mti

11 ms·

31.
by mti 12y ago
This kind of invalid curve attack exists against all elliptic curves, so it's a bit difficult to argue that they're a reason to prefer one curve type over another. The situation is a bit different in the presence of point compress
32.
by mti 12y ago
It's not clear that (2) is true. Support for the idea that "the husband should work outside and the wife should care for the household" remains surprisingly strong in Japan (people are roughly evenly split between for and aga
33.
by mti 12y ago
When the base field is pseudo-Mersenne, taking mods is actually fine, since the statistical distance to uniform of the resulting distribution is O(2^{-λ}) at the λ-bit security level. In other words, an attack that exploits the bias is at l
34.
by mti 12y ago
Deterministic nonces are a good idea, but they don't necessarily prevent biases. Generally speaking, for (EC)DSA/Schnorr in a group of cardinality n, using a nonce of the form k=F_x(m) (where m is the message and x the public key)
35.
Search term spirited away from Google search results(tsurupeta.info)
2 points by mti 12y ago|0 comments
36.
by mti 12y ago
Even assuming D-Wave actually achieves quantum annealing (a highly uncertain proposition at this point), the implications for cryptography are inexistent. Quantum algorithms relevant to cryptography (mostly Shor's and Grover's) re
37.
by mti 12y ago
Someone interested in a serious, rather than derisive, attempt at selecting good curves with cofactor 1 may want to look at the recent paper by Bos, Costello, Longa and Naehrig[0]. [0]: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/130
38.
by mti 12y ago
To clarify some of these points further: - As mentioned elsewhere in the discussion, the algorithm does have an impact on some elliptic curve-based cryptosystems, but it is an indirect one. The attack is against the discrete logarithm probl
39.
by mti 12y ago
Most of the midrange and high-end models at the time did support over 64 MB of RAM (the Centris 650/Quadra 800 supported 136 MB, the Quadra 950 supported 256 MB, etc.). In fact, even the 1987 Macintosh II could be pushed to 68 MB (or 1
40.
by mti 12y ago
tptacek makes a number of good points but I find it hard to agree with this one: > there is concern that the NIST curves are backdoored and should be disfavored and replaced with Curve25519 and curves of similar construction. Of course,
41.
Cracks In The Tech Bubble (That Doesn't Exist)(testosteronepit.com)
2 points by mti 13y ago|0 comments
42.
The Day The Bubble Became Official, And Everyone Was Happy(testosteronepit.com)
1 points by mti 13y ago|0 comments
43.
Government -- investor, risk-taker, innovator(ted.com)
1 points by mti 13y ago|0 comments
44.
by mti 13y ago
Says the Guardian[0]: "Tany Lokshina has confirmed that the US embassy called her before the meeting to ask her to pass on to Snowden the message that he was not a whistleblower." So forget about Wikileaks. It's either Human
45.
Assange, RSF: Why European nations must protect Edward Snowden(en.rsf.org)
3 points by mti 13y ago|0 comments
46.
by mti 13y ago
As far as France is concerned, this seems to be an incorrect statement by unnamed Foreign Affairs Ministry officials. Le Monde reports[0] that government spokeswoman Najat Vallaud-Belkacem says that France "eventually allowed the plane
47.
James Clapper made 'least untruthful' answer possible on data collection(nymag.com)
12 points by mti 13y ago|0 comments
48.
by mti 13y ago
The signing key for Gmail's certificate is a 1024-bit RSA key. That key size is simply not safe against an attacker like the NSA today, so we may as well assume they have the private key even if Google didn't voluntarily give it t
49.
by mti 13y ago
>How are they getting the DH keys without cooperation from at least one of the SSL endpoints involved? One possibility is to actually compute discrete logarithms. Does anyone know what elliptic curve parameters Gmail uses for key exchang
50.
All stars have planets(io9.com)
1 points by mti 14y ago|0 comments