xnyhps

22 ms·

121.
by xnyhps 13y ago
There's a difference between Google "knowing" you sent a message and third parties being able to verify that you sent a specific message. Whether Google stores your message when you turn on "Off-the-Record" is of co
122.
Is Google signing your chat messages?(blog.thijsalkema.de)
90 points by xnyhps 13y ago|39 comments
123.
by xnyhps 13y ago
Eh, no. Maybe in SSLv2, but the first thing TLS encrypts is a hash of the entire handshake. Modifying the cipher list would change those hashes into something different. Unless you have a client which will happily disable a cipher and try a
124.
by xnyhps 13y ago
Do you want to make the gamble that every server has "honor cipher order" on and configured in a saner way?
125.
Piercing Through WhatsApp’s Encryption(blog.thijsalkema.de)
230 points by xnyhps 13y ago|81 comments
126.
by xnyhps 13y ago
The key schedule weakness in AES256 that I know of only applies to related-keys, which don't affect TLS as far as I know. If there's anything else I'm missing, I would like to know. I don't have a specific concern with A
127.
by xnyhps 13y ago
I clarified that I mean to refer to those with OpenSSL names that start with "ECDH-" and "DH-", which is not the same as what the shorthand "DH" gives you. As far as I can tell, EDH is an older synonym for DHE.
128.
by xnyhps 13y ago
I wrote this post before the latest of Snowden's revelations and Bruce Schneier's comments on them[1]. "Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influe
129.
The State of TLS on XMPP(blog.thijsalkema.de)
73 points by xnyhps 13y ago|32 comments
130.
by xnyhps 13y ago
Note that certificates are always sent in plain. If it's a CA-signed certificate it will always have a common name or subject alt name field that specifies what host it is for (or a wildcard), readable in plain. If it's a self-sig
131.
Prosody 0.9.0 released(blog.prosody.im)
5 points by xnyhps 13y ago|0 comments
132.
by xnyhps 13y ago
How would that help? If the NSA tracks a billion accouns, how is even a million fake ones going to make a difference? I'm pretty sure "spam" is not a new concept to them. If they want to look up any real person, they'll
133.
by xnyhps 13y ago
I find all of these attempts to "troll" or "distract" the NSA quite naive. If they truly have direct access to the backbone cables of the internet, then they must be pretty good at filtering signal from noise. Just imagi
134.
by xnyhps 13y ago
Most places where you can authenticate with SSL client certs allow you to add your own self-signed certificate and authenticate using that. All the validation you need is to check wether the cert is in the user's list. You can only for
135.
by xnyhps 13y ago
The end goal is to package Tor + this + an XMPP server (Prosody) into plugins for clients. It'd be a federated network running through Tor, but any XMPP-capable client will be able to use it. Sure, you need to rely on Tor, but aside fr
136.
by xnyhps 13y ago
I totally agree! I've been working on federating XMPP over hidden services ( https://blog.thijsalkema.de/blog/2013/06/11/xmpp-federation-... ), but I don't give a setup like that any chance to be
137.
by xnyhps 13y ago
I wonder how that can be "surveillance-proof". Even with e2e-encryption any product using central servers can still see who is chatting with whom, who's in your address book and what IP address your phone is connecting from.
138.
by xnyhps 13y ago
GPG for chat (at least XEP-0027) is much, much less secure than OTR. You have no authentication of received messages, no defense against replay attacks or dropped messages, no perfect forward secrecy. In my opinion, support for it should be
139.
by xnyhps 14y ago
It somewhat reminds me of http://www.sagemath.org/ .