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All new evidence points to the fact that the Japanese were thinking of surrendering and that the Americans new it, before the bombs were dropped. Also it shows

All new evidence points to the fact that the Japanese were thinking of surrendering and that the Americans new it, before the bombs were dropped. Also it shows that the bombs had little to no effect on their reasoning. They whished to surrender on their own terms which they did, more or less, despite the "unconditional surrender" bs.

dabeeeenster 11y ago
Further reading on this (really interesting piece) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japa...
- talmand 11y ago
  I find it interesting but doesn't convince me. Their timeline, 20/20 hindsight, ability to predict a future without the bombings, and definitive "we know, know!, they were unnecessary" doesn't make me think highly of their argument. My favorite example is that the first bombing only required one initial report from the governor for the council to understand what happened. The second bombing had a similar verbal report but they had to wait another day to get the full report to understand what happened. Never mind the fact they don't seem to grasp the significance that one bomb dropped from one plane equaled up to 10,000 bombs, or more, from around 500 planes. Is there no consideration in that leisurely dropping one bomb delivered more kilotons than a full scale air raid is a major show of force? With the obvious promise of more to come? For my part, I would say that the bombing were not the full reason for the surrender. But they did play a major part. They faced either nuclear destruction from the US or being totally wiped out by the Soviets invading. If the Chinese didn't get their licks in too.
bpodgursky 11y ago
What are you talking about? Japan completely gave up on declaring their own terms. Taking away the godhood of the emperor was a colossal blow. If Japan surrendered on their own terms, there would absolutely have been no occupation. Japan for a decade after the war was a completely occupied, controlled, planned state (by the US). They got NONE of their own terms. What about "unconditional surrender" is BS?
- JoeAltmaier 11y ago
  The Emperor remained in his palace, with his traditional signs of power. For the Japanese, that was huge.
  - bpodgursky 11y ago
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito "U.S. General Douglas MacArthur insisted that Emperor Hirohito retain the throne. MacArthur saw the Emperor as a symbol of the continuity and cohesion of the Japanese people. " That was a tactical US decision to help reconstruction. It had nothing to do with the Japanese govt wanting it.
davidjeet 11y ago
What is your source for this new evidence? There is overwhelming evidence that is quite the contrary to what you are saying at the time it happened (which is why they dropped the bomb) and even now in retrospect.
Jeema101 11y ago
I've heard that claim made before, but the fact is that the Emperor specifically mentioned the atomic bomb in his surrender speech. That seems to me to be the most powerful evidence against the notion that it had 'little or no effect' on their reasoning... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyokuon-h%C5%8Ds%C5%8D https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyokuon-h%C5%8Ds%C5%8D
sanoli 11y ago
What new evidence? I searched for this a couple of months ago and found that the "Japanese were close to surrendering" is one more recent 'internet myth' that's been propagating lately, with no real hard, substantiated evidence. Please help me correct myself on this issue.
- JoeAltmaier 11y ago
  Documentary (Nova?) showed Emperor was planning how to secure his sigils of power, hide out. They were planning to lose, at any rate. But this is hearsay; I don't have a reference to that documentary.
- notahacker 11y ago
  The intercepts collected by the Allies on the internal debates of some of the Japanese, and the internal debates the US decision makers had over whether to opt for unconditional surrender or something believed to be more likely to be accepted are pretty well documented by this reasonably neutral source: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/ http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/
  - hga 11y ago
    I'd really appreciate your at least calling out which of these 75 documents supports this thesis. I started skimming the titles and descriptions but didn't find anything contradicting the Official Story which I've been studying closely for the last few months before giving up. Yes, of course, the Japanese were considering surrender, that was no secret to our decision makers, and yes, of course there was consideration of relaxing "unconditional" surrender, as we signaled to them WRT to the Emperor. We weren't stupid, that was one of many reasons War Secretary Stimpson removed Kyoto from all target lists (he was familiar with the east Pacific region and had visited the city prior to the war).
    - notahacker 11y ago
      Fair enough. Try documents 33 and especially 40 Of course it doesn't make it clear that some form of surrender is going to be straightforward since the Ambassador who's outspoken in acknowledging Japan should accept a settlement like that forced on Germany as the only way to preserve the Emperor is not in a position to influence an internal vote, and the more important Foreign Minister attempting to arrange "end the war" is also quite adamant that it won't be "like a unconditional surrender". But it's also impossible to cogently argue that the US, being aware through intercepts that Japanese ministers both (i) want peace and acknowledge it might be painful and (ii) don't want peace if it involves "unconditional surrender", was sincerely interested in avoiding further casualties when after internal debate they chose to unambiguously insist upon (ii) being the condition for not wiping out cities. Document 49, an appraisal of the situation which opens "President, Leahy and JFB agreed Japan looking for peace. President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia rather than some country like Sweden" is a reasonable indication the substance of these intercepts was available to Truman and other decision makers. Easy to see why the U.S. wanted to avoid protracted and potentially duplicitous negotiations via their frenemies; less easy to set the value of uncomplicated negotiations at ~200,000 lives... As for Stimson, he wasn't stupid, but he was also heavily outgunned by the war party when it came to arguing for the relaxation of unconditional surrender, which is why it was not included in the Potsdam declaration against his express wishes. [There's also no evidence that signals of the relaxation of unconditional surrender were sent separately from this (and abundant evidence from cables the US was intercepting either side of Hiroshima that even Japan's peaceniks were only hoping they might be able to secure the Emperor's status)] The US had of course outlined conditions for peace much earlier (before it was clear Japan had lost) which included a right to choose a form of government, were aware the Japanese ambassador was using this as a basis to argue the emperor's status might be an acceptable surrender condition prior to the Potsdam Declaration, and yet opted to remove signals of the Emperor's status from earlier drafts of that ultimatum before issuing it. Given all this was known and debated at the time, it's difficult to cogently argue the Potsdam Declaration that actually went out was intended as anything other than a prelude to dropping the bomb.
maratd 11y ago
> All new evidence points to the fact that the Japanese were thinking of surrendering and that the Americans new it, before the bombs were dropped. What new evidence? This doesn't even make sense. There were fighting until the last man on every island up to that point. What signs of surrender were there?
- JoeAltmaier 11y ago
  Internal documents (unavailable to the Allies) show they were actually coming up with terms of surrender. But that's not fair; the Allies didn't know. Its hindsight.
  - notahacker 11y ago
    The Allies responsible for making the decision did have access to intelligence reports making it clear that senior representatives of the Japanese were trying to mediate an end to the war, including explicitly quoting many of the Japanese comments - both intentional communications and intercepts - to that effect. There's no shortage of notes to suggest that White House decision makers were aware of these and debated the possibility that including a guarantee of the Emperor's position in the Potsdam Declaration might have made surrender possible, but didn't want Russians as mediators and were more concerned about domestic opinion of demanding anything other than unconditional surrender than actually hastening the surrender. Ultimately these considerations (and others) took precedence over saving lives, and if anything is hindsight bias it's the [plausible] argument that a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Japan was achieved through insisting on total defeat and not involving any Soviet "mediation".
    - hga 11y ago
      Well, by then we were starting to get a good take on what the post-war Soviets were going to be like, and with FDR's death and Truman, not previously an insider, the government wasn't quite so in thrall to them. However we did signal flexibility to the Japanese about the Emperor's position; we weren't stupid, we knew that might be part of an acceptable and otherwise "unconditional" surrender.

dabeeeenster 11y ago

Further reading on this (really interesting piece) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japa...

talmand 11y ago
I find it interesting but doesn't convince me. Their timeline, 20/20 hindsight, ability to predict a future without the bombings, and definitive "we know, know!, they were unnecessary" doesn't make me think highly of their argument. My favorite example is that the first bombing only required one initial report from the governor for the council to understand what happened. The second bombing had a similar verbal report but they had to wait another day to get the full report to understand what happened. Never mind the fact they don't seem to grasp the significance that one bomb dropped from one plane equaled up to 10,000 bombs, or more, from around 500 planes. Is there no consideration in that leisurely dropping one bomb delivered more kilotons than a full scale air raid is a major show of force? With the obvious promise of more to come? For my part, I would say that the bombing were not the full reason for the surrender. But they did play a major part. They faced either nuclear destruction from the US or being totally wiped out by the Soviets invading. If the Chinese didn't get their licks in too.

bpodgursky 11y ago

What are you talking about? Japan completely gave up on declaring their own terms. Taking away the godhood of the emperor was a colossal blow. If Japan surrendered on their own terms, there would absolutely have been no occupation. Japan for a decade after the war was a completely occupied, controlled, planned state (by the US). They got NONE of their own terms. What about "unconditional surrender" is BS?

JoeAltmaier 11y ago
The Emperor remained in his palace, with his traditional signs of power. For the Japanese, that was huge.
- bpodgursky 11y ago
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito "U.S. General Douglas MacArthur insisted that Emperor Hirohito retain the throne. MacArthur saw the Emperor as a symbol of the continuity and cohesion of the Japanese people. " That was a tactical US decision to help reconstruction. It had nothing to do with the Japanese govt wanting it.

davidjeet 11y ago

What is your source for this new evidence? There is overwhelming evidence that is quite the contrary to what you are saying at the time it happened (which is why they dropped the bomb) and even now in retrospect.

Jeema101 11y ago

I've heard that claim made before, but the fact is that the Emperor specifically mentioned the atomic bomb in his surrender speech. That seems to me to be the most powerful evidence against the notion that it had 'little or no effect' on their reasoning... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyokuon-h%C5%8Ds%C5%8D https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyokuon-h%C5%8Ds%C5%8D

sanoli 11y ago

What new evidence? I searched for this a couple of months ago and found that the "Japanese were close to surrendering" is one more recent 'internet myth' that's been propagating lately, with no real hard, substantiated evidence. Please help me correct myself on this issue.

JoeAltmaier 11y ago
Documentary (Nova?) showed Emperor was planning how to secure his sigils of power, hide out. They were planning to lose, at any rate. But this is hearsay; I don't have a reference to that documentary.
notahacker 11y ago
The intercepts collected by the Allies on the internal debates of some of the Japanese, and the internal debates the US decision makers had over whether to opt for unconditional surrender or something believed to be more likely to be accepted are pretty well documented by this reasonably neutral source: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/ http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/
- hga 11y ago
  I'd really appreciate your at least calling out which of these 75 documents supports this thesis. I started skimming the titles and descriptions but didn't find anything contradicting the Official Story which I've been studying closely for the last few months before giving up. Yes, of course, the Japanese were considering surrender, that was no secret to our decision makers, and yes, of course there was consideration of relaxing "unconditional" surrender, as we signaled to them WRT to the Emperor. We weren't stupid, that was one of many reasons War Secretary Stimpson removed Kyoto from all target lists (he was familiar with the east Pacific region and had visited the city prior to the war).
  - notahacker 11y ago
    Fair enough. Try documents 33 and especially 40 Of course it doesn't make it clear that some form of surrender is going to be straightforward since the Ambassador who's outspoken in acknowledging Japan should accept a settlement like that forced on Germany as the only way to preserve the Emperor is not in a position to influence an internal vote, and the more important Foreign Minister attempting to arrange "end the war" is also quite adamant that it won't be "like a unconditional surrender". But it's also impossible to cogently argue that the US, being aware through intercepts that Japanese ministers both (i) want peace and acknowledge it might be painful and (ii) don't want peace if it involves "unconditional surrender", was sincerely interested in avoiding further casualties when after internal debate they chose to unambiguously insist upon (ii) being the condition for not wiping out cities. Document 49, an appraisal of the situation which opens "President, Leahy and JFB agreed Japan looking for peace. President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia rather than some country like Sweden" is a reasonable indication the substance of these intercepts was available to Truman and other decision makers. Easy to see why the U.S. wanted to avoid protracted and potentially duplicitous negotiations via their frenemies; less easy to set the value of uncomplicated negotiations at ~200,000 lives... As for Stimson, he wasn't stupid, but he was also heavily outgunned by the war party when it came to arguing for the relaxation of unconditional surrender, which is why it was not included in the Potsdam declaration against his express wishes. [There's also no evidence that signals of the relaxation of unconditional surrender were sent separately from this (and abundant evidence from cables the US was intercepting either side of Hiroshima that even Japan's peaceniks were only hoping they might be able to secure the Emperor's status)] The US had of course outlined conditions for peace much earlier (before it was clear Japan had lost) which included a right to choose a form of government, were aware the Japanese ambassador was using this as a basis to argue the emperor's status might be an acceptable surrender condition prior to the Potsdam Declaration, and yet opted to remove signals of the Emperor's status from earlier drafts of that ultimatum before issuing it. Given all this was known and debated at the time, it's difficult to cogently argue the Potsdam Declaration that actually went out was intended as anything other than a prelude to dropping the bomb.

maratd 11y ago

> All new evidence points to the fact that the Japanese were thinking of surrendering and that the Americans new it, before the bombs were dropped. What new evidence? This doesn't even make sense. There were fighting until the last man on every island up to that point. What signs of surrender were there?

JoeAltmaier 11y ago
Internal documents (unavailable to the Allies) show they were actually coming up with terms of surrender. But that's not fair; the Allies didn't know. Its hindsight.
- notahacker 11y ago
  The Allies responsible for making the decision did have access to intelligence reports making it clear that senior representatives of the Japanese were trying to mediate an end to the war, including explicitly quoting many of the Japanese comments - both intentional communications and intercepts - to that effect. There's no shortage of notes to suggest that White House decision makers were aware of these and debated the possibility that including a guarantee of the Emperor's position in the Potsdam Declaration might have made surrender possible, but didn't want Russians as mediators and were more concerned about domestic opinion of demanding anything other than unconditional surrender than actually hastening the surrender. Ultimately these considerations (and others) took precedence over saving lives, and if anything is hindsight bias it's the [plausible] argument that a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Japan was achieved through insisting on total defeat and not involving any Soviet "mediation".
  - hga 11y ago
    Well, by then we were starting to get a good take on what the post-war Soviets were going to be like, and with FDR's death and Truman, not previously an insider, the government wasn't quite so in thrall to them. However we did signal flexibility to the Japanese about the Emperor's position; we weren't stupid, we knew that might be part of an acceptable and otherwise "unconditional" surrender.