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plasticmachine
searching PlanetScale…
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10 ms
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31.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
That's incorrect, Monero does not leak amounts since they created and added RingCT (currently compulsory on testnet, and compulsory on mainnet from a hard fork next year September) - https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/
32.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
No, it is. Those already exist in the form of Monero. Using some new-fangled, likely broken cryptography, is very hipster.
33.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Thanks for confirming that you rushed unproven, untested cryptography into a production system meant to defend user's privacy and their money. Speaking of - why did you rush it out? Because your investors wanted to make profit? Absolut
34.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
It uses completely unproven cryptography that may quite possibly be horribly broken. If you have a better definition of "hipster" than "use something for the sake of it, regardless of practicality" I'd love to hear
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Can you give me that price in buckets of tempura shrimp?
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plasticmachine
10y ago
No, Google removed the beta label some time ago: https://gmail.googleblog.com/2009/07/gmail-leaves-beta-launc... Also if Gmail lost all your email it would be bad, but you'd probably be ok. If ZCash causes yo
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plasticmachine
10y ago
*stark
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plasticmachine
10y ago
If the aim was for it to be experimental, why create a "live" monetary system? Why not keep it testnet-only, untradeable?
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plasticmachine
10y ago
You had a single thing with ZCash that you had to get right, and you couldn't get it working in your initial release? What an utter embarrassment.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Sure, and I agree with you in principle. Doesn't change the fact that what you've highlighted as some indication of Monero's inferiority lives in start contrast with the ZCash amateurs.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
I think it's relevant, as I've heard a LOT of people claim that ZCash is amazing "because of the dream team behind it". The dream team clearly misunderstand cryptocurrencies, see for eg https://github.com/
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Exactly. The coinbase could've been time-locked and only spendable after a block height.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
The amount of perverse incentives it creates is insane. Instead of investors being forced to slowly accumulate ZEC, they are given it almost in bulk, and are in a perfect position to manipulate and short the market.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Sorry but I can't agree with you here. When Monero still allowed mixin 0 transactions almost nobody used the privacy-enhancing transaction type. The same goes for Dash and it's DarkSend, or Shadow's ring-signature side-curren
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plasticmachine
10y ago
What you're talking about has already been covered in research by the Monero Research Lab: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf and https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf Basicall
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Then rushing the launch in the absence of a superior MPC protocol is just a bad idea. Except that they had to rush the launch because they're a for-profit, centralised company, with investors that are demanding return on their investme
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Linking to that GitHub issue is pretty embarrassing for you. Not only can it not be practically exploited, per the author of that issue, but it looks like it's just using Keccak as a stream cipher of sorts (but seeding it from /de
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plasticmachine
10y ago
How will they pump the ZCash scam if they do?
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plasticmachine
10y ago
You're almost there, but not quite. Since Monero outputs go to dual-key stealth addresses, outputs are effectively paid to a random 256-bit "address". So if you use a mixin of 50, in a transaction with 1 input, an external ob
50.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
You can do that with Monero right now (within a cryptographically negligible, but plausibly deniable, risk) and it doesn't require crazy unreliable cryptography, a (badly done) trusted setup, or 8gb+ of RAM and 60 seconds on a Xeon.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Sergio's a great guy, but he does NOT understand the mechanics behind SNARKS "very well". You're overestimating his grasp of the moon-math in SNARKS.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Values can't be known, after the RingCT hard fork. See: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf
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plasticmachine
10y ago
As I recall, it's been mining Monero for over 2 years. Reports of it in malware go back to 2014!
54.
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plasticmachine
10y ago
I wonder if they could be sued for that:-P
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Just chiming in here: Kovri is still a work in progress, and there is still some work to be done before it can be used more broadly or as a replacement for the Java router: https://github.com/monero-project/kovri
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Surely this is better suited to ZMTP than 0MQ?
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Some of the Monero Kovri developers are known, public people, there's no problem with that at all if you choose to be public. There's really no longer as much of a stigma for people who are working on privacy projects:)
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Monero has got an I2P router in C++ as one of their projects: https://github.com/monero-project/kovri If you want some general information on Monero then this is a good talk on Bitcoin privacy and on what Monero is and
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Unsurprisingly, there exists research by the Monero Research Lab highlighting temporal association attacks and other possibilities. https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf https://lab.getmonero.org/
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plasticmachine
10y ago
Fair enough, I retract my name-calling.
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