3 ms·

This is my wish list: * DNSCurve * Certificate Transparency * TACK * HPKP headers * HSTS headers * TLS 1.2 minimum * EdDSA TLS cert

This is my wish list: * DNSCurve * Certificate Transparency * TACK * HPKP headers * HSTS headers * TLS 1.2 minimum * EdDSA TLS certificates (Ed25519 / Ed448-Goldilocks) Implement all of the above, and you've obsoleted any argument that DNSSEC advocates can make. Most of the people who I've seen advocate for DNSSEC are graybeard traditionalists who want centralized control, not cryptographers or security experts. A decentralized system like Namecoin, but more like Stellar (with EdDSA signatures please) than Bitcoin, would probably serve as an appropriate replacement for DNSSEC. But even that probably isn't necessary. Every sane end-to-end encryption protocol assumes DNS is insecure anyway.

marcosdumay 11y ago
> Implement all of the above, and you've obsoleted any argument that DNSSEC advocates can make. Still no offline signatures. How is it that centralized control is worse than the TLS's "everybody has full power to impersonate you" decentralization? You know that Certificate Transparency is still subject to MITM attacks, right? It just makes it obvious that you were victim of one after the fact (if there is an "after the fact").
- sarciszewski 11y ago
  You can have offline signatures in a design for a Stellar/Namecoin/EdDSA decentralized protocol. > How is it that centralized control is worse than the TLS's "everybody has full power to impersonate you" decentralization? You know that Certificate Transparency is still subject to MITM attacks, right? It just makes it obvious that you were victim of one after the fact (if there is an "after the fact"). This is non sequitur. You're comparing a bad option where only a few can screw you over (DNSSEC) with a bad option where lots can screw you over (CAs). I want a protocol where no one can screw you over, except yourself. And I want the government to be powerless to do anything about it without your consent. And if it function with high anonymity (e.g. with Tor Hidden Services on servers purchased with cryptocurrencies), all the better.

marcosdumay 11y ago

> Implement all of the above, and you've obsoleted any argument that DNSSEC advocates can make. Still no offline signatures. How is it that centralized control is worse than the TLS's "everybody has full power to impersonate you" decentralization? You know that Certificate Transparency is still subject to MITM attacks, right? It just makes it obvious that you were victim of one after the fact (if there is an "after the fact").

sarciszewski 11y ago
You can have offline signatures in a design for a Stellar/Namecoin/EdDSA decentralized protocol. > How is it that centralized control is worse than the TLS's "everybody has full power to impersonate you" decentralization? You know that Certificate Transparency is still subject to MITM attacks, right? It just makes it obvious that you were victim of one after the fact (if there is an "after the fact"). This is non sequitur. You're comparing a bad option where only a few can screw you over (DNSSEC) with a bad option where lots can screw you over (CAs). I want a protocol where no one can screw you over, except yourself. And I want the government to be powerless to do anything about it without your consent. And if it function with high anonymity (e.g. with Tor Hidden Services on servers purchased with cryptocurrencies), all the better.