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The entire SSL infrastructure we use is not only looking at you side-eyed, but also asking you if you've checked your SSL root certificate list lately. Just sa

The entire SSL infrastructure we use is not only looking at you side-eyed, but also asking you if you've checked your SSL root certificate list lately. Just saying, our life is full of secret master keys. Most of the products built here rely on secret master keys. There really isn't any way to get around secret master keys. The problem here is that we don't trust the TSA to secure said master keys. In part because it's an incredibly hard problem since any image capture device glimpsing them can enable reproduction, but also because the TSA doesn't incentivise its employees well enough (see pay bands here: http://www.federallawenforcement.org/tsa/ http://www.federallawenforcement.org/tsa/ and note that airport security folks won't be making even $70k a year).

TD-Linux 11y ago
It's more of an example of why widely distributed, irrevocable master keys are a bad idea. In addition, it's also an example of why end-user-owned but secret master keys don't work (see DRM). The picture taken was totally not necessary to make these 3D models. You could just buy one of each of the seven lock types, and saw them open to look at the pin arrangements.
- KirinDave 11y ago
  > The picture taken was totally not necessary to make these 3D models. You could just buy one of each of the seven lock types, and saw them open to look at the pin arrangements. Is it really that simple with modern locks? I thought they had gotten good at foiling this kind of attack.
  - TD-Linux 11y ago
    Newer locks are designed to be hard to pick. If you have complete, destructive access to the lock, there's nothing they can do.
InclinedPlane 11y ago
Are your implying that the ssl CA system isn't a huge shit show? Because it is, and it's only incrementally more secure than the tsa keys.
- KirinDave 11y ago
  I'm just saying that at some point you need to accept a fundamental level of insecurity. Being mad at the TSA for copying the model everyone already uses is sort of pointless until we start to provide better alternatives.
IshKebab 11y ago
Well, yeah, and SSL's key system is widely regarded as awful and insecure. That's why things like certificate pinning, DANE (using DNSSEC for SSL certificates), and HSTS were invented.
- dragonwriter 11y ago
  > Well, yeah, and SSL's key system is widely regarded as awful and insecure. Its not really the key system so much as the fact that the first step of trust is broken because end-users aren't directly choosing trusted root CAs, they are being chosen on behalf of the end users by third parties whose interests aren't aligned with those of the end user, and who do as much as possible to remove (or at least obscure) end-user control of that most fundamental step in the delegation of trust that underlies SSL's key system.

TD-Linux 11y ago

It's more of an example of why widely distributed, irrevocable master keys are a bad idea. In addition, it's also an example of why end-user-owned but secret master keys don't work (see DRM). The picture taken was totally not necessary to make these 3D models. You could just buy one of each of the seven lock types, and saw them open to look at the pin arrangements.

KirinDave 11y ago
> The picture taken was totally not necessary to make these 3D models. You could just buy one of each of the seven lock types, and saw them open to look at the pin arrangements. Is it really that simple with modern locks? I thought they had gotten good at foiling this kind of attack.
- TD-Linux 11y ago
  Newer locks are designed to be hard to pick. If you have complete, destructive access to the lock, there's nothing they can do.

InclinedPlane 11y ago

Are your implying that the ssl CA system isn't a huge shit show? Because it is, and it's only incrementally more secure than the tsa keys.

KirinDave 11y ago
I'm just saying that at some point you need to accept a fundamental level of insecurity. Being mad at the TSA for copying the model everyone already uses is sort of pointless until we start to provide better alternatives.

IshKebab 11y ago

Well, yeah, and SSL's key system is widely regarded as awful and insecure. That's why things like certificate pinning, DANE (using DNSSEC for SSL certificates), and HSTS were invented.

dragonwriter 11y ago
> Well, yeah, and SSL's key system is widely regarded as awful and insecure. Its not really the key system so much as the fact that the first step of trust is broken because end-users aren't directly choosing trusted root CAs, they are being chosen on behalf of the end users by third parties whose interests aren't aligned with those of the end user, and who do as much as possible to remove (or at least obscure) end-user control of that most fundamental step in the delegation of trust that underlies SSL's key system.