5 ms·
OpenSSL's implementation of DSA appears to be broken
- ryan-c 11y agoOpenSSL allows (by virtue of doing nothing to check for) composite p and/or q for RSA keys. Is there something here beyond "if you use parameters from an untrusted source you might have a bad time"?
- tptacek 11y agoI don't think so.
- sarciszewski 11y agoWhy would anyone use DSA in this day and age anyway? EdDSA is where it's at.
- alcari 11y agoPeople use DSA for the same reasons they use RC4, 3DES, and MD5: that's what the other party's 10 year old legacy platform that will never be updated supports.
- mtgx 11y agoThen those others parties get hacked to hell and put out statements such as "We care deeply about our customers' security!"
- Twirrim 11y agoIt's a hard call for service providers. Sort of catch-22. They have to support old ciphers because most of their possible customers are running old software or operating systems that don't support newer ciphers. So to make money they're effectively forced to take a more insecure position. They can care deeply about customer security, while effectively being forced to offer only the most secure that their customers will support, and having to accept that ugly compromise as a necessity of remaining in business.
- illumen 11y agoSetting up a proxy for those customers is possible. Different end points for those customers is possible. Reverse proxy is not such a hard setup task these days. But really it's about everyone just being human, and therefore crap at these things. Once security 'products' realise this, and cope well with people being rubbish at their jobs, then those products will make a lot of money... If only the people measuring ROI were also not rubbish at their jobs... ;)
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- rurban 11y agoOnly if you care about performance. But not everybody is happy about the chosen magic curve parameters, which could include backdoors.
- wbl 11y agoI've discovered similar issues in TLS implementations, but I don't think this is actually a vulnerability without more details. Just because a client will use bad parameters doesn't mean that it will use its existing key with those bad parameters. It shouldn't be hard to make a PoC if this is in fact what is going on.
- ambrop7 11y agoI don't completely understand the description but I think they managed to extract the private key of the server.
- tptacek 11y agoThe linked discussion between Guninski and Peter Gutmann on the Cypherpunks list is much more interesting. Since there's probably no implementation of any crypto standard that has ever gotten parameter validation right, calling it a "backdoor" is a bit of a stretch.
- tedunangst 11y agoI think there is an argument to be made that the ongoing requirement for "flexible" crypto represents a backdoor. We know enough to say it'll never be right. Even in the 90s, when we didn't perhaps have hard earned experience, I think we knew enough to say it wasn't proven secure, and therefore the safe choice would be less flexible. No, it's not specifying a particular backdoor, but if you make something hard enough you can be assured one will develop organically. And even if it's not deliberate malfeasance, can we at least call it callous negligence?
- bro-stick 11y agoTLS is a pile of IETF design-by-committee extensions uncomfortable with saying "no;" OpenSSL is a mountainous kitchen sink of TLS and other features. OpenSSL seems to "work," but the endless pattern of vulnerabities lies in the risky process in which code is developed, lightly tested and pushed out as a production release... That hasn't changed enough to convince me they're going to get proactive and stop SNAFUBAR anytime soon. 'cperciva was on the right track about a better protocol would encode parameters much more simply and have just enough options for an important gamut of use-cases. The issue is we're seemingly stuck on TLS everywhere and would require massive cost and coordination pains to use something, even if it were 10X better and formally-proven.
- dlitz 11y agoIt would be fairly cheap if we got our secure-connection APIs right. Upgrading the protocol should be as simple as upgrading any system library.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- nextos 11y agoWhy don't we start implementing this kind of software in ways that can be formally verified? Sounds crazy hard, but it's not that difficult. For example, Airbus fly-by-wire system was proven not to have any runtime errors using abstract interpretation. And it's coded in a subset of C. [1] One can formulate other analyses to look for e.g. leaked information. I think 70s tech doesn't cut it when dealing with formidable adversaries like NSA. [1] http://www.astree.ens.fr/ http://www.astree.ens.fr/
- serge2k 11y agoThis would help how in this case?
- bro-stick 11y agoFormal methods have their place. I think we do need more waterfall-type design and documentation of cryptosystems (not massive pointless documentation, but relevant documentation and security/engineering tradeoffs design justifications.) Also, for more and better eyeballs to audit code, it needs to be simple and clear code. More thorough C unit/system testing, fuzzing and static/dynamic analysis steps as standard would help... I think a project/startup which could be like a TravisCI for the security and correctness of C code would work because there's just so much C code which needs better coverage.
- pascal_cuoq 11y agoProving formal properties requires formal specifications. “absence of undefined behavior”, the property that Astrée more or less verifies, is one more or less formal piece of specification that authors of formal tools for C get for free. In reality, they get to formalize it themselves, because the C standards are written in English and contain much ambiguity, and their interpretation evolves over time. Two decades ago, signed arithmetic overflow was described as undefined because everyone “knew” that the authors of the standard wanted to accommodate 1's complement and sign-magnitude, and therefore everyone assumed that if you knew your architecture was 2's complement, you could expect 2's complement behavior. The issue being discussed here is not one of having undefined behavior, though. OpenSSL is being blamed with not satisfying a property that it wasn't even documented as having, much less formally specified. Your comparison to aeronautics code is also omitting the price of developing to aeronautics safety standards. For one thing, in aeronautics it is decided in advance what the software will do, and the software is implemented to have only these features. This is not how OpenSSL got to where it is today! Astrée is only used to verify one aspect of the safety of part of the code in the aircraft, so it is really not a good example to use here. If you wanted to make a strong case, you could use miTLS: http://www.mitls.org/wsgi/home http://www.mitls.org/wsgi/home And since miTLS already exists, you can ask the question of why it is not used in place of OpenSSL. Part of the answer is that it is F# and is only likely to interface easily with .NET projects. My employer sells formal verification reports for open-source software. One piece of software we have formally verified with a tool comparable to Astrée is PolarSSL: http://trust-in-soft.com/polarssl-verification-kit/ http://trust-in-soft.com/polarssl-verification-kit/ This verification did not check whether the algebraic properties of any key are correctly validated in any of the cases where this would be relevant, because that's outside the perimeter. The verification sets out to verify that the code doesn't have any of the problems of the sort that Astrée would find (and a bit more), and it does exactly that.
- peterwwillis 11y agoI feel like if an implementation (or RFC) had a spelling error in it, people would be screaming backdoor. Granted, this spec is from 1996? But I think the fact that nobody ever used this speaks for itself; why backdoor a standard nobody would ever use?
- alexdowad 11y agoCan someone explain the vulnerability this post is talking about in simpler terms?