile network vendors such as in Nokia / NSN equipment. would be interesting to understand how these are impacted. http://www.lightreading.com/mobile/mobile-security/nsn-juniper-strengthen-mobile-ties/d/d-id/706046 http://www.lightreading.com/mobile/mobile-security/nsn-junip...