pfg

58 ms·

511.
by pfg 10y ago
> We're talking about CA's issuing certs - DNS queries for email, http are outside of CA cert issuance. Still doesn't make any sense to me. Whether a CA performs a DNS query in order to do domain validation via email, http
512.
by pfg 10y ago
> Not all - only a subset of certs issued I'm not sure I follow. My point is that if you're arguing that a DNS query is some kind of added complexity, then I have bad news for you, because DNS queries are already a part of all
513.
by pfg 10y ago
> So do you agree that a powerful enough owner of the device should be considered able to setup a server which poses as the regular server the app talks to, and sniff any request the app sends to its server? I think any attempt to preven
514.
by pfg 10y ago
1) I don't see how it can possibly be worse than the status quo. CAs already rely on DNS for domain validation. This is just another DNS query, with the reply being a whitelist of permitted CAs, not a replacement for domain validation.
515.
by pfg 10y ago
1) No, it is not necessary to have full control over your domain's DNS to obtain a certificate. There are various domain validation mechanisms. Having full control over the HTTP server (as mentioned in the article) would be sufficient,
516.
by pfg 10y ago
No, HPKP is not intended as a mechanism to prevent that. In fact, all user agents I'm aware of do not check pins if the certificate chain leads to a custom CA certificate (one that has been installed manually, as opposed to the default
517.
by pfg 10y ago
The attack described in the article (web server compromise) would not necessarily give you access to the DNS of your domain (that's putting a lot of eggs in one basket). It's certainly an effective defense-in-depth mechanism.
518.
by pfg 10y ago
CAA is just a DNS record that can be changed at any time, so there's no vendor lock-in. CAs that implement CAA request that record and check whether they're permitted to issue the certificate; if they're not, they should refu
519.
by pfg 10y ago
Right, I don't think you got my point. You don't always need the best option. CAs are far from perfect, but the threat model for a blog or a cat-sharing site is unlikely to include adversaries who are capable of compromising a CA
520.
by pfg 10y ago
That's an odd argument to make. You're essentially saying if you can't afford the most secure safe for your jewelry, just put it in a basket in front of your door instead of getting a cheaper safe that keeps most thieves ou
521.
by pfg 10y ago
There's nothing stopping you from pinning exclusively to keys under your control. A pin counts as satisfied if the hash matches at least one of the keys in the certificate chain, including the end-entity certificate itself. In other wo
522.
by pfg 10y ago
Precisely - and just like that one line of code is enough to spawn a HTTP server, a different line of code could be enough to spawn a HTTPS server. It's a matter of improving the tooling. No one is advocating to disable HTTP today , w
523.
by pfg 10y ago
Certificate Transparency (especially if mandatory) guarantees detection after the fact (if we assume the domain owner is properly monitoring known logs). It also adds a certain chilling effect that will probably cause attackers to look for
524.
by pfg 10y ago
I don't think blocking rapid re-keying on the CA side is going to do much good to prevent this kind of thing. It would help with the pattern described in RansomPKP, but that's not the only option available to attackers. The web se
525.
by pfg 10y ago
The article makes some good points, but I don't believe the risk of malicious pins has any effect on adoption. It doesn't really matter whether your site currently uses HPKP or not - the attack works either way, as long as the use
526.
by pfg 10y ago
If you're referring to SAN certificates, Let's Encrypt supports them (with up to 100 names per certificate).
527.
by pfg 10y ago
> I'd see a MitM in the cert chain if I manually inspect it, wouldn't I? (It'd be signed by the corporate MitM CA cert, right?) Yep, it should show up in the cert chain. > Interesting that it shows up in your screenshot
528.
by pfg 10y ago
bcrypt, for example, is limited to 50-70 character inputs, depending on the implementation.
529.
by pfg 10y ago
I believe what the article was referring to with regards to synchronization is that it works fine with existing file sync software like Dropbox or Google Drive, and knows how to merge changes. I believe there are plugins for things like SFT
530.
by pfg 10y ago
> Further, HPKP scares me. It requires you to keep a secondary key, but if something happens like a fire, you could lose both keys. You're free to outsource the risk of losing key access by pinning to a small number of CAs you trust
531.
by pfg 10y ago
To put it bluntly: The inconvenience caused to you (and other users who might be able to make an informed decision when facing a certificate warning) is less important than the risk that a non-technical user accepts a certificate mistakenly
532.
by pfg 10y ago
I don't think anyone has indicated that there are any plans to enforce key pinning (which is completely separate from Certificate Transparency). Certificate Transparency is required for some CAs (with known mis-issuance events) in Chro
533.
by pfg 10y ago
Right, but doing this for HTTPS URLs would change the semantics of those URLs. People expect HTTPS to mean you either have a trusted CA certificate or you see a big, red warning. Changing these semantics would be terrible for security. You
534.
by pfg 10y ago
> Any of 2,000+ root and intermediary CAs can sign a certificate for any domain name. "That won't happen", except it did: we know of at least DigiNotar and MCS Holdings. > Any hostile government can compel a CA to issue
535.
by pfg 10y ago
That's a fight you'll have to take up with various root programs and the CA/B Forum. There are provisions that allow root program operators such as Microsoft to force Let's Encrypt to revoke certificate, though as far as
536.
by pfg 10y ago
A self-signed certificate for a site that I expect to be delivered via HTTPS (either because I typed " https://" , or clicked a link that starts with " https://" , or because I opened a bookmark that
537.
by pfg 10y ago
I suspect it's both a policy question and the fact that there's not really much of a consensus on wildcard validation in ACME (i.e. how to approach it, and whether it should be a topic for ACME or just a policy decision for the CA
538.
by pfg 10y ago
Here's a screenshot of the EV UI prior to this change: https://ftt-uploads.s3.amazonaws.com/browser-ssl-ui-comparis... It's possible that some sort of corporate MitM proxy is replacing the certificate in your case
539.
by pfg 10y ago
The threat model you described did not take HPKP into account at all, and the existence of HPKP has a large effect on the question of whether DANE is worth the hassle (and the problems it comes with).
540.
by pfg 10y ago
If a site deploys certificate pinning via HPKP, you don't need to trust anyone other than whoever the site deems trustworthy. So why bother with a new system that might be an improvement for a small subset of the trust problem (and com

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