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Microsoft, stop sending user identifiers in clear text
- digital-rubber 11y ago#care
- _nedR 11y agoWhile you're at it Microsoft, please also give a way for users to remotely log out all active sessions on other computers and devices.
- c54 11y agoWhat would you want this feature for?
- wernercd 11y agoSecurity? Forget to log off somewhere, cell phone gets stolen, account gets hacked... It's nice to be able to force logoff everywhere.
- scott_karana 11y agoIt's nice being able to invalidate tokens on demand. However, in the case of a hack/theft, shouldn't changing your password also invalidate all login tokens? You'd be doing that anyways. Right? ;)
- mglinski 11y agoIt's a terrible hack, but changing your Skype password via their website does log you out of all active sessions within a 2-5 minute timeframe. A friends Skype got "hacked" via a third party botting a message to all of his contacts, and as soon as I changed the password the spam stopped and soon after his local client logged out.
- r00fus 11y agoIt's not a hack... this is exactly what is guaranteed for OAuth2 servers that follow spec to deauthorize all tokens.
- Kiro 11y agoHow should Microsoft resolve this? Not using CIDs at all?
- po1nter 11y agoNot include them in the (sub)domain name?
- Kiro 11y agoSo it's fine to use them in the query string?
- noselasd 11y agoThat would at least not reveal them in DNS queries, or the TLS SNI
- mrcarrot 11y agoWell they wouldn't be included in DNS lookups if they were not in the host name.
- _nedR 11y agoSo long as the query is passed over HTTPS, it is encrypted. But the domain/subdomain info is not concealed by HTTPS.
- ramen-hero 11y agoThe profile picture URL looks like “https://cid-___.users.storage.live.com/___”. Both the host part and the path part contain your CID. The CID in the host name really doesn’t have an effect (from the client’s perspective); you could use, for example, “cid-0000000000000000.users.storage.live.com” instead, or really just “storage.live.com”.
- drdaeman 11y ago1. Not using any persistent identifiers when they're transferred as plain text. 2. Not allowing to retrieve any information based on persistent identifier alone i.e. require authentication for all resources (unless all data under some resource was explicitly meant to be publicly available). 3. Optionally, try to get rid of any long-term persistent identifiers (of course, besides Microsoft account ID which is meant to be persistent), in favor of ephemeral ones that are reasonably short-lived and rotated frequently.
- jo909 11y agoIsn't the real point that one should not be able to obtain that much information simply by knowing some user id or user name? I would guess plenty of services include the username in some URLs. Edit: of course the autor also stated that, but more as a side note. Leaking the CID would not be a problem if there wasn't any futher information to be gained.
- pdkl95 11y agoIt is well known that unique identifiers are used to identify general internet traffic as the host moves to different IPs. This works even when the intended meaning of that identifier isn't known. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/nsa-turns-cookies-and-more-surveillance-beacons https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/nsa-turns-cookies-and-...
- jo909 11y agoFair argument that every unique id or name makes you trackable, but that is a much bigger (and IMHO long lost) battle on so many fronts, and it does not seem very fair to single out Microsoft here. And I don't think that is the motivation of the author either.
- pdkl95 11y agoI'm absolutely not singling out Microsoft, and I'm not sure why you would think I was. Anybody that is regularly putting a unique identifier in plaintext network traffic is harming their users, and that goes for Microsoft embedding CIDs in dommain names, Verizon with their X-UIDH vandalism, Google's 3rd-party tracking cookies, and the like similar. Also, you will never win a war if you give up the fight. This battle is absolutely not "long lost". The only way that could be true is if you give up, thereby self-fulfilling the prediction.
- aembleton 11y agoI noticed that my bank (Halifax) sends a long numerical code to webtrends for every page that I visit. The code that it sends seems to be unique for each session. This is blocked by uBlock but it is concerning.
- spydum 11y agoDifferent problem. That session identifier is probably unique to each session. The complaint here is that the CID is always the same for you, and can be used to look up more information (your profile)
- rasz_pl 11y agohttp://www.windytan.com/2015/04/trackers-and-bank-accounts.html http://www.windytan.com/2015/04/trackers-and-bank-accounts.h...
- eponeponepon 11y agoIntriguing that this renders Tor essentially transparent in some contexts - that could almost seem by design. I guess (unless Tor is completely broken) that there would still be more legwork involved in associating traffic from the endpoint with its corresponding traffic into Tor, but even "user logs into that service through Tor" is still a pretty fertile datapoint. Obviously Microsoft would be able to see that pretty easily anyway, but why would they make it easy for others to see it too?
- devit 11y agoWhy? DNS lookups are routed through Tor just like HTTP/TCP traffic (in implementations that aren't broken).
- eponeponepon 11y agoAh, OK, I see. My understanding of Tor is far from complete, I should point out - it's not my area of expertise at all, and I'm just an interested observer! But surely the point still stands? Even if you only see the DNS lookup as it emerges from the endpoint, you still know that User XYZ uses Tor to access Service ABC, correct?
- devit 11y agoThe enemy sees that someone using Tor exit node E is accessing Microsoft using user id XYZ and they can infer that other traffic coming out of exit node E is also more likely than average to be from the owner of Microsoft account XYZ. Obviously, the enemy may know more about the owner of Microsoft account XYZ: for example, they may know the name you typed when registering it or, if you login to the same account from your home internet connection, they may know that it is the same person that had assigned IP I at time T and may thus know that it is the same person that the ISP who was assigned the IP address block containing IP I claimed presented ID stating he was Mr X to the ISP as part of subscribing to the ISP. This means that between accessing the Microsoft account XYZ and doing other things that you don't want to be associated to the owner of Microsoft account XYZ, you should use the "New Identity" button in Tor Browser, or use a separate machine or Tor Browser instance. Of course you cannot know which services reveal your user id to your enemies, so you should always do that regardless of whether the service is known to send it in plain text or not.
- vbezhenar 11y agoAnother concern: modern HTTPS use SNI standard and those who sniff your traffic, can extract the hostname from this traffic, because it's not encrypted yet. So DNS sniffing is not necessary, if I understand everything correctly. I would consider that as misuse of DNS. User id must be in request parameter or path, not in hostname.
- bargl 11y agoIf you can look up skype Id by CID then this also opens your IP up to discovery. Which is a really big deal for people who stream (like my little brother). But I have no confirmation that is possible or not. Just speculation.
- mdpopescu 11y agoAs far as I know, this used to be a big problem in the Starcraft 2 pro gamer community, before everyone switched to naming their account "||||||||" or some such. (They would get DDOSed a lot.)
- nv-vn 11y agoLet's not forget the whole Skype thing where knowing a user's ID is enough to edit any of their messages.
- philliphaydon 11y agoEveryone seems to talk about what MS should do, and why it's bad. But I wonder why the people working on these systems do not think or feel the same, and want to fight internally to fix it etc.