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What is the effectiveness of RFID shields? Tampering with the passport is really a nono.

by leni536 11y ago

ThePhysicist 11y ago
That's also an option and there are some commercial providers, e.g. this one: http://www.pointprotect.de/ http://www.pointprotect.de/
dagw 11y ago
There's an old, but fairly comprehensive, consumer report article from 2011 that concludes: "When Recursion’s security experts tested 10 types of shields and wallets currently being sold to protect contactless cards, they found that none blocked the signal completely, and there was dramatic variability even among samples of the same brand." I don't know if the situation has improved much since then.
- maze-le 11y ago
  > they found that none blocked the signal completely You can not block ths signal completeley. It is just the nature of radio wave that some small amplitude will get past the barrier, but you can lower the signal-amplitude so much, that the signal is worthless and a passive rfid chip will never respond. Alas, with a very strong sender, you might get through, but that is more a theoretical possibility or for the truly paranoid.
richmarr 11y ago
To be fair, allowing the arbitrary and (practically) undetectable leaking of fingerprints is also a no-no.
- leni536 11y ago
  I think you leave your fingerprint at more places than your passport number anyway.
  - redblacktree 11y ago
    Yes, but you don't also leave your name and other identifiers behind, just the prints.
  - richmarr 11y ago
    Sure but, as redblacktree points out, you usually don't leave it behind in conjunction with your passport data. Also, with RFID you give an attacker more options for gathering more data without anyone noticing. For example at the entrance to an airport you might gather hundreds of identities per hour.
bitL 11y ago
I use them for all my credit/ID/etc. cards now. They should lower the maximal distance for reading so that someone has to be super close to your card to read anything. It's not 100% but for practical purposes should be sufficient (e.g. rogue RFID reader at the airport reading all passing by cards from 1m distance etc.)
maze-le 11y ago
Very good. I made some tests, back when I was at the university. We had a Hardware Lab with Radio-Test Equipment and RFID Readers/Writers. I have this one: https://shop.digitalcourage.de/thema/stoprfid/rfid-nfc-myfare-schutzhuelle-aus-metall-folienausfuehrung-leder-einfach.html https://shop.digitalcourage.de/thema/stoprfid/rfid-nfc-myfar... It just works. The Signal/Noise-Ratio and amplitude of the RFID-Signal (in the casing) is just too small, to trigger a rfid response.
- pbhjpbhj 11y ago
  What material is actually used in your linked shield for "Schnüffel-Chips" [fantastic word!] ? Is it just foil lined or is there a mesh, what material is the mesh and what pitch? I'd imagine you could have an active mask too [eg just a RFID with false data] that would return some signal just not the one being sought.
  - maze-le 11y ago
    I don't know what material it is exactly but it is a mesh, and suprisingly thin and flexible. Your idea of an active fake-chip is really nice, it could actually work (on non-encrypted content).

What is the effectiveness of RFID shields? Tampering with the passport is really a nono.

by leni536 11y ago

What is the effectiveness of RFID shields? Tampering with the passport is really a nono.

That's also an option and there are some commercial providers, e.g. this one: http://www.pointprotect.de/ http://www.pointprotect.de/

dagw 11y ago

There's an old, but fairly comprehensive, consumer report article from 2011 that concludes: "When Recursion’s security experts tested 10 types of shields and wallets currently being sold to protect contactless cards, they found that none blocked the signal completely, and there was dramatic variability even among samples of the same brand." I don't know if the situation has improved much since then.

maze-le 11y ago
> they found that none blocked the signal completely You can not block ths signal completeley. It is just the nature of radio wave that some small amplitude will get past the barrier, but you can lower the signal-amplitude so much, that the signal is worthless and a passive rfid chip will never respond. Alas, with a very strong sender, you might get through, but that is more a theoretical possibility or for the truly paranoid.

richmarr 11y ago

To be fair, allowing the arbitrary and (practically) undetectable leaking of fingerprints is also a no-no.

leni536 11y ago
I think you leave your fingerprint at more places than your passport number anyway.
- redblacktree 11y ago
  Yes, but you don't also leave your name and other identifiers behind, just the prints.
- richmarr 11y ago
  Sure but, as redblacktree points out, you usually don't leave it behind in conjunction with your passport data. Also, with RFID you give an attacker more options for gathering more data without anyone noticing. For example at the entrance to an airport you might gather hundreds of identities per hour.

bitL 11y ago

I use them for all my credit/ID/etc. cards now. They should lower the maximal distance for reading so that someone has to be super close to your card to read anything. It's not 100% but for practical purposes should be sufficient (e.g. rogue RFID reader at the airport reading all passing by cards from 1m distance etc.)

maze-le 11y ago

Very good. I made some tests, back when I was at the university. We had a Hardware Lab with Radio-Test Equipment and RFID Readers/Writers. I have this one: https://shop.digitalcourage.de/thema/stoprfid/rfid-nfc-myfare-schutzhuelle-aus-metall-folienausfuehrung-leder-einfach.html https://shop.digitalcourage.de/thema/stoprfid/rfid-nfc-myfar... It just works. The Signal/Noise-Ratio and amplitude of the RFID-Signal (in the casing) is just too small, to trigger a rfid response.

pbhjpbhj 11y ago
What material is actually used in your linked shield for "Schnüffel-Chips" [fantastic word!] ? Is it just foil lined or is there a mesh, what material is the mesh and what pitch? I'd imagine you could have an active mask too [eg just a RFID with false data] that would return some signal just not the one being sought.
- maze-le 11y ago
  I don't know what material it is exactly but it is a mesh, and suprisingly thin and flexible. Your idea of an active fake-chip is really nice, it could actually work (on non-encrypted content).