pfg

31 ms·

241.
by pfg 9y ago
You're right about exit polls not being particularly effective here, unless you're being very obvious with the rigging. Luckily, the published results can also be cross-checked by the volunteers - often, but not exclusively repres
242.
by pfg 9y ago
As I understand it, this is for domains provided by their users. The rate limits would not be problematic unless the domain uses Let's Encrypt for a lot of other subdomains. I'm guessing they're using a wildcard certificate f
243.
by pfg 9y ago
Are you suggesting this change merely for users navigating to IP addresses in reserved IP space, or for everything? If it's the latter, all that stands between an active MitM and my paypal.com credentials is a non-blocking "Not Se
244.
by pfg 9y ago
Most notably, this fixes a RCE that can be exploited by any MitM capable of poisoning a DNS response[1]. [1]: https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems/commit/8d91516fb7037ecf...
245.
by pfg 9y ago
HPKP is based on the public key, not the certificate. You can continue to use a certificate with the same public key across renewals. You could even switch to a different CA if you pin to the key of your server (end-entity) certificate. Tha
246.
by pfg 9y ago
It's worth noting that Let's Encrypt makes no guarantees regarding the ability to sign under either key[1]. Both keys could be rotated without prior notice (though that would admittedly be unlikely unless there's an emergen
247.
by pfg 9y ago
First, it's worth pointing out that certificate lifetime is tangential to HPKP. HPKP is public key-based, and nothing prevents you from using the same public key for years. > This completely arbitrary 90 day limit makes little sense
248.
by pfg 9y ago
I had to double-check the RFC on this. The OP suggested pinning to "current CA + current pubkey", which would technically count as two pins and satisfy a simple "you'll need at least two pins" requirement. Luckily,
249.
by pfg 9y ago
Defaulting to key rotation for each renewal is a sane choice for most ACME clients. There is no enforcement of this on the CA side of things, so HPKP deployment is possible regardless. The vast majority of sites should probably not use HPKP
250.
by pfg 9y ago
The interesting bit about RansomPKP is that it works independent of whether your HPKP pinning strategy is sound. In fact, it works even if you don't use HPKP at all. All the attacker needs is the ability to modify your HTTP headers and
251.
by pfg 9y ago
You should add one additional (CA|end-entity) pin regardless. If your key is compromised, there's a non-zero chance that you'll realize that your CA has stopped issuing certificates under the CA key you pinned at the same time. Mo
252.
by pfg 9y ago
HPKP is based on the public key, so you don't necessarily need to obtain signed certificates in advance - generating a key pair and keeping the private key safe would suffice. There is some value in ensuring that a CA is willing to sig
253.
by pfg 9y ago
One price increase for a beta product hardly makes for a habit of increasing prices. If anything, prices in cloud computing have continuously been getting lower across the entire industry, and with margins being fairly large and the market
254.
by pfg 9y ago
They announced the new prices[1]. There doesn't seem to be a price increase for most scenarios, and the price is slightly lower for some. There appears to be a $ 0.01 increase if you currently push more than 1 TB, but less than 10 TB o
255.
by pfg 9y ago
Most ISPs filter spoofed IP addresses nowadays[1]. Even if your ISP doesn't prevent it, NAT might. You wouldn't get a whole lot of responses this way, and there'd be a strong bias because of regional differences w.r.t. filter
256.
by pfg 9y ago
The browser passes the origin (protocol + hostname + port) to the key. This field is included in the data the key signs. The signature would not match for an authentication response obtained via phishing because of that. Your original descr
257.
by pfg 9y ago
These numbers aren't comparable. You're equating membership of an actual Nazi group with being a member of a far-right party with historical ties to Nazis. A much more apt comparison to these parties would be to look at members of
258.
by pfg 9y ago
In addition to this, comparing Austria and Germany, which both are multi-party systems, to a two-party system like the United States is problematic in this context. A significant chunk of the GOP and their voters likely support the same pol
259.
by pfg 9y ago
It's mentioned in the last sentence of the article: > We are working on an additional smaller YubiKey form factor with a USB-C design akin to the YubiKey 4 Nano, but do not yet have a time frame for availability.
260.
by pfg 9y ago
The website (AWS) doesn't use U2F in that scenario, so you don't get the phishing-resistance U2F brings to the table. It's just regular TOTP, with the secret stored on your Yubikey instead of your phone (or wherever else you&
261.
by pfg 9y ago
Yubico is working on a nano-like design for USB-C[1]. [1]: https://www.yubico.com/2017/01/yubikey-usb-c-ces2017/
262.
by pfg 9y ago
Ah, yes. The key would not be compromised and U2F is safe against replay attacks.
263.
by pfg 9y ago
I think you're making this too complicated, unless I'm missing something. If your system is compromised, the attacker can steal your session key (from your cookies or whatever else the site uses). That's just about as good as
264.
by pfg 9y ago
You're not wrong, but for most sites, there is very little difference between extracting the U2F key and a session key, from the victim's point of view. Exceptions to that rule include sites that do things like what GitHub calls &
265.
by pfg 9y ago
TOTP keeps authentication secure in the face of password reuse/compromise. If you add a password manager to the mix, it keeps you safe in the event that only your password manager is compromised, unless you're storing your TOTP
266.
by pfg 9y ago
> What happens if the attacker spoofs DNS? They would also have to get a publicly-trusted TLS certificate for that domain. U2F is HTTPS-only, at least on Chrome. If the attacker can do that, you have bigger problems. > Also, the schem
267.
by pfg 9y ago
A number of European countries have laws that make denial of the holocaust (or sometimes more generally all known acts of genocide) and usage of Nazi symbols (swastika, etc.) illegal, with exceptions for things like art and research. Many a
268.
by pfg 9y ago
What are your thoughts on a CA issuing a wildcard certificate for: *.com.removed-limits.com Blocking the string "paypal" would prevent issuance for phishing sites for maybe a day. After that, they'd have all migrated t
269.
by pfg 9y ago
I imagine it differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If the law merely states something along the lines of the takedown notice having to contain the copyrighted work, the name of the copyright holder and some kind of assurance that the c
270.
by pfg 9y ago
It's quite possible that Russian companies will not care about DMCA, but that's not to say Russia doesn't have their own copyright law, which includes a notice and takedown protocol. It's just a question of how much effo

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