shuckles

73 ms·

961.
by shuckles 5y ago
What’s the difference between hybrid cloud/local scanning “due to a bug” checking all your files and uploading too many safety vouchers and cloud scanning “due to a bug” uploading all your files and checking them there?
962.
by shuckles 5y ago
Cloud Scanning vulnerability: no transparency over data use. On the phone, you can always confirm the contents of what’s added to the safety voucher’s associated data. On the cloud, anything about your photos is fair game. Where does that f
963.
by shuckles 5y ago
No they wouldn’t need a system like this. They already escrow all your iCloud Backups, and doing the scanning server side allows you to avoid any scrutiny through code or network monitoring.
964.
by shuckles 5y ago
Apple shipped iCloud Private Relay which is a “1-line code change that hooks into CFNetwork” away from MITMing all your network connections, by this standard.
965.
by shuckles 5y ago
I think the fact that no technical document has lasted on the front page but various rumors have is a strong point for my view. An article about internal dissent at Apple has hung on for most of the day, yet almost no comments on it engage
966.
by shuckles 5y ago
I think the flagging mechanism is rife for abuse. There are clearly more people interested in low information reactions than substantive discussion. If all you act on is reports, you will be biased towards whatever they care about. That is
967.
by shuckles 5y ago
Sincere question: why doesn’t this policy apply to the innumerable number of hot takes which are variations on the exact same, often misinformed, reaction? I’m thinking of comments like, “Apple will send me to prison for taking bath tub pic
968.
by shuckles 5y ago
It’s pretty lonely over here in technical discussion land. Have we considered Reuters’s intern’s take on this?
969.
by shuckles 5y ago
They have explicitly said they don’t scan iCloud photos in their interview with Tech Crunch.
970.
by shuckles 5y ago
In particular, false positives with perceptual hashes are not because they are similar in semantic content but because they are similar in whatever features the neural network determined stay stable across transformations. Your fall colors
971.
by shuckles 5y ago
People who sincerely believe this is accidentally possible should be constantly freaked out that iCloud Backups is “accidentally” uploading all their photos to a warrant accessible database.
972.
by shuckles 5y ago
They said so in an interview with Tech Crunch. The other articles confused iCloud Mail with iCloud Photo Library.
973.
by shuckles 5y ago
Apple has the software to “steal files off a phone” through iCloud Backup. Whether they do this for governments is a policy matter.
974.
by shuckles 5y ago
Just because Apple didn’t attend Alex’s mini conference for his contacts does not mean they didn’t engage any privacy experts. Furthermore, Alex is a security expert and not a privacy expert. Finally, if that conference was really pushing t
975.
by shuckles 5y ago
Photos intelligence already exists, and if people are really going to cite the legal arguments in Apple vs. FBI, then it’s important to remember the “forced speech” Apple argued it could not be compelled to make was changing a rate limit co
976.
by shuckles 5y ago
The precedent established by Apple, narrowly read, is it’s ok to scan data that the user is choosing to store in your data center. As you pointed out, this is at least partly a legal matter, and I’m sure their lawyers - the same ones who wr
977.
by shuckles 5y ago
I’ve read your comments, and they are a glass of cold water in the hell of this discourse. This announcement should force people to think about how they are governed - to the extent they can influence it - and double down on Free Software a
978.
by shuckles 5y ago
They have said the mechanism is global in both their FAQ and in an interview with Tech Crunch. They have no way to target a database to a region or device.
979.
by shuckles 5y ago
Ok but now you’ve said that the precedent established by Google and others already moved the legislation to require terrible invasions of privacy far along. You started by saying Apple’s technology (and, in particular, its framing of the te
980.
by shuckles 5y ago
This hypothetical lacks an explanation for why every politician has not demanded Apple (or say Google) do this scope creep already for photos stored in the cloud where the technical feasibility and legal precedent has already been establish
981.
by shuckles 5y ago
There’s nothing OS specific here. Google Photos could ship this on any Android distribution, and they have a billion users.
982.
by shuckles 5y ago
The technical risk to user privacy - if your threat model is a coerced Apple building surveillance features for nation state actors - is exactly the same between CSAM detection and Photos intelligence which sync results through iCloud. In f
983.
by shuckles 5y ago
That is a distinction without a difference. I’m sure you could put together quite a good tank man classifier (proof: Google Reverse Image Search works quite well), and it’d catch variations which a perceptual hash wouldn’t. The only differe
984.
by shuckles 5y ago
USPS regularly X-rays mail, and the only protection against abuse is policy (it’s not admissible evidence in the United States).
985.
by shuckles 5y ago
Apple already scans your photos for faces and syncs found faces through iCloud. I’d imagine updating that machine learning model is at least as straightforward as this one.
986.
by shuckles 5y ago
So what you’re saying is if Apple had a 5 year plan to help China disappear minorities, they should’ve just kept improving photos search? Maybe this child safety effort isn’t aimed at satisfying some authoritarian wet dream after all!
987.
by shuckles 5y ago
The proposal is the exact opposite of how you characterize it. > Apple just side-stepped the question on how to reconcile trust in propietary software and surveillance requests from the government. They actually inserted themselves into
988.
by shuckles 5y ago
Presumably the widespread proliferation of (ironically!) iCloud Private Relay and the like will help alleviate this.
989.
by shuckles 5y ago
I have nothing to add except that once a child accepts the risk at each prompt, I believe they get to see the original image and not a blurred version. When I first read their objection, I thought that the system would transmit the image fr
990.
by shuckles 5y ago
Good thing the device only does this as part of voluntarily uploading the photo to a cloud based solution.

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