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strcat
searching PlanetScale…
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211.
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by
strcat
1y ago
No, all of the standard APEX modules are part of the Android Open Source Project. Only device-specific APEX modules used to distribute driver support aren't part of it.
212.
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strcat
1y ago
Eylenburg's site has comparisons between a bunch of different types of software and services with a significant focus on privacy and security rather than aesthetic customization features, etc. For the Android comparison, GrapheneOS is
213.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Eylenburg's site is focused on privacy and security for the comparisons. GrapheneOS is the only privacy and security hardened OS included in the Android-based OS comparison. None of the other operating systems listed in that comparison
214.
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by
strcat
1y ago
The numbers on that site aren't quite right. For the Pixel 8a, May 14th, 2031 is 2036 days from now which is ~5.58 years rather than 5 years. They're using the 1st of the month instead of the launch day and for some reason the num
215.
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by
strcat
1y ago
/e/ lacks privacy without taking exploits of unpatched security vulnerabilities into account due to having severe unpatched privacy vulnerabilities, lack of modern Android privacy protections and lack of important privacy features
216.
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by
strcat
1y ago
/e/ isn't a safe option for regular people. It doesn't provide the most basic privacy and security patches or protections. Multiple years of important privacy and security patches being missing is terrible for a personal
217.
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by
strcat
1y ago
You're responding to verifiable technical information by linking to harassment content based on fabricated stories. The company you've linked was scamming people who wanted GrapheneOS phones by selling them end-of-life devices no
218.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Verified boot and hardware attestation enable verifying a GrapheneOS install is genuine. It can't prevent all hardware tampering but it provides very strong protection against tampering with any firmware or software.
219.
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strcat
1y ago
It will likely happen after the initial generation with official support. It's hard to do it for the initial generation, but it's possible.
220.
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strcat
1y ago
It's one of the major OEMs. They have a bunch of devices, so we can eventually support more than one and can have new supported models each year. Small OEMs are not currently capable of meeting our security feature and update requireme
221.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Snapdragon flagships have solid security and it's the devices made with those which ruin it. Snapdragon has both advantages and disadvantages compared to Tensor. Pixel 6 through Pixel 9a are essentially Exynos SoC devices using standar
222.
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by
strcat
1y ago
GrapheneOS isn't a product or a business. It's partnership between a non-profit organization (GrapheneOS Foundation) obligated to pursue the defined mission and a for-profit Android OEM making hardware. It's not a for-profit
223.
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strcat
1y ago
GrapheneOS recently added official support for forcing the availability of VoLTE, VoNR, 5G and/or VoWiFi with any carrier providing proper implementations. It was previously possible via ADB but no longer is since the December 2025 sec
224.
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by
strcat
1y ago
The most recent 3 generations of Pixels have 7 years of support rather than the 3 provided by the Pixel 4a. Pixel 4a no longer has driver or firmware updates or official support for current Android releases, so GrapheneOS doesn't offic
225.
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by
strcat
1y ago
The most recent 3 generations of Pixels have 7 years of support from launch. One of the hardware requirements for GrapheneOS is 5-7 years of firmware and driver security patches. We continued allowing 5 years to avoid locking ourselves into
226.
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by
strcat
1y ago
/e/ has extraordinarily poor privacy and security. Extremely delayed privacy and security patches including years of delays for kernel, driver and firmware updates or complete AOSP patches is not compatible with privacy. /e&#
227.
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by
strcat
1y ago
The approach used by /e/ doesn't actually work and enables fingerprinting VPN users. It only stops the least invasive tracking for client side analytics, etc. where there are single purpose domains which can be blocked. Multi
228.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Global Mock Location is a standard Android feature not specific to /e/. GrapheneOS also supports it, and is building a better replacement for it similar to our Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes features providing otherwise missing
229.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Apps mainly avoid it because their most privacy invasive features are tied to their functionality and their own servers. They can share with third party server side and mainly do that. Client side stuff is mainly far less important analytic
230.
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by
strcat
1y ago
No, it doesn't block tracking or privacy invasive behavior by apps and it has much weaker privacy protections from apps than GrapheneOS. /e/ has built-in DNS filtering, which blocks a small minority of third party tracking an
231.
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by
strcat
1y ago
It has very poor privacy and security. See https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand... . It lags extremely far behind on kernel, driver and firmware patches even when they're available. It lags
232.
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by
strcat
1y ago
/e/ has extraordinarily poor privacy and security. It's largely the opposite of GrapheneOS. It's hardly focused on privacy and security. See the information available at https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d&#
233.
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strcat
1y ago
Waydroid is not a private or secure way to run Android apps. It uses an old fork of LineageOS and throws away most of the privacy and security model with how it's implemented. It does that to run Android apps on top of a much less priv
234.
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by
strcat
1y ago
We're working with a major Android OEM on the future generations of their existing devices meeting the official GrapheneOS requirements so we can officially support their devices. People will be able to buy the regular devices and inst
235.
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by
strcat
1y ago
Each of the AOSP apps still present in GrapheneOS going to be replaced or overhauled. They're only there as basic bundled functionality. There's no point in improving some of those apps because there are either better open source
236.
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by
strcat
1y ago
There were no Android or Pixel security patches for either July or October. It's not a break of any promise. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45562792 provides links to the bulletins and a comparison to a device ma
237.
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by
strcat
1y ago
There were no Android or Pixel security patches for either July or October. Android July 2025: https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-07-01 Pixel July 2025: https://source.android.c
238.
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by
strcat
1y ago
The reason GrapheneOS doesn't support these additional devices is because they don't provide proper privacy/security patches or security features. Pixels are currently the only devices with proper alternate OS support with a
239.
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by
strcat
1y ago
That's only because Pixels are the only devices meeting the hardware security and update requirements. GrapheneOS has an OEM partner working on meeting our requirements for some of their future devices. That's how GrapheneOS is ab
240.
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by
strcat
1y ago
GrapheneOS never had a stance against implementing RCS and has supported RCS at an OS level for years. The issue was that the only available RCS app in practice is Google Messages and it requires privileged access for Google Play services,
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