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rasengan
searching PlanetScale…
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8 ms
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61.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
VP.NET doesn't require any trust at all [1][2]. [1] https://vp.net/l/en-US/blog/Don%27t-Trust-Verify [2] I work for VP.NET and can answer any questions regarding the technology as well!
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Separately, PureVPN is one of the providers you can’t trust [1]. [1] https://www.makeuseof.com/worst-vpns-you-shouldnt-trust/
63.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Another great software contribution to the world by Jason Donenfeld, creator of WireGuard!
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> But I recognize that violence can sometimes become a necessity—which is why I say that people should forgo the use of violence unless all non-violent paths to resolve a conflict have either been exhausted or taken off the table. > L
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Verified Privacy vs. "Trust" Marketing: A Case with NordVPN and Obscura
(vp.net)
2 points
by
rasengan
1y ago
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0 comments
66.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
You can since the enclave attests to what is running! This is also coupled with the crypto and NAT occuring in-enclave with various timing/obfuscations. It's verifiably private.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Oops!
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A Zero Trust VPN
(vp.net)
5 points
by
rasengan
1y ago
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1 comments
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by
rasengan
1y ago
VP.NET is the first VPN provider that you don't have to trust, but instead, can verify directly. See the source, which is verifiable: https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx You can learn more here: https:/&#
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Shameless plug: VP.NET [1] runs in a trusted execution environment (enclave) so you can verify it is doing what it is supposed to do and not anything else! [1] https://vp.net/l/en-US/blog/Don%27t-Trust-Verify
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Why VPN Audits Don't Protect Your Privacy
(vp.net)
3 points
by
rasengan
1y ago
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1 comments
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The London Bridge Effect
(vp.net)
1 points
by
rasengan
1y ago
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2 comments
73.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Thanks for this as it was a bit more thoughtful and an almost accurate depiction. However, there are some discrepancies: 1. The ex staffers were already preparing their takeover event long before my name came in the picture. Domain registra
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by
rasengan
1y ago
If you’re still debating trust in a VPN you’re doing it wrong, but that’s your prerogative. For the rest, code is more important than words from non-deterministic people. As for the freenode issue, look at the facts before parroting false n
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by
rasengan
1y ago
I think you should look into the narrative before parroting falsehoods. Further, I’m not sure what came off as a “revenge” in my response unless facts are being interpreted as such.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
It would probably make sense to look into details before parroting false narratives. Additionally, if you’re still talking about trust it means you don’t understand the technical implications of this.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
Defense in depth dictates that this is more secure than standard VPNs out there (Mullvad, Proton, Nord, Express, etc.). Any real security researcher recognizes this. If you think 'trusting random strangers' is a better security ar
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> guy who destroyed Mt Gox Let me correct that for you - the guy who brought you the first Bitcoin exchange and arguably helped pave the way for cryptocurrencies today. > guy who destroyed Freenode This was already debunked [1]. I tr
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by
rasengan
1y ago
The whole point here is you don’t have to trust us - we don’t want you to. We want you to trust code, period. That said, the freenode issue was debunked and you can see receipts here: http://techrights.org/wp-content/up
80.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> I'm a huge fan of the technical basis for this Trusting random internet people is actually the biggest “troll” of the internet. Any VPN that asks you to trust their guarantees and not the guarantees of code is selling you snake oi
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by
rasengan
1y ago
The first part is definitely true. The second part in terms of correlations is untrue since we include a number of techniques to frustrate timing attacks among other things.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
This has been debunked. Freenode was sold to me by Christel, the previous owner. I did not even offer to purchase it and simply assumed I was doing what I had been doing for a decade for freenode and many other FOSS projects - keeping them
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by
rasengan
1y ago
I didn’t sell PIA. It was a merger to create a publicly owned privacy company and, unfortunately, the terms of the merger did not come to fruition. I left the company on principle by relinquishing my shares at a mere fraction (about 1/
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> Cryptocurrencies? Aka the least private form of transactions, where not only the sender and receiver know, but the whole block chain immutably stores for everyone else to view? There are cryptocurrencies like ZCash, Monero, Zano, Freed
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> how do I know it's actually running inside the enclave, and not an ordinary process sending a hardcoded expected fingerprint? It's signed by Intel and thus, guaranteed to come from the enclave!
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> Honestly, I feel more comfortable using Mullvad. This team has some folks with questionable backgrounds and I wouldn't trust Intel. Relying on "trust" in a security/privacy architecture isn't the right way to d
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by
rasengan
1y ago
> Any network protocol can be spoofed, with varying degrees of difficulty. Because of the cryptographic verifications, the communication cannot be spoofed.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
The attestation guarantees it's the one serving the request, and the encryption/decryption and NAT occurs inside the enclave so it's definitely private.
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Show HN: A Provably Zero Trust VPN
(github.com)
10 points
by
rasengan
1y ago
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2 comments
90.
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by
rasengan
1y ago
It is slightly more than just a UI since all of the applications actually work (you can save and reload for example and still see your previous files too). It seems functional to me! Kudos to the author!
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