phlip9

12 ms·

31.
by phlip9 5y ago
> RustBelt is a formal model of Rust’s type system, together with a soundness proof establishing memory and thread safety. [1] [1] https://people.mpi-sws.org/~jung/thesis.html
32.
by phlip9 7y ago
Or spun differently, _I_ can run private, trusted code on an adversarial, remote EC2 instance without compromising my privacy and preventing the adversary (Amazon) from tampering with my secure execution . At least in theory. IIRC, a
33.
by phlip9 7y ago
I wouldn't say it is quite the same threat model, but certainly a powerful attack vector if you happen to control 1/3+ of the voting power. In the unlikely event that someone does compromise 1/3+ of the voting power, the rema
34.
by phlip9 7y ago
+ FWIW, 51% of the mining power only allows you to double-spend, not arbitrarily modify the existing ledger. + Since Libra uses a HotStuff variant, you need to control 2/3+ of the voting power to violate safety, i.e., double-spend. In
35.
by phlip9 7y ago
I strongly agree with him on transaction privacy, though not for the reasons he lists. Some issues, however: 1. His argument against BFT is "legal systems are efficient" (lmao). Also, the whole point of HotStuff (vs. PBFT etc...)
36.
by phlip9 7y ago
Did we watch the same hearing? David Marcus was pretty explicit about wallets and exchanges (i.e. on/off-ramps) being regulated but never mentioned (rather successfully dodged questions about) the Association facilitating on-chain AML
37.
by phlip9 7y ago
https://github.com/perfectmak/libra-core It seems the Congressman mistook an unofficial 3rd-party js repo whose author is Nigerian as an official Libra project...
38.
Fed vs. Narrow Banks(johnhcochrane.blogspot.com)
2 points by phlip9 8y ago|0 comments
39.
by phlip9 8y ago
> nQUIC is maybe an interesting approach for some specialist applications but more likely a dead end. Adding on to this, nQUIC (and Noise specifically) is significantly better for use-cases where CAs and traditional PKI don't make s
40.
by phlip9 8y ago
I'm skeptical of this claim. From the Cardano paper [1] p. 47, > Even if the attacker could find a strategy to generate an alternative chain with valid leader selection data, presenting this chain and its blocks generated at slots t
41.
by phlip9 8y ago
> This setup assumes there’s already consensus on a certain set of validators, but the challenge is arriving at this consensus in the first place. The validator set changes as people bond or unbond coins in exchange for stake. Running a
42.
by phlip9 8y ago
First, some Proof-of-Stake setup: 1. Assume we have some set of "validators" who control the global consensus process. They come to consensus on the current global state of the system. These validators are vaguely analogous to min
43.
by phlip9 8y ago
Selfish/stubborn mining isn't applicable here, since the double spender has to fork and withhold all blocks from the point where their honest transaction is included in a block until the victim sends them the goods/exchange w
44.
by phlip9 8y ago
A similar article on how to optimize SGEMM on GPUs using OpenCL - https://cnugteren.github.io/tutorial/pages/page1.html
45.
by phlip9 9y ago
In a proof-of-work chain, the fundamental trust assumption is that no malicious mining collusion holds more than 50% of the hash power. If you can make this assumption, your security holds as long as you manage to obtain the most recent blo
46.
by phlip9 11y ago
In theory, cryptocurrencies like Zcash [1] should solve the issues with transaction privacy. However, enforcing taxation when using a totally private and anonymous currency disconnected from government control would be nontrivial if not imp