4 ms·
Interview with a Tor developer who works on hidden services
- golergka 11y agoI think that correct definition of this article is "FAQ", not interview. The term "interview" usually implies actual conversation.
- corin_ 11y agoI disagree; Interviews range from full conversations to simple questions and answers, "FAQ" on the other hand implies many people asking the same questions, not a single interviewer asking them.
- nitrogen 11y agoQ&A might be what the OP meant?
- dang 11y ago> The term "interview" usually implies actual conversation. Usually, yes, but it's still a well-established secondary usage when the questions were sent in advance, and it's the word the article itself uses, so I think it's ok.
- jokoon 11y agoI wonder if I2P is not becoming a little more attractive than tor.
- aw3c2 11y agoUnfortunately I2P has not had nearly the same amount of research attention.
- MichaelGG 11y agoIs there added security by stacking hidden services? So a.onion is just a reverse proxy for b.onion? Buys you a bit more time before the final server gets popped? Or can you increase the number of Tor hops for your hidden service to get a similar effect? Thinking of Silk Road - was it ever proved they leaked their IP versus some more advanced way of finding the server? (I know, it's highly likely that such a poorly written system would have had a real IP leak, just wondering what documented facts we have.)
- at-fates-hands 11y agoThe investigators claimed they found it when the login page leaked its IP. It was one of the more contested facts of the case - some thought it was possible, other infosec people thought it wasn't. There are stories that say Ulbricht was notified by someone in one of the chat rooms that the site was leaking IP addresses, but Ulbricht never fixed it, which allowed the FBI to find the real server in Iceland. Wired did a great two part article on the story: http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ More articles on the leaky login page: http://www.wired.com/2014/09/the-fbi-finally-says-how-it-legally-pinpointed-silk-roads-server/ http://www.wired.com/2014/09/the-fbi-finally-says-how-it-leg... http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/dread-pirate-sunk-by-leaky-captcha/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/dread-pirate-sunk-by-leak... http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/08/leaky_captcha_behind_fbis_silk_road_rapture/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/08/leaky_captcha_behind...
- NoMoreNicksLeft 11y agoThis conversation shouldn't happen without first talking about "parallel construction". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction We know they've tapped every fiber there is, in closets and undersea. It would be simple to use timing attacks at that point. Given that they had the means, and the lack of principles to use those means, why would we believe it was anything else? We don't have to invent absurd scenarios, nor should we believe anyone else's inventions.
- unsignedint 11y ago> Yes, I do run onion services; I run an onion services on every box I have. I connect to the PC in my house from anywhere in the world through SSH—I connect to my onion service instead of my house IP. People can see my laptop accessing Tor but don’t know who I am or where I go. Funny, I do the same thing and it saved me a few times when my router went crazy and stopped port forwarding, but I still had access to it. (And successfully fixed the problem without making a visit to the site...)