moe

119 ms·

901.
by moe 14y ago
I think your approach is problematic because it hinges on the integrity of rubygems.org (the very host that is compromised right now). I do see your concern about having a large number of gems, but I believe that is a bootstrapping problem
902.
by moe 14y ago
The trouble is self-signed X.509 certificates are pretty worthless. I disagree. If you obtain the public key from a second location that is not rubygems.org (e.g. from gem.homepage) then that raises the bar for a potential attacker. He no
903.
by moe 14y ago
And gem/bundler warn if the signature is not present or invalid? The problem seems to be that work on the trust infrastructure has been dormant since 2011. The basic signing functionality is in place[1], but it's not enforced and conseque
904.
by moe 14y ago
Many people work on these things (renewable energy, electric cars, education, you name it) and many more donate to such causes when they can't or don't want to get involved directly. We also vote for political parties that we hope may impro
905.
by moe 14y ago
Do you really not see the difference between Linus Torvalds recalibrating a kernel contributor and three nobodies of questionable "conference-fame" picking on a random stranger?
906.
by moe 14y ago
I'd like to hear what you have in mind. Personally I've always been fond of asciidoc[1]. It even has a LaTeX-backend but I imagine the impedance mismatch must be problematic (I have not tried it). However, realistically the problem will p
907.
by moe 14y ago
and you never have to think about presentation at all Sadly your colorful description is not entirely accurate. With LaTeX you're in hell immediately when you need to divert just the tiniest bit from what your \package of choice provides.
908.
by moe 14y ago
SuSE?! That is just cruel. The realistic choice for servers today is either Debian or CentOS. This is what you'll find in pretty much any large deployment and for good reasons. Ubuntu may be a distant third candidate due to its recent popul
909.
by moe 14y ago
Well, of course it still looks similar (albeit not identical). Why should they change perfectly fine visual elements unless they can improve on them? I see nothing questionable in copying a good layout anyway, as long as you don't try to
910.
by moe 14y ago
They have actually changed the UI from earlier versions, probably to make it look less like github, and it does look very different[1] to github now. I like the new look (I think it's more usable than github). In particular I find the "Co
911.
by moe 14y ago
PG accepted them into YC, funds them and defends them in public. If that's not an "active proponent" then I wonder how you define that term?
912.
by moe 14y ago
people overuse shared keys This is not a drawback of key-based authentication versus passwords because you have the exact same problem with passwords. If you want to explain proper key-management then explain it. But don't make it sound a
913.
by moe 14y ago
attacker is going to have absolutely no issue finding your 'new' SSH port. As I wrote in my initial comment: It's not about targeted attacks, it's about evading netblock scans. Use shared keys like you would salt, sparingly and with lots
914.
by moe 14y ago
the value of changing SSH ports versus using only public key authentication is somewhat debatable. No, there never was a debate. The two changes address different concerns and you should always do both. You turn off password authenticatio
915.
by moe 14y ago
Lots of questionable advice here (/dev/shm, fail2ban, PermitRootLogin no, "sysctl hardening") with little explanation and glaring omissions (SSH-port left unchanged, no check for listening services, no pointer to an iptables-wrapper). None
916.
by moe 14y ago
Otherwise a webpage has to escape its own sandbox, bypass the native client's sandbox (in a different process) composed of the inner and outer sandbox and then access the native client. Or there could be just some really dumb bug that som
917.
by moe 14y ago
I'm a bit baffled to what degree some people here try to deny the obvious. Yes, you can use ssh-agent with chrome (if they have that implemented, I don't know). Yet you are still in trouble when the chrome sandbox gets compromised, because
918.
by moe 14y ago
but I'm saying that compromising the sandbox can be looked as well as an additional step to achieve You're making no sense. The previous attack vectors don't go away when you put your keys into Chrome. Chrome becomes an additional option
919.
by moe 14y ago
No. When you load your SSH-Keys into Chrome and the Chrome sandbox is compromised then there is no further layer between the attacker and your keys. This is a new attack vector in addition to those that may exist in SSH itself and your op
920.
by moe 14y ago
When running OpenSSH on top of Linux you will be affected by any security bug in Linux or OpenSSH. When running OpenSSH inside Chrome on top of Linux you will be affected by any security bug in Linux, OpenSSH or Chrome. It's not that hard t
921.
by moe 14y ago
Not everybody works for a startup, and not everybody works in San Francisco. Which I didn't suggest, I think? Do you think any bank, healthcare provider, or BigCo business lets the programmers come in whenever they want and leave wheneve
922.
by moe 14y ago
If I deliver, however, I can't just get up and walk out in the middle of the day. Then you're working outside the IT-sector or in an old fashioned company. In modern IT-companies (most startups that I know, including some with >150 pe
923.
by moe 14y ago
Now that's an interesting reference! I actually remember this incident (albeit blurredly, hell, was that really 10 years ago...). I dug up a few snippets[1] and I think the main sources of the animosities back then were certain regressi
924.
by moe 14y ago
I don't want to drag this out further (all said and voted I think), so I'll only briefly refer to my idea of an "obscured" patch. Not pretty by any metric and definitely not a template for future incidents. But I still think it could have
925.
by moe 14y ago
Well, the votes are strongly in your favor, but I remain unconvinced - accepting that I'm in the minority here. For me this very article (bitcoin exchange being hacked) demonstrates that despite the harsh wording, the advisory didn't reach
926.
by moe 14y ago
I'll try to put this more politely: Since you apparently neither understand what was discussed (an optional rather than an "Orwellian" kill-switch), nor the implementation options (a signed message via any broadcast mechanism), nor why us
927.
by moe 14y ago
Well, not quite (when the messages are signed and the key is not stored on rails.org). However, as was pointed out, said attacker could indeed collect the ip-addresses of the polling servers - hence the idea to use twitter for the broadcast
928.
by moe 14y ago
You're still making no sense. Various large projects, including the kernel, have seen silent security patches (yes, even by Linus himself). Also there is no "downplaying" in declaring any kind of problem as a remote SQL injection vulnerabil
929.
by moe 14y ago
That "concern" is absurd. You're making no sense.
930.
by moe 14y ago
No. I was advocating to release a patch that fixes the issue in an obfuscated, non-obvious way. And labeling it as a boring-yet-important follow-up to the previous SQL-injection vulnerability, rather than yelling "LOOK, REMOTE CODE INJECTIO

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