sweis

36 ms·

331.
by sweis 17y ago
Obliviously computing over encrypted data has a lot of potential, but there are still many technical barriers to overcome before it's practical on a large scale. If you're talking about Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption, that's not goin
332.
by sweis 17y ago
Quantum crypto is not an "imminent development". It's being used in practice today. Your might mean that Shor's quantum factoring algorithm is not an imminent threat to practical cryptosystems.
333.
by sweis 17y ago
This article is confused about several concepts, namely the role of certificate authorities and the state of quantum cryptography.
334.
by sweis 17y ago
Ben Adida has been blogging about the election and verification in Takoma Park: http://benlog.com/articles/2009/11/09/takoma-park-verifying-...
335.
by sweis 17y ago
Looks like they're working with Google to get it resolved: http://twitter.com/Dropbox/status/5610900563 Update: They warnings are gone.
336.
by sweis 17y ago
Sites are automatically flagged when malware is detected. Dropbox may be serving malware without knowing it. This page has instructions about how to request a malware review: http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answe...
337.
by sweis 17y ago
Check out Ben Adida's posts about the audit process: http://benlog.com
338.
by sweis 17y ago
Plaxo ran a trial using OpenID identifier-select and the OAuth Hybrid extension. They had a 92% on-boarding rate for users, which blew away expectations: http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/comcast_property_sees_9... I'd imagine that FB
339.
by sweis 17y ago
Have you considered using OpenID, Facebook Connect, or both? Then you can support two-click account creation for anyone with a Yahoo, Google, MSN, or Facebook account. Check out Zoho and Plaxo's sign-up process for an example. Also, HN uses
340.
by sweis 17y ago
Yes, they're certainly faster than HMAC. I've found that OCB is faster than CCM or EAX because it's only one pass, but unfortunately is patented. It can be used under the GNU GPL, though. Phil Rogaway considers EAX to have been "supplanted
341.
by sweis 17y ago
And the experts have a hard time of it too: http://rdist.root.org/2009/05/28/timing-attack-in-google-key... http://groups.google.com/group/keyczar-discuss/browse_thread... Back on the topic of this thread: Keyczar authenticates all sym
342.
by sweis 17y ago
The curriculum will vary by university. I remember taking these classes for an undergrad CS degree: - Structure and interpretation of computer programs - Data structures - Machine structures - Digital circuit design - Operating systems - Pr
343.
IRobot Morphing Blob Robot(youtube.com)
2 points by sweis 17y ago|0 comments
344.
by sweis 17y ago
From the abstract: "Researchers at the University of Washington recently proposed Vanish, a system for creating messages that automatically “self-destruct” after a period of time. ... In this paper, we defeat the deployed Vanish implementat
345.
Defeating Vanish with Low-Cost Sybil Attacks Against Large DHTs(cse.umich.edu)
2 points by sweis 17y ago|2 comments
346.
by sweis 17y ago
Some words of advice: Don't make up your own crypto. I didn't look at what your construction is, but there appears to be a flaw in the implementation. Your code does not generate a strong primes for the modulo. So, the order of the cylic gr
347.
by sweis 17y ago
If you're concerned about physical theft of the hard drive, why not encrypt everything that is written to disk?
348.
by sweis 17y ago
If you're familiar with the linear time deterministic selection algorithm, this is straightforward to solve. It's usually taught in intro to algorithms classes. See CLRS chapter 9. Incidentally, the algorithm is from 1973 and four of the au
349.
by sweis 17y ago
What padding mode is this using? Looking at the code, I think it's using raw RSA to encrypt the data directly. That may be vulnerable to several attacks. I may not understand your application correctly, but it's unclear why you're even usin
350.
by sweis 17y ago
The authors are able to conduct "cloud cartography" to map the internal structure of Amazon EC2 and identify where a target VM is likely to reside. Then they're able to get a VM placed on the same instance and experiment with a few known si
351.
Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in 3rd-Party Clouds(people.csail.mit.edu)
3 points by sweis 17y ago|1 comments
352.
by sweis 17y ago
This does raw RSA in ECB mode. It is vulnerable to both chosen-plaintext and replay attacks.
353.
by sweis 17y ago
I was surprised by that too. I usually take that as a sign that either everybody understands or nobody understands. Hopefully the former.
354.
by sweis 17y ago
No condolences necessary. I'm glad that more people are looking at Keyczar and finding these bugs. We learn from our mistakes and in the end have safer code for everyone.
355.
by sweis 17y ago
Yes, if the 'k' values are predictable, then someone can extract the private key. The Python random module uses a Mersenne twister, so observing a sufficient number of signatures would allow someone to extract the key. This is not a flaw in
356.
by sweis 17y ago
Mea culpa. I originally reviewed this code and missed it. Here's the post in the message group about this: http://groups.google.com/group/keyczar-discuss/browse_thread...
357.
by sweis 17y ago
Yes, there are many constructions for computing over private data that use homomorphic encryption. For example, Paillier's cryptosystem, which supports addition of ciphertexts, has been a building block in many voting protocols. You can als
358.
Who Pwns the Internet? A map of TLD dependencies(links.org)
14 points by sweis 17y ago|0 comments
359.
by sweis 17y ago
This is a good post, Colin. One thing people reading it may not realize is the importance of picking good IVs and the necessity of including them in the MAC. Someone might just authenticate the ciphertext and neglect to include the IV, leav
360.
by sweis 17y ago
As the person who made the coding mistake, I think the lesson drawn from this is the benefit of open sourcing Keyczar. I've seen this exact type of timing attack before, but overlooked it in my own code. There's a real advantage to having f

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