moxie

20 ms·

151.
by moxie 13y ago
We agree that localization is super important. TextSecure is localized into 30 languages already. We use Transifex to crowdsource it: https://www.transifex.com/projects/p/textsecure-official/
152.
by moxie 13y ago
We are also interested in a TextSecure implementation for the desktop! Right now the protocol includes multi-device support, so the foundation is there for developing desktop and tablet apps that work seamlessly in conjunction with your pho
153.
by moxie 13y ago
This OTRv3 document has been available since at least 2012(?), so I'm not sure why there's a sudden interest in discussing it, but here was our analysis of OTRv3 at Open Whisper Systems: 1) The introduction of SIGMA in the switch
154.
by moxie 13y ago
I help develop TextSecure, an Android app which allows users encrypt their text messages: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcri... It's fully open source: https://github.com&
155.
by moxie 13y ago
Our feeling is that 40MB for an initial download is not acceptable on mobile devices, particularly in many of the areas we'd like to support. Maybe we're wrong, but it seems like too much on edge networks, particularly given that
156.
by moxie 13y ago
This post is about building untrusted servers, which is somewhat orthogonal to "the snapchat problem." The best a privacy preserving protocol can hope to achieve is to match the characteristics of its non-privacy preserving equiva
157.
by moxie 13y ago
That's absolutely true, but I think the reason this seems so devastating for Telegram is not necessarily because there was a vulnerability, but because they were so dismissive of the feedback they got and so willing to immediately make
158.
by moxie 13y ago
Does this mean that you were unable to recover Alice's message?
159.
by moxie 13y ago
Yikes, that actually looks like potentially deceptive marketing to me. > "Yes, Threema provides forward secrecy on the network connection. Client and server negotiate temporary random keys, which are only stored in RAM and replaced
160.
by moxie 13y ago
Their protocol doesn't provide any forward secrecy. It uses the PGP protocol model, which is increasingly being seen as an architectural dead end (particularly given the recently revealed ciphertext recording capabilities of NSA): htt
161.
by moxie 13y ago
I don't actually think that's true. At least, not within the time limits they defined. The $75k 896bit RSA factoring prize went unclaimed for 20 years, for instance.
162.
by moxie 13y ago
Trevor Perrin worked at Cryptography Research (I mean, the domain name is cryptography.com!) for six years, which alone should probably be enough to call yourself a cryptographer. His other work outside of CRI is also really quite prolific
163.
by moxie 13y ago
> 2. A passing look at the docs would reveal that we do not use IGE that way, and instead use SHA1 for integrity check (see 'message key' here: https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/description ). The problems
164.
by moxie 13y ago
> 2. And what problems with IGE are you aware of? Any known attack? As far as we know, it is the ubiquitous CBC that has had issues. And by the way, Kerberos had to abandon PCBC - not IGE. IGE was the first attempt at an "authenti
165.
by moxie 13y ago
Our hypothesis with this project is that any commit, even a "fluff commit," is better than no commit, and that the overhead of trying to build a more complex accounting model is higher than the cost of paying out 2% for "fluf
166.
by moxie 13y ago
The reason that cryptographers laugh at people who advertise "military grade cryptography" or "we use AES256" is because the choice of crypto primitives is often less important than how they're composed. Those phra
167.
by moxie 13y ago
There was a period of time where Android made a sudden unannounced change to an app's ability to access APN settings on the device, which prevented MMS from working. We now prompt users to configure their MMSC for their carrier if APN
168.
by moxie 13y ago
FYI, from another Verizon user: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/467 Looks like we need to add some new MCC/MNC values to the defaults for that MMSC. Group messages use MMS, so hopefu
169.
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova of Pussy Riot's prison letters to Slavoj Žižek(theguardian.com)
5 points by moxie 13y ago|1 comments
170.
by moxie 13y ago
CT requires all CAs to willingly participate. They are, obviously, less than willing: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/certificate-transparen... (Symantec is VeriSign) The efficacy of CT will largely hinge o
171.
by moxie 13y ago
The somewhat difficult thing about a lot of this stuff is that its future is really in the hands of the browser vendors, not the IETF, W3C, or anyone else. What they choose to do or not do is all that matters, so there's not much more
172.
by moxie 13y ago
This compromise was detected by Google because they have hard-coded "certificate pins" in Chrome which specify which CAs the browser should expect to see when connecting to Google. This type of "pinning" is the only tech
173.
by moxie 13y ago
Everything you've done until this moment has defined beginnings and endings. Even when you can barely stand to sit in class another day, you can always tell yourself that it'll all be over in a year or two years or whatever. Once
174.
by moxie 13y ago
There's a huge difference between running your own mail server and running a mail client. Most people are not well positioned to run their own mail server. Mailpile is an MUA, not an MTA.
175.
by moxie 13y ago
I don't think we've quite worked out the language here yet. I use "webmail" to refer to a remote hosted web interface. GMail, Yahoo Mail, Hotmail, riseup.net, etc. This is the dominant way that people access email, and
176.
by moxie 13y ago
Lavabit was vulnerable to three attackers: 1) The server operator could choose to obtain access to plaintext. 2) An attacker who compromised the server could get access to plaintext. 3) Anyone capable of intercepting the SSL communication c
177.
by moxie 13y ago
I think it's important that we separate our support for Ladar's legal problems from our support from his technical decisions. I think we should support Ladar as a person for bravely deciding not to comply with the government'
178.
by moxie 13y ago
> Opal requires as little trust as possible, but you are correct that some server-trust is required at the moment. Unless there is some other mechanism at play here, it requires full server trust. > I hope that apps like Opal will enc
179.
by moxie 13y ago
If this were a blog post with a proposal for changes to implement a workable JS crypto mechanism, that'd be great, but it's a actually blog post about how some people are going to implement a "secure" service using a mec
180.
by moxie 13y ago
Client side cryptography is almost always about providing a solution that doesn't require server trust. This article mentions end-to-end encrypted messaging, for instance, which provides the nice property that not even the messaging s

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