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The point of something like Halvm, the Haskell unikernel, is that can bring to bear a lot of formal methods for proving the components are secure. This sort of
by kasey_junk 11y ago
The point of something like Halvm, the Haskell unikernel, is that can bring to bear a lot of formal methods for proving the components are secure. This sort of thing is untenable in a general purpose OS, but for specialized use case it makes a lot of sense.
Here (https://github.com/GaloisInc/haskell-tor https://github.com/GaloisInc/haskell-tor) for instance is a Tor implementation written for HalVM. The surface area for proving this implementation is secure is dramatically smaller than the more general purpose one. That it is more efficient about resources means that you can run more nodes, which in this particular case is very important.
The author gave a talk at QCon last week, I can't seem to find video of it just now...
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYou're right about where it's going on that but wrong about where it is. The reason is the compiler, state of FP security analysis, and overall TCB. So much to prove that's non-trivial and even non-obvious how before we can trust as secure the object code that started as your Haskell program linking to that. I advise safe constructions of simple imperative or functional languages until INFOSEC research in security verification catches up to things like Haskell. That's basically subsets of C, Java, Ada, ML, and LISP with certifying or hand-compilation. I'd love a certified Haskell runtime, though. Tolmach et al were making progress in that direction and might pick it back up eventually.