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Doesn't PGP subkeys already essentially solve the problem of requiring shared private key on devices? Its not immediately obvious what the main benefits of thei
by zokier 11y ago
Doesn't PGP subkeys already essentially solve the problem of requiring shared private key on devices? Its not immediately obvious what the main benefits of their solution are.
- subway 11y agoI'd like to know how they plan on dealing with subkeys -- my Keybase key is an ed25519 key kept offline, with a set of RSA subkeys generated directly on a Yubikey. This lets me use my key on an Android device (via Open Keychain), or PC (via GnuPG's smart card interface.) I don't want additional NaCL keys hanging around on 'online' machines outside of a secure element such as a smart card.
- jmgrosen 11y ago> my Keybase key is an ed25519 key Could you explain how you did this? I was under the impression it was impossible because Curve25519 encryption isn't implemented yet.
- subway 11y agoThe offline key isn't used for encryption, only signing. In this case, signing the subkeys, which are used for encryption (or auth, or signing). Really not all that different from past days of having a dsa key with an el gamal subkey for encryption.
- oconnor663 11y agoI don't think it's possible to issue subkeys that can create further subkeys, or revoke each other. You have to use the master key for that, which means going back to your safety deposit box or the center of the Earth or wherever it is you keep it. We don't want to make people do that, so we can't represent your set of devices as subkeys of a single PGP key.
- e12e 11y agoI wonder about this too. I'm not even sure what this feature is supposed to do? As best I can gather, this ties signing to keybase.io (which is anchored in a GPG-key). But it's unclear to me how this is an improvement for users. If you sign anything with a nacl sub-key, that can't be verified with gpg? It's not even clear if this will work off-line, when keybase is down, when keybase have revoked your account...? > Technically, though, this is not a normal 2fa: the devices will share a secret with just each other. This is exactly 2fa: two devices sharing a secret? Normally your idp and your TOTP app/token share a secret, now two of your devices share a secret? I very much welcome someone hammering out a standard equivalent to GPG, but based on NaCL, that is: have a master key (off-line), have a private-sub-key (on-line, protected by smart card/pass phrase), enable further sub-keys -- and a companion tool (set) for verifying up the chain (like gpg2 --verify file.asc, but with file.asc being backed by a (device) sub-key, signed by the private key, signed by the "master" off-line key -- and allow for revoking "from this key and down" (eg: I lost my phone, revoke phone-key, my laptop got hacked, revoke my sub-key, and all device keys...)). But I'm not sure if that is what keybase is trying to do? I'm not even sure if it really makes sense to keep backwards comparability with GPG -- the main thing would probably be to be compatible with GPG agent and smartcards. For most everything else, I think a new standard would be a good thing. Perhaps with some kind of bridge, for easier transition (eg: nacl-gpg --verify file.asc, which gives similar output/return-codes to gpg, while file.asc can be signed by a "nacl-key" trusted by a gpg key. But the complexity would probably make for a less secure system until everyone could just move on to the new standard).