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tdullien
searching PlanetScale…
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20 ms
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211.
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by
tdullien
10y ago
Hey there, I was enrolled in the 2013 edition of Analytic Combinatorics, but it seems that I am out of luck - no access to the materials either way. :-/ Does anyone happen to have the name of the 2013 edition? Or is it by design that t
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3 things that Rowhammer taught me (talk slides)
(docs.google.com)
1 points
by
tdullien
11y ago
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0 comments
213.
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by
tdullien
11y ago
So I do not know (in the mathematical sense) that ChipKill won't create a problem, but I think it is unlikely. In general, if the ECC infrastructure works (e.g. DRAM detecting bit corruption and reporting it to the OS), the odds of a
214.
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by
tdullien
11y ago
Co-author of the original exploit writing here. ECC doesn't "make the attack take longer", it turns it from an exploitable security issue into a denial-of-service issue (as odds are the ECC will detect the bitflip and the ker
215.
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by
tdullien
11y ago
Hey there, if anyone wants some more background on all the negative side-effects of the current regulation, I wrote a lengthy blog post on the problems with the current phrasing of the Wassenaar amendments here: http://addxorrol.
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Why changes to Wassenaar make oppression and surveillance easier, not harder
(addxorrol.blogspot.com)
2 points
by
tdullien
11y ago
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0 comments
217.
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by
tdullien
11y ago
This is a good point really -- the BND seems to be exceptionally gaffe-prone. It seems the current BND president has to leave the office every few years over some affair or the other...
218.
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by
tdullien
11y ago
What I suspect is actually not "helping", but rather "blind trust" -- e.g. just having an arrangement with the US where the US sends in "selectors" and the Germans send over the data; and nobody competent/
219.
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tdullien
12y ago
thomas followed by a point followed by dullien at gmail.
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tdullien
12y ago
Do you have similar numbers that are adjusted for "amount of money in the acquisition / IPO" ? (genuinely curious)
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tdullien
12y ago
Yep, that was me :-) - although already post-acquisition. Alan Mycroft had invited me over, I really enjoyed the visit :)
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by
tdullien
12y ago
This touches on an interesting conundrum: I was one of the founders of zynamics (exit to Google in 2011), and I have been looking for attractive angel investment opportunities in Europe for a while - and also have tried to volunteer some ti
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by
tdullien
12y ago
Katsuyama created a trading platform that nullifies one HFT strategy, namely latency arbitrage. Stieglitz is much more critical of the strong efficient market hypothesis in general; from this, he derives a number of positions that are ana
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tdullien
12y ago
The traditional way to dealing with this from a computer crime perspective is to bribe a few officials in a third-world country, buy one basestation, and become a mobile operator there.
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by
tdullien
12y ago
As someone who has been very closely involved with Infosec and who has followed all the vulnerability market rumors, I have never heard of "pays the companies to not fix them" before, and I strongly doubt the veracity of that st
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by
tdullien
12y ago
What you are describing as a background is all part of a "normal" math/CS undergrad education (at least in Germany where I studied). From a level of the mathematical difficulty, Elements etc. (but also current-level research
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by
tdullien
12y ago
Agreed; I guess my complaint could be best phrased as "the paper does not sufficiently address the complexities of determining whether you are in such a cycle, and the fact that many people that struggle actively search for more concre
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by
tdullien
12y ago
Bosses do, but the article does not necessarily provide any real solutions. The only clear thing to take away is "be aware that you may be causing a vicious cycle, and try to look out for that/get out of it" - which is a leve
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by
tdullien
13y ago
We had lots of hilarious answers to the question of what we do, but none are fit to post :-). As soon as you mention "reverse engineering", you end up in long discussions about EULAs; so you're immensely popular at cocktail p
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by
tdullien
13y ago
The company was initially called "SABRE Security", then rebranded "zynamics" after a trademark dispute. We built high-end reverse engineering software for purposes of security review and malware analysis. In essence, we
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tdullien
13y ago
We were originally based in Bochum, Germany; the entire team was moved to Google Zurich post-acquisition.
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tdullien
13y ago
Perhaps as a "cheer up" story: We applied to YC in their very first batch and got rejected. It is unclear what the reasons were -- but there were many reasons why it was understandable for YC to reject us. Among other things, the
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Akamai's "secure allocator" is broken and doesn't protect against heartbleed
(lekkertech.net)
1 points
by
tdullien
13y ago
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0 comments