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"the contents of mathematics is far from arbitrary -- while an infinite number of mathematical objects might potentially be envoked [sic], the few that prove in
by lisper 11y ago
"the contents of mathematics is far from arbitrary -- while an infinite number of mathematical objects might potentially be envoked [sic], the few that prove interesting develop a very small number of core concepts. These core concepts are not arbitrary -- they are elaborations of structures which are discovered during the study of nature. There are four of these core concepts: number, geometry, algebra and logic."
It could be as well argued that there is only one core concept: computation. (Or maybe "symbol".)
The interesting question is: of all the myriad possible things that are computable, how is it that we are able find the unfathomably small subset whose behavior corresponds to (what we perceive as) physical reality? That was the question Wigner was asking, and I don't think Smolin answers it at all.
- amelius 11y ago> The interesting question is: of all the myriad possible things that are computable, how is it that we are able find the unfathomably small subset whose behavior corresponds to (what we perceive as) physical reality? Isn't that simply because of the Anthropic principle [1]? We are observing this computation simply because we are part of it. Other creatures may be observing different computations (but we will never be able to ask them because they live in a different reality). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle
- lisper 11y agoNo. The anthropic principle is an answer to a different question, namely, of all the possible universes that could conceivably exist, how is it that we find ourselves in this one, where the fundamental physical constants are (apparently) fine-tuned to allow the formation of atoms and hence life.
- ubernostrum 11y agoMost anthropic arguments are also based on an equivocation. William Lane Craig has some good work on this, using an analogy (which he admits he borrowed): suppose you are tied up and brought before a firing squad consisting of 100 expert marksmen. They all load, aim at point-blank range and fire... and then you open your eyes and see they all missed and you're still alive and unhurt. (1) Anthropically, you should not be "surprised" to observe a world in which 100 expert marksmen all missed from point-blank range, because the very fact of your being able to observe anything at that point makes that world necessary. (2) But you nonetheless should be "surprised" that such a low-probability event has occurred, and you would be justified in wondering whether some as-yet-unaccounted-for factor meant that the true probability was not what you would have estimated it to be. Anthropic arguments, in this view, slyly try to switch between different meanings of "surprised" (or a variant, depending on the level of formality and the particular terminology chosen) to make it look as if (1) actually answers (2) when it doesn't.
- animefan 11y agoI think this critique can be rephrased as saying that the anthropic principle is equivalent to saying that the relevant probabilities are not the "raw" probabilities, but the probabilities conditional on the existence of a conscious observer. Such conditional probabilities only make sense if you assume many possible universes, one of which we happen to inhabit. If you are a Christian, then you most likely believe in a single objective universe, which is the one we live in (I'm not a Christian so I won't go as far as saying that a Christian must believe this, although many theologians do). If you are not a Christian, you might have more flexible beliefs that allow for the anthropic principal.
- ubernostrum 11y agoWell. My thesis (12 years ago, before I learned that coding paid a lot better than philosophy) was a survey of how the argument from design had developed post-Darwin, and part of that involved digging into arguments being made by physicists who had no particular religious affiliation but still felt that the Goldilocks-ness of our universe was something that needed explaining. And it turns out a lot of those people find anthropic arguments to be, at best, unsatisfying; at worst, they can point to logical fallacies underlying anthropic attempts to explain away the conditions of the universe we find ourselves in. The interesting arguments, to me, fell into two camps: 1. Natural selection operating on the level of entire universes. Several different theories postulate singularities as a source of new universes, which in turn means that a universe in which conditions allow for significant gravitationally-bound accumulations of matter will have more "offspring" than a universe in which they don't. Thus, physical constants which are conducive to life are likely to be more common than otherwise expected, simply because (coincidentally) those conditions are the ones which give rise to significant gravitationally-bound accumulations of matter. 2. Arguments in favor of simulated universes. Paul Davies (if you want a name to look up) has a few layman-accessible articles arguing about the probability of this, and working from the fact you only need one life-supporting universe -- which is likely given various of the multi-universe theories -- to kickstart the process and wind up with a far larger number of life-supporting simulated ones. There are also people who make arguments in favor of a more traditional religious conception of "God", but do so from the standpoint of regularities in physical law. Those are less interesting to me personally for a few reasons, but they are out there.
- amelius 11y agoYes, but replace "fundamental physical constants" by "algorithm" (or "computation"), and you can basically apply the same argument. Or am I missing something?
- d4rkph1b3r 11y ago"the contents of mathematics is far from arbitrary -- while an infinite number of mathematical objects might potentially be envoked [sic], the few that prove interesting develop a very small number of core concepts. These core concepts are not arbitrary -- they are elaborations of structures which are discovered during the study of nature. There are four of these core concepts: number, geometry, algebra and logic." The fact that Smolin thinks these are distinct things shows just how out of touch he is, and is ironic given his hatred of mathematics.
- DougMerritt 11y ago> ironic given his hatred of mathematics. Wait, what? Are you going off of a particular polemic of his? Because it's hard to imagine someone who had to have learned enough math to do string theory, to be a true math hater, even if (I am assuming) he rants.
- tjradcliffe 11y agoWe find it because that's what we're looking for, or inventing. Here's a comparable question: "How is it that we can find an unfathomably small sub-set of possible symbols--a mere 26!--that are capable of encoding any idea whatsoever?" The answer is: we are humans, doing human things within the scope of human capabilities. If there are ideas that are inexpressible by us, we can't possibly know about them. If there is physics profoundly beyond our ken (what lies behind the quantum veil, for example) we simply don't know about it. Mathematics is a natural language (as physicists use it) to describe nature to ourselves. The fact of the knowing subject, and the activity of the knowing subject, cannot be left out without leaving a central mystery, which always amounts to "Why does the knowing subject do what they do?" (like restrict math to Smolin's four key categories of number, geometry, algebra and logic). If you imbue some mystical subject-free "mathematics" with these properties, rather than the activity of the knowing subject with them, they will remain mysterious. This also explains why mathematics is so very, very bad at describing reality: http://www.tjradcliffe.com/?p=381 http://www.tjradcliffe.com/?p=381
- lisper 11y ago> How is it that we can find an unfathomably small sub-set of possible symbols--a mere 26!--that are capable of encoding any idea whatsoever? That's not an equivalent question. Any repertoire of N distinguishable symbols for N>1 is essentially equivalent. But there's no reason a priori to believe that the laws of physics should be modellable with mathematics at all, let alone that we should be able to figure out what those mathematics are, let alone that they should turn out to be simple enough that the model (or at least a very significant chunk of it) can fit in a single human brain. Consider dreaming: when you are in a dream state you are living in essentially a solipsistic world where science doesn't work. There's no inherent reason why that could not be totality of your existence. It's just an accident of biology that you wake up occasionally and get to experience the "real" world, which we consider "real" because it seems to behave according to mathematical laws. The existence of such experience is not a given.
- tagrun 11y agoOr NAND gate since it's universal? But that's not the point. There are myriad branches of mathematics; he's emphasizing these these four as fundamental.