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If, I'm reading you right, I think you are saying there is a distinction between: a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself The question is then, can

If, I'm reading you right, I think you are saying there is a distinction between: a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself The question is then, can there be a real b) if there is no corresponding "a)", the thing that is being named. It would seem the obvious answer is, no. However, I'm sure you could try to construct some twisted logic in an attempt to allow it. Such a logic would probably have flaws (incompleteness theorems likely have something to do with it) and are likely near useless. I would agree that there are multiple definitions of existence that can be considered fruitfully. However, as a matter of formal logic, attempting to disprove/prove the non-existence of a 'thing' [0] is a trap. [0] I use quotes here, because I'm not sure anyone here has yet defined what exactly a 'thing' is. :)

Dylan16807 11y ago
>The question is then, can there be a real b) if there is no corresponding "a)", the thing that is being named. If you can describe a thing that exists, in sufficient detail to check the description, then you can describe a thing that doesn't exist too. For the answer to be 'no', you have to reject the entire idea of descriptions. You have to reject the entire idea of categories, leaving only sets with predefined member lists. I think that line of thought is a waste. If you reject language as too imprecise to use on reality, you end up concluding that proofs cannot exist, so you must not actually be talking about proofs. Plus, it's easy to name something that doesn't exist. There is no piece of paper on Earth that has printed on it the string T5hYEQdla6ZLTjxQnA3D. This is something that could exist. You could even make one yourself! But as I make this comment, it does not exist.
Retra 11y ago
The notion of existence in formal logic isn't the same as what it means generally, nor are the notions of proof and truth the same. In a formal setting, proof is a sequence of symbols accepted by a formal system, and "exists" means you have a structure verifiable by that system using proof.
shkkmo 11y ago
>If, I'm reading you right, I think you are saying there is a distinction between: >a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself Yes, that is generally accepted. Generally philosophers talk about the name, 'A', the thing, A. > It would seem the obvious answer is, no. If you think that is obvious, you need to spend more time thinking about it. For example, you seem to be implying that we don't know if 'alien' is a real word or not since we don't know if aliens exist. (Some people may claim to know, but most of us have not seen proof.)
- jsprogrammer 11y ago
  I agree you can think about it on that level. However, there is a level where it is not about the words, but the actual things. In your example, the word 'alien' is real, but there is no 'real' definition of it, in the sense that there is no definition that can be given that could select an actual instance of 'alien' (I may have confused the quotes by this point) precisely (perhaps) because 'aliens' don't actually exist (even though there is a word that can be mapped to some vague concept of what an alien might actually be like).
  - shkkmo 11y ago
    You are confusing a "real definition" with a "definition of something real". The concept 'alien' is actually pretty well defined and specific, the least specific part of it is probably the definition of 'life'.

Dylan16807 11y ago

>The question is then, can there be a real b) if there is no corresponding "a)", the thing that is being named. If you can describe a thing that exists, in sufficient detail to check the description, then you can describe a thing that doesn't exist too. For the answer to be 'no', you have to reject the entire idea of descriptions. You have to reject the entire idea of categories, leaving only sets with predefined member lists. I think that line of thought is a waste. If you reject language as too imprecise to use on reality, you end up concluding that proofs cannot exist, so you must not actually be talking about proofs. Plus, it's easy to name something that doesn't exist. There is no piece of paper on Earth that has printed on it the string T5hYEQdla6ZLTjxQnA3D. This is something that could exist. You could even make one yourself! But as I make this comment, it does not exist.

Retra 11y ago

The notion of existence in formal logic isn't the same as what it means generally, nor are the notions of proof and truth the same. In a formal setting, proof is a sequence of symbols accepted by a formal system, and "exists" means you have a structure verifiable by that system using proof.

shkkmo 11y ago

>If, I'm reading you right, I think you are saying there is a distinction between: >a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself Yes, that is generally accepted. Generally philosophers talk about the name, 'A', the thing, A. > It would seem the obvious answer is, no. If you think that is obvious, you need to spend more time thinking about it. For example, you seem to be implying that we don't know if 'alien' is a real word or not since we don't know if aliens exist. (Some people may claim to know, but most of us have not seen proof.)

jsprogrammer 11y ago
I agree you can think about it on that level. However, there is a level where it is not about the words, but the actual things. In your example, the word 'alien' is real, but there is no 'real' definition of it, in the sense that there is no definition that can be given that could select an actual instance of 'alien' (I may have confused the quotes by this point) precisely (perhaps) because 'aliens' don't actually exist (even though there is a word that can be mapped to some vague concept of what an alien might actually be like).
- shkkmo 11y ago
  You are confusing a "real definition" with a "definition of something real". The concept 'alien' is actually pretty well defined and specific, the least specific part of it is probably the definition of 'life'.