upofadown

15 ms·

91.
by upofadown 8mo ago
Jmp.chat is the same sort of the same thing as Google voice and is allegedly based in Canada. It has the bonus feature of using standard XMPP clients.
92.
by upofadown 8mo ago
AES defines a block cipher (128 bits in, 128 bits out) so there is no "before". I think that you are suggesting that default crypto libraries should work at a higher level where the documentation specifies that the resultant encry
93.
by upofadown 8mo ago
How would you send an uncompressed video/image? Like thumbnails?
94.
by upofadown 9mo ago
Off the top of my head, NIST was suggesting something like 8GB as the working limit. It would depend on your risk tolerance and the application in practice I guess. For something like video you might not really care about exposing a few 8 b
95.
by upofadown 9mo ago
Si (2^32)*8 works out to 34GB for TDES. How many applications involve encrypting that much data in one go?
96.
by upofadown 9mo ago
If you are not typing in a passphrase or plugging in a device containing a key to unlock your disk then the secret exists somewhere else. Chances are that secret is available to others. The root issue here is that the user is not being made
97.
by upofadown 9mo ago
>“I’m currently working on a mounting plate that’s 4.5 by 8 in. that needs a 40 mm bore 1/2 -in. deep located 75 mm from the edge with m10 tapped holes and two 1/4-20 set screws tangential to the bore. Please kill me.” When I w
98.
by upofadown 9mo ago
The interesting article that I am pretty sure produced the statistic about relative risk: https://chessintheair.com/the-risk-of-dying-doing-what-we-lo...
99.
by upofadown 9mo ago
If the user can get immediate access to older messages then normally those messages will be available on a confiscated phone. That's why things like Signal have you set a retention period. A retention period of zero (message is gone wh
100.
by upofadown 9mo ago
The cookie banners are for initial consent. You just consent to less stuff sometimes. A website might claim some sort of legitimate interest for the initial collection of data but might not think that they can claim that for the retention o
101.
(Open) Widevine support added to the OpenBSD Chromium port(undeadly.org)
19 points by upofadown 9mo ago|6 comments
102.
by upofadown 9mo ago
If it is an actual legitimate interest then you would likely be expected to contact the site out of band to object to the use of your data. Depending on the technical details you might not be able to continue using the site after a successf
103.
by upofadown 9mo ago
This seems like a fairly reasonable assumption for the Briar case. An adversary would have to get a user accept a Briar link in error. Contrast with things like Signal[1] that base their trust on phone numbers. Note that Briar groups are co
104.
by upofadown 9mo ago
Classic Forth Dimensions article: Why Forth Isn't Slow * https://www.forth.org/fd/FD-V06N5.pdf Basically it is because Forth programs are fairly flat and don't go deep into subfunctions. So the interpreter ov
105.
by upofadown 9mo ago
Back in my day the local telephone company used waxed lacing cable for that sort of thing[1]. These days it seems that polypropylene string is popular (search on "conduit pull string"). You basically want something that is slipper
106.
by upofadown 9mo ago
For me the solution to subpixel issues with tiny fonts is to not do subpixels. I have been looking at bitmapped fonts my whole life so I don't see any reason to give up all that perceptual context. Which is why I ended up buying a repl
107.
Trump spectrum sale leaves airlines with $4.5B bill for altimeter do-over(theregister.com)
6 points by upofadown 9mo ago|1 comments
108.
by upofadown 9mo ago
Sorry that my, perhaps, poor wording caused you to waste your time producing colliding 64 bit PGP key IDs. I should have used the term "threat model". We were discussing how long key fingerprints should be. My point was that even
109.
The XMPP Newsletter December 2025(xmpp.org)
2 points by upofadown 9mo ago|0 comments
110.
Verifiable Brute Force Strength(gist.github.com)
9 points by upofadown 9mo ago|1 comments
111.
by upofadown 10mo ago
I think the two cases are different. The EFAIL researchers were suggesting that the PGP code (whatever implementation) should throw an error on an MDC integrity error and then stop. The idea was that this would be a fix for EFAIL in that th
112.
by upofadown 10mo ago
I think it is fair to say that usability is fairly bad for most end to end encrypted systems ... and usability and security are intertwined for E2EE. Here are my comments on Signalgate 1.0: * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?
113.
by upofadown 10mo ago
My comments on The PGP Problem: * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:tpp
114.
by upofadown 10mo ago
Regular Bluetooth security is not that great. A lot of it is poor usability where the user can't easily know that they don't have a secure connection. Setting up a secure connection might involve entering a PIN on each end of the
115.
by upofadown 10mo ago
This is not about what is most popular. This is about what can work. The current situation can not work.
116.
by upofadown 10mo ago
>I mean that 64 bits can probably be inexpensively attacked to produce first or second preimages. Keep in mind that you would have to generate a valid keypair, or something that could be made into a valid keypair for each iteration. That
117.
by upofadown 10mo ago
>And it’s not like 256 bit hashes are expensive. A key fingerprint is a usability feature. It has no other purpose. Otherwise we would just use the public key. Key fingerprints have to be kept as short as possible. So the question is, ho
118.
by upofadown 10mo ago
>...and your threat model includes collisions. OK, to be clear, I am specifically contending that a key fingerprint does not include collisions. My proof is empirical, that no one has come up with an attack on 64 bit PGP key fingerprin
119.
by upofadown 10mo ago
Yes, the OpenPGP standards schism was all about personality conflicts. Those conflicts still came from a fundamental difference of philosophy. Who's idea was it to have Koch lead the most recent attempt at a process? Why was that suppo
120.
by upofadown 10mo ago
They were attacking an entire community. Perhaps I should have complained about being deliberately provocative. But to the point, how long should something like a key fingerprint be?

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