thirsteh

28 ms·

301.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Most new SSD drives, e.g. Samsung's or Intel's, have transparent encryption (no matter if you set it up or not,) and you are able to "format" your drive by wiping the container with the encryption key, effectively maki
302.
by thirsteh 13y ago
"I'm glad to let you know that you qualify for X healthcare coverage. Can I just have your social security number and we'll send over the confirmation documents?" Yes, people fall for this kind of stuff all the time.
303.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Haskell is catching on. It's extremely popular in academia, and it's growing on e.g. Github: http://ec2-54-224-80-201.compute-1.amazonaws.com:8888/langua... But you're right, examples like this are extremel
304.
by thirsteh 13y ago
> It wouldn't defeat GPG, or OTR-based systems used in reasonably popular open-source clients. Until you consider where GPG and OTR are used, e.g. Enigmail or Pidgin, addons or clients which both autoupdate or ask to be updated. The
305.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Indeed, the PRG was flawed, but IIUC, this applied to only the RSA key generation used for group chat, not OTR, which is what cryptocat is mainly used for. People reference "numerous flaws" a lot, but it all seems to lead back to
306.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Your indentation broke: import Control.Monad queens n = foldM (\y _ -> [ x : y | x <- [1..n], safe x y 1]) [] [1..n] safe x [] n = True safe x (c:y) n = and [ x /= c, x /= c + n, x /= c - n, safe x
307.
by thirsteh 13y ago
> They are already effectively communicating in plaintext Got anything to back up this statement, or is this what you're inferring from the post and the analysis of the group chat component a while back? Are you saying that the OTR
308.
by thirsteh 13y ago
He wants it taken off the app stores. I don't disagree with the point that you shouldn't pretend, but literally no one is in a position to make absolute promises like that, yet everyone's doing it. I'm not saying it&#x27
309.
by thirsteh 13y ago
> I think it's misleading to say "more secure". I think it's misleading to insinuate that security is an absolute, but, again, you're missing my point. I'm not telling anyone to use Skype. I'm saying th
310.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Previous thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6986155
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by thirsteh 13y ago
Unfortunately, after the recent revelations this is how I feel about computers in general :)
312.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Ironically, tptacek spends a large amount of time criticizing crypto, but a lot of the time it's useful criticism (i.e. actually provides some kind of a solution.) I have nothing against criticism. If there's a flaw in something
313.
by thirsteh 13y ago
I wouldn't prefer that, but I'm also not as convinced that Cryptocat is as "clearly broken" (i.e. plaintext is trivially recoverable) in its current state as a lot of people on here are. Most of the attacks that I'v
314.
by thirsteh 13y ago
I didn't say it had a satisfactory level of security, just that it was a lot more secure than it is now, and still had the same level of usability that it does today.
315.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Ironically, OTR is what Cryptocat uses. But for the sake of argument, let's compare it to the OTR plugin for Pidgin, another IM: It's just not as usable. I'm sorry. Look at the very website you linked! But... it's possib
316.
by thirsteh 13y ago
> Crypto can't be easy and safe. It's not that black and white. Yes, usability tends to carry with it some measure of sacrifice in security, but Skype used to have a lot more security, and was as easy to use as it is today. The
317.
by thirsteh 13y ago
OTR is as close to this as you'll get for IM at the moment, and even the most popular implementations like OTR for Pidgin (or Cryptocat!) haven't been vetted very thoroughly (not to mention Pidgin itself has a fairly spotted secur
318.
by thirsteh 13y ago
> Would you rather use a piece of communications software which purported to be cryptographically secure ..than communicate in plain text? Yes. Where's the alternative? We can have Cryptocat shut down, which is what the author is su
319.
by thirsteh 13y ago
But that would require implementing and marketing a significant piece of software. The users who are risking their lives using Horribly Insecure Piece of Software X are important and we should save them.. but they're not that important
320.
by thirsteh 13y ago
You sure are extracting a lot of things from my comment that I actually didn't say. I don't think anyone is above criticism, nor do I think truly understanding how a piece of software works is "very easy." All I'm s
321.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Definitely holding off until the open source release (and hopefully it won't just be dumps of old versions like Silent Circle's.) Agree that TextSecure and Redphone are great tools, albeit in different categories, and as far as I
322.
by thirsteh 13y ago
The best general answer to this question is probably "Use Tails: https://tails.boum.org/ ." Especially for activists in Syria/regular users who have a genuine concern for their lives. (Tails uses Pidgin with
323.
by thirsteh 13y ago
I think you responded to my comment that I somehow managed to delete, but re-posted here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6990738 I agree with you. I don't think Cryptocat or how the implementation is handled is p
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by thirsteh 13y ago
I don't think your two examples are contradictory. It is silly to try to regulate export of strong crypto, and it is difficult to get crypto right.
325.
by thirsteh 13y ago
So make something better that people will actually use--then the question of what to use will become a no-brainer. "Just use Foo." The "best" alternative to something like Cryptocat is Pidgin/Adium+OTR plugins, and
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by thirsteh 13y ago
Talk version: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3dkRsTqdDA Highly recommended. Simon is a very good speaker.
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by thirsteh 13y ago
No. It's not ridiculous. What's ridiculous is that they're even trying to claim no data was leaked when it demonstrably was. There are many ways to securely scrub an SSD without subjecting it to a full write. They were outlin
328.
by thirsteh 13y ago
Cool, but unfortunately also a great example of when excessive commenting actually makes the code less digestible.
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by thirsteh 13y ago
It'd be great if it were that simple, but it isn't.
330.
by thirsteh 13y ago
This is primarily a political problem. Talk to people who really understand the capabilities of state-level adversaries--applied cryptographers in particular--and you'll invariably get "well... what can you do?" Entities like

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