sigil

26 ms·

211.
A low-resource quantum factoring algorithm [pdf](eprint.iacr.org)
45 points by sigil 9y ago|3 comments
212.
by sigil 9y ago
I know tptacek regards this as a security antipattern (he's usually right), but I do it anyway for smaller projects. It's better than committing plaintext secrets to a repo somewhere. Couple things I wonder about: 1. I don't
213.
by sigil 9y ago
Okay, there's some disagreement about terminology here. Does "hidden" refer to a tax or fee rolled into the price? Or does "hidden" mean "only visible later, at checkout?" Guess it depends on whether you&#
214.
by sigil 9y ago
I've never understood this line of reasoning. You don't object to sales tax per se, you just prefer that it be hidden from you? (Ie, included in the sticker price.) But later you object to hidden fees in the context of major purch
215.
by sigil 9y ago
There is such a thing as a Memory Hard Function (MHF). cperciva's scrypt was designed to be one, and was subsequently proven to be maximally memory hard. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/989.pdf Litecoin uses scrypt.
216.
by sigil 10y ago
Thanks for that. The gitosis approach of a single shared unix account (typically `git`) with git-shell and a master authorized_keys file definitely seems simpler. You lose some of the auditing and security benefits of the one-unix-account-p
217.
by sigil 10y ago
You could do that, but that means for a shared repo and N git shell accounts you've got N chroots, presumably using null or bind mounts. That's a lot more work than a restricted shell which just...restricts.
218.
by sigil 10y ago
Sure, but there might be git repos sitting around elsewhere. Why risk exposing a git repo literally anywhere in the filesystem to a restricted shell account?
219.
by sigil 10y ago
I think you nailed it. This isn't about ads; Facebook is an ad business and it's 6x twitter. This is warrens vs plazas. Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are all warrens. Twitter is a plaza. https://www.ribbonfarm.com&#
220.
by sigil 10y ago
This is precisely what I do. But, I'd prefer it if git-shell didn't let users probe and read git repositories at any absolute path on the remote end. That's not great behavior for a restricted shell.
221.
by sigil 10y ago
Security question. Can `git-shell` restrict users to their remote home directory? Or if you give me a git shell, can I still do things like `git clone me@example.com:/home/you/secret-sauce` ? This is only an issue if you&#x27
222.
by sigil 10y ago
This is Electron scapegoating. The real issue is twofold: 1. Electron makes it trivial for developers who don't regularly reason about native performance to release desktop apps. The result: a flood of apps that "don't do muc
223.
by sigil 10y ago
> "That form of "money" has been happening for thousands of years. " > Can you give me some examples? Nick Szabo has a great history of money paper, "Shelling Out: The Origins of Money" with some examples
224.
Cloud Viruses in the Invisible Republic(ribbonfarm.com)
1 points by sigil 10y ago|0 comments
225.
by sigil 10y ago
> It simply pulls from our DNS data repository, then compiles all the zone data via named. With every compile time – which takes about 4 minutes... 4 minutes seems like an awful long time for what I'm assuming is a fairly simple t
226.
by sigil 10y ago
"Why can't we just control prices?" wonders a publication called The Economist in the second graf. This article doesn't meet the Hacker News bar for me. Why read a shallow, dataless, meandering, "could the grass be
227.
Show HN: Timebox, politely timebox unix programs(github.com)
19 points by sigil 10y ago|1 comments
228.
by sigil 10y ago
Shouldn't this work? - In the parent, open a pipe. Fork. - Parent closes the write side. Child closes the read side, clears FD_CLOEXEC on it, and execs. - Parent does a select(2) on the pipe's read side with the desired timeout. I
229.
by sigil 10y ago
Mostly I'm just curious what the shape of the code looks like for a scheme roguelike. What's easy, what's awkward, how easy it is to extend the rules of the world. I've always loved roguelikes, and I enjoy reading scheme
230.
by sigil 10y ago
> But I think I would like to use Racket to make one one day. That would be neat. Are there any roguelike engines for scheme? Or would you build it from scratch?
231.
by sigil 10y ago
When possible, measure security in attacker dollars. What's interesting here is that, just 5 years ago, the 2017 cost of this very attack (the Stevens attack) was estimated at 2^18.4 = $350k [0]. The collision announced today cost abou
232.
by sigil 10y ago
> There is a very real issue in that [USPS's] machines are ripping the labels right off of packages. I recently sent a USPS package that "disappeared," and they offered the same explanation. A month later it magically sh
233.
by sigil 10y ago
NSIS is more than alive for Electron apps -- it's about to become the default windows installer in electron-builder! Squirrel.windows will be deprecated soon.
234.
by sigil 10y ago
Thanks for the explainer. This stood out: > QUIC has implemented its own identifier for unique connections called the Connection UUID. It's possible to go from WiFi to LTE and still keep your Connection UUID, so no need to renegotia
235.
by sigil 10y ago
Nice. I'm loving this series, keep it up!
236.
by sigil 10y ago
Totally! Bernstein chaining is concatenative. So are shell pipelines, if you squint at them just right: function composition mediated by special stacks of records called stdin and stdout. Reminds me, I have a pretty neat tail-recursive shel
237.
by sigil 10y ago
Good to know, thanks!
238.
by sigil 10y ago
My Thinkpad X1 Carbon 2nd gen is still going strong 3 years later, but this 5th gen is pretty tempting. Main questions: - Are these "up to 15.5 hours of battery life" numbers purely theoretical? Even brand new, my 2nd gen only g
239.
by sigil 10y ago
Has the author seen the SC4-HSM I wonder? https://sc4.us/hsm/ Show HN thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12053181
240.
by sigil 10y ago
A long form answer ("Internet Voting: A Requiem for the Dream") appeared in Phrack earlier this year. [1] The author concludes: 1. Internet voting is not compatible with democracy 2. No amount of technology can change this 3.

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