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I think discussions around this are ill-served by the "upload" metaphor, as it somewhat implies that the new brain, the original brain, and the uploading proces

I think discussions around this are ill-served by the "upload" metaphor, as it somewhat implies that the new brain, the original brain, and the uploading process are all largely separate things. It seems much more likely to me that the new brain will take the form of an augmentation that survives the death of the original brain. The personality would be "uploaded" not by deliberately sampling parameters to feed a model, but by the new brain organically (heh) becoming a component and embodiment of the existing personality. I'm sure this isn't a new idea, but I don't know what it's called.

anonmeow 11y ago
They should just call it copying/copies. The prospect of having your copy managing your assets could be desirable, for example.
nbadg 11y ago
Agreed. Especially given our limited (read: virtually nonexistent) understanding of how, exactly, consciousness is created, it seems to me that this gradual transition through an organically integrated component is the most likely scenario by which a digital consciousness could be created.
- tim333 11y ago
  Or perhaps a Siri like AI could try to imitate someone or 'be' them in a way that an actor does. That seems the kind of tech we are closest to actually being able to try to build.
  - nbadg 11y ago
    I'd say that's certainly what we're closest to, but isn't the point to actually experience the transition? If all you have is an imitation, then you're still dead. Though, it might be nice to create duplicates of yourself to get more done in the day.
    - tim333 11y ago
      You could argue that when you wake up in the morning it's a new you anyway.
- mrdrozdov 11y ago
  I thought it was mutually agreed that consciousness is a while loop that needs to be paused every once in a while for garbage collection. ;)
mazsa 11y ago
Like Borges and I:) http://www.cs.northwestern.edu/~fabianb/borgesandi.html http://www.cs.northwestern.edu/~fabianb/borgesandi.html
svantana 11y ago
This is similar to the Moravec Transfer [1], a proposed method of (slowly) transitioning to a non-biological brain. Indeed the whole concept of "the self" is important to maintain, even if it is to some degree an illusion. 1. http://everything2.com/title/Moravec+Transfer http://everything2.com/title/Moravec+Transfer
- amelius 11y ago
  There is no guarantee that the subject will not lose a bit of consciousness on every neuron that is being replaced (even if, to outsiders, it appears not to be the case).
  - 0xcde4c3db 11y ago
    I would expect a hybrid meat-computer personality to notice that at some point in the transition. If not -- if consciousness is so profoundly ethereal that a person's own consciousness can be gradually replaced with a simulated one without the person themselves even noticing -- then what's the difference between the "real" consciousness and the simulation?
    - meowface 11y ago
      >then what's the difference between the "real" consciousness and the simulation? Well, isn't that the whole idea? Objectively, there is no difference. If there was, uploading wouldn't ever be possible. The only potential difference is the subjective impression of "this consciousness that I am now is the same consciousness that I was yesterday" versus "this new consciousness is an exact clone of mine, but is not really 'me'". This incremental upload technique simply tricks your subjective self into thinking there is absolutely no change in continuity.
      - pdonis 11y ago
        > This incremental upload technique simply tricks your subjective self into thinking there is absolutely no change in continuity. In other words, your subjective consciousness is somehow changed but you can't subjectively tell? What does that even mean?
saiya-jin 11y ago
IMHO - making a static full copy of my current personality is useless to me. there is no immortality of myself, just copy of mine, and we already have that in a bit different fashion - kids (I would say that's even better approach compared to 100% copy). facing my copy, there wouldn't be a reason to feel immortal - I would die anyway, and the other guy would continue to live. so immortality for me means preserving my own instance of me, anything else is just not there. it seems to me this would be much harder to implement compared to creating a copy, so this would be available much later, and who knows with what consequences. this is not possible in our timelines, and frankly, I don't mind. kids are good enough solution, and as previous generations made space for our, I will make some space for next ones, hoping they'll get a bit closer to stars than we did. once we settle through Milky way, our extinction on short or medium time scale should be less probable compared to single-planet situation.
- Qwertious 11y ago
  >facing my copy, there wouldn't be a reason to feel immortal - I would die anyway, and the other guy would continue to live. so immortality for me means preserving my own instance of me, anything else is just not there. it seems to me this would be much harder to implement compared to creating a copy, so this would be available much later, and who knows with what consequences. Do it while you're unconscious. You go to sleep, then wake up in a different body. No existential crises needed.

anonmeow 11y ago

They should just call it copying/copies. The prospect of having your copy managing your assets could be desirable, for example.

nbadg 11y ago

Agreed. Especially given our limited (read: virtually nonexistent) understanding of how, exactly, consciousness is created, it seems to me that this gradual transition through an organically integrated component is the most likely scenario by which a digital consciousness could be created.

tim333 11y ago
Or perhaps a Siri like AI could try to imitate someone or 'be' them in a way that an actor does. That seems the kind of tech we are closest to actually being able to try to build.
- nbadg 11y ago
  I'd say that's certainly what we're closest to, but isn't the point to actually experience the transition? If all you have is an imitation, then you're still dead. Though, it might be nice to create duplicates of yourself to get more done in the day.
  - tim333 11y ago
    You could argue that when you wake up in the morning it's a new you anyway.
mrdrozdov 11y ago
I thought it was mutually agreed that consciousness is a while loop that needs to be paused every once in a while for garbage collection. ;)

mazsa 11y ago

Like Borges and I:) http://www.cs.northwestern.edu/~fabianb/borgesandi.html http://www.cs.northwestern.edu/~fabianb/borgesandi.html

svantana 11y ago

This is similar to the Moravec Transfer [1], a proposed method of (slowly) transitioning to a non-biological brain. Indeed the whole concept of "the self" is important to maintain, even if it is to some degree an illusion. 1. http://everything2.com/title/Moravec+Transfer http://everything2.com/title/Moravec+Transfer

amelius 11y ago
There is no guarantee that the subject will not lose a bit of consciousness on every neuron that is being replaced (even if, to outsiders, it appears not to be the case).
- 0xcde4c3db 11y ago
  I would expect a hybrid meat-computer personality to notice that at some point in the transition. If not -- if consciousness is so profoundly ethereal that a person's own consciousness can be gradually replaced with a simulated one without the person themselves even noticing -- then what's the difference between the "real" consciousness and the simulation?
  - meowface 11y ago
    >then what's the difference between the "real" consciousness and the simulation? Well, isn't that the whole idea? Objectively, there is no difference. If there was, uploading wouldn't ever be possible. The only potential difference is the subjective impression of "this consciousness that I am now is the same consciousness that I was yesterday" versus "this new consciousness is an exact clone of mine, but is not really 'me'". This incremental upload technique simply tricks your subjective self into thinking there is absolutely no change in continuity.
    - pdonis 11y ago
      > This incremental upload technique simply tricks your subjective self into thinking there is absolutely no change in continuity. In other words, your subjective consciousness is somehow changed but you can't subjectively tell? What does that even mean?

saiya-jin 11y ago

IMHO - making a static full copy of my current personality is useless to me. there is no immortality of myself, just copy of mine, and we already have that in a bit different fashion - kids (I would say that's even better approach compared to 100% copy). facing my copy, there wouldn't be a reason to feel immortal - I would die anyway, and the other guy would continue to live. so immortality for me means preserving my own instance of me, anything else is just not there. it seems to me this would be much harder to implement compared to creating a copy, so this would be available much later, and who knows with what consequences. this is not possible in our timelines, and frankly, I don't mind. kids are good enough solution, and as previous generations made space for our, I will make some space for next ones, hoping they'll get a bit closer to stars than we did. once we settle through Milky way, our extinction on short or medium time scale should be less probable compared to single-planet situation.

Qwertious 11y ago
>facing my copy, there wouldn't be a reason to feel immortal - I would die anyway, and the other guy would continue to live. so immortality for me means preserving my own instance of me, anything else is just not there. it seems to me this would be much harder to implement compared to creating a copy, so this would be available much later, and who knows with what consequences. Do it while you're unconscious. You go to sleep, then wake up in a different body. No existential crises needed.